Misha Zelinsky

Peter Jennings

Peter Jennings is the executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. As a leading global expert on defence and security policy, Peter has held senior roles in the Department of Defence and was a key advisor to Prime Minister John Howard.

Peter joined Misha Zelinsky to talk about the US-China rivalry, how Australia should manage its changing relationship with the Chinese government, the importance of cyber-security in future 5G networks, how democracies should respond to threats posed by hostile state actors, and the rise of right-wing terrorism at home and abroad.

 

EPISODE TRANSCRIPT

Misha Zelinsky                    Peter Jennings welcome to Diplomates.

Peter Jennings:                  Thank you very much.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Now, it’s always difficult to know where to start, and it seems foreign affairs is a big space, but naturally when you talk about Australia’s foreign affairs policy, you think about big powers and the influence upon on them on Australia. United States and China is obviously on the tip of everyone’s tongue. You recently wrote an article saying that 2019 was a turning point in the world’s relationship with China. Can you just tell us about that a bit?

Peter Jennings:                  Well, we’ve seen this coming for some few years. And I think historians will look back and say 2012 was a very significant year because that was when Xi Jinping came to power. And really the importance of that was I think she decided for his own leadership and for the country that the time of sort of hiding China’s power was was passed, and he was going to take China out more assertively onto the world stage. And we’ve been watching that ever since, including in areas like, for example, China’s military annexation of the South China Sea, which really happened between 2014 and 2016.

Peter Jennings:                  So I think 2019 becomes important because we’re now seeing a lot of countries in the developed democracies start to push back against China, seeking to gain too much influence in their societies. And one of those really big decisions has been around whether or not countries will allow Chinese telecommunications companies like Huawei into the 5G network. Now, it all sounds a bit complicated measure, I guess. But 5G is going to become the most critical backbone of national infrastructure in every country. Everything is going to run over it from driverless vehicles, to new medical technology, to electricity, to gas. It’s going to be absolutely vital.

Misha Zelinsky:                  The so-called Internet of Things, right?

Peter Jennings:                  Yeah, that’s right. And quite a few countries, Australia included, have decided that it’s just not safe. It’s not secure to allow Chinese companies, Chinese telcos to actually run that critical infrastructure. And so I think Australia was quite literally the first country to formally decided that it was not going to allow Chinese companies into 5G. And then Japan and New Zealand, interestingly enough, and the United States followed suit. You’ve now got the Americans, and the Canadians, and the Brits, and a few others considering what they will do. I think that we’ll look back on 2019 as the year where a much more observable divide started to become clear in the world, which was China on the one hand, and the developed democracies on the other. And this is very significant.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Just going back to the question of Huawei, because this has caused a lot of angst for the Chinese government, why is it that our security agencies in particular and others within the Five Eyes network in particular taking such an issue with it, a Chinese telco. I mean, something, so, well, it’s just a company. They make good stuff. They do it cheaper than some of their competitors. Why is it a concern for them to be developing the 5G network?

Peter Jennings:                  Well, because capitalism in China is different. There is no such thing as a Chinese company, particularly a large Chinese company doing business overseas. There’s no such thing as that type of company being able to operate independent from the wishes of the Chinese Communist Party. So Huawei has had such success internationally precisely because it’s had the backing of the party, the funding from Chinese banks to go out around the world and to produce at remarkably low cost, sometimes lower than the cost of production, telecommunications infrastructure for many countries.

Peter Jennings:                  Why this is significant is because I think Huawei’s close connections to the Chinese Communist Party means that it’s really not in a position to say no if Chinese state intelligence comes knocking and says to Huawei, “Hey, we’d like you to facilitate our access to a particular communication system. Or we’d like you to make it possible to help us put some malware into a piece of critical infrastructure.”

Misha Zelinsky:                  Once overseas.

Peter Jennings:                  One that’s overseas indeed. And Huawei, of course, denies as you would expect it to. They say, “No, we operate independent of the Chinese state.” But back in 2017, the Communist Party passed a law called the National Security Law, which says that every individual and every company in China must support the work of the intelligence services if they’re asked to do so. And that was, I think, a clear factor behind the Australian government’s decision. In fact, the government said, “Look, we’re not going to let any company bid into 5G if we have concerns that it might at times follow the bidding of a foreign government. And so I think that’s why there’s been this concern, because if you’re designing the technology in China, and you’re manufacturing key parts of the technology in China, and you have the Chinese Ministry of State Security looking over your shoulder, that is the best possible intelligence gathering partnership that you could imagine if you believe that China might have an interest in tapping into your information technology.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s interesting because there’s sort of a global race now on in 5G. And it’s one thing for Australia to say we’re not going to have Huawei here. But is there a issue globally with through the Belt and Road Initiative and the way that China is rolling out its network in other parts of the world, across Africa, parts of Asia, central Asia particular about the contest between standards and which standards are adopted, because if the Chinese standard is adopted, does that have implications for security globally as well?

Peter Jennings:                  I think we’re going to see a world that’s divided into essentially two types of 5G networks. And they will be Chinese supply will be one type, and there will be Western supplied will be another. Yet I think it’s a great shame that the developed democracies have not found it possible in the last decade to sort of create an industrial situation where an obvious 5G supplier can become a champion for the democracies in providing those 5G networks. But what I am pretty sure about is that the market will meet that need if enough governments conclude that they’re not going to allow Chinese suppliers into their networks. And of course we are talking about technology that in the first place came from companies like Ericsson and Nokia. And so I think that the technology is there.

Peter Jennings:                  And unfortunately, for a number of developing countries across Africa, for example, Huawei has been able put a price case for adopting their technology, which has been impossible to ignore. But the question we should be asking ourselves is why is it so cheap? Why has China of all countries found it to be strategically valuable to try and lock down as much IT infrastructure around the world as they possibly can and actually do so at uncompetitive prices?

Peter Jennings:                  Well, it’s because they see a strategic value for themselves to own global telecommunications. And I think that it’s never too late to kind of push back against that type of strategic positioning. And that’s what the democracies have to do now.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So you sort of touched there on Chinese want to dominate strategic industries. There’s so-called the 2025 plan that China announced just recently. It caused a lot of alarm, the United States in particular, with China saying, “We’re going to dominate these 10 key industries.” Firstly, is it a concern that China wants to do that? And secondly, if it is a concern, how should worldview respond to that. Is this the beginning, are we seeing the beginnings of a cold war, or is this something that’s perhaps not as considered because they’re looking to tech up?

Peter Jennings:                  I think we are at risk of finding ourselves in a new type of cold war with China, and quite frankly we’re probably in an industrial cold war, you might say, because China’s objectives both in the 2025 plan and in earlier five-year plans that they’ve produced will often become the sort of box-checking list for Chinese intelligence agencies to actually see, “Well, what technology can we go out and steal, or legally acquire, or force from Western companies that want to do business in China if we’re having trouble developing that technology ourselves?”

Peter Jennings:                  And the 2025 plan is a very good indicator of where Chinese intelligence activities are pointed in terms of industrial espionage to steal the technology that they can’t develop themselves. That’s been a pattern of Chinese behavior for years. I think on top of that, we’d have to also acknowledge a reality, which is that China is building its own in-house capabilities very quickly and becoming extremely good in some areas like artificial intelligence, for example.

Peter Jennings:                  But a lot of that, at least to begin with, has been done on the off-back of intellectual property theft. And we have to wise up to that. We have to understand that our businesses and our universities are being attacked regularly by Chinese intelligence, precisely to try and sweep up all of the interesting tech that we might be producing.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It was described by a prominent member of the US security agencies or defense establishment that this Chinese property theft was the greatest transfer of wealth in human history. So there’s the obvious grounds that you want the commercial benefit of white people. What does it mean in a contest between perhaps democracies and the traditional sort of alliance structure versus a Chinese government-led approach to it, which is being tech advantaged? Does that lead to being defense or offense capability advantaged as well?

Peter Jennings:                  Look, it’s a tricky one. I think that democracies are always going to be less efficient than autocracies in terms of their ability to harness industry or to protect intellectual property because we are sort of messier systems that actually place a lot of value on giving people freedom from being directed to do things be a government, and happily so. That’s entirely the right kind of system, from my point of view. But it is a weakness compared to the ability of the Chinese state to simply direct industry, for example, to say, “Right. This is a particular type of technology we want. Got to develop it or steal it,” and to compel individuals to actually support the work of China’s intelligence apparatus.

Peter Jennings:                  So in some senses I think we’re behind the play and probably always will be against what a powerful authoritarian government can do. But on the other hand, there is still a sense that democracies produce I think better types of innovation. So it remains the case that it’s the democracies, the Americans, the Europeans, even Australia in some niche areas of technology which are producing the best types of stealth technology, the best types of artificial intelligence technology. How long we can rely on that sort of innovative advantage, I don’t know. But my sense is that, and an authoritarian state like the People’s Republic of China is going to struggle at that very fine edge of the best innovation.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s interesting, though, that, I mean, you sort of said Western governments struggle. There is a precedent for this in that the Americans were caught flat-footed in the ’50s and ’60s when the Russians sort of had the so-called Sputnik moment, where they launched a satellite into space. And then Kennedy of course said, “We’re going to go to the moon.” And they did shortly thereafter.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So if the political world is there, so do you think perhaps going back to your 2019 example, the United States now very clearly, and Pence said that in a speech not too long ago, very clearly now sees Chinese or China as a strategic rival, could that be sort of the impetus to drive that level of sort of innovation and perhaps government-led innovation rather than relying on the private sector just to do it entirely?

Peter Jennings:                  Yeah, I think there is now probably more consensus in the United States around the risks presented by China than I’ve ever seen. And there is some ironies in that, Misha, when you think about it because it’s not a country that’s known for consensus under the leadership of Donald Trump. And indeed I think the one point of weakness I see in Washington is how personally Trump might be signed up to this consensus view. There’s quite a fear amongst a lot of people in Europe and well indeed in the United States that feel that Trump might try to cut a deal over trade with Xi Jinping. And that could lead to turning a blind eye on some of the intellectual property protection that I think is really the core of America’s concerns about China.

Peter Jennings:                  But putting Trump to one side across the national security community, across mainstream Republicans and Democrats, Congress, the American System will generally, there is now a very strong view that the number one strategic problem the Americans face is a powerful China, especially a China which is becoming more authoritarian. And this is something that will have consequences for America’s allies and for how America kind of operates in the world in coming years.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So it’s interesting. One of the things I think often gets raised, and it’s quite difficult in the Australian political context at times where I think you see globally in that this pushback you’re seeing, critics of that pushback will say, “Well, this is really xenophobia. This is kind of the Anglosphere not being comfortable with the rising East, or being replaced, or being strategically rivaled by another country that wants to do well.” Is this, do you think that that argument has merit, or is this something specific to the Chinese government and the way it conducts itself? I’m just curious about your thoughts around that question?

Peter Jennings:                  Well, I think it’s a great way to muddy the waters in a strategic discussion for some people, and we see them in Australia, that are determined to say that this is ultimately a debate about race. And therefore if you are expressing concerns about China, that must mean that in some way you’re going to be a xenophobe. The point I’d like to make is that it is not racist to be concerned about the behavior of the Chinese Communist Party. And I think we’re going to have to work very hard to be clear in the language we use. For example, we often say China as a kind of a shorthand, when most of the time, what I’m really talking about is the role of the Communist Party.

Peter Jennings:                  I do believe that this is almost a debating tactic that a lot of PRCs supporters use. I have seen what a democratic China looks like, and it’s called Taiwan. So I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that the people of the mainland of China could operate very effectively in a democratic system. And in fact in many ways, it’s the nature of the party status, it’s called, the Communist Party, which is the biggest risk factor that we have to deal with. So I completely reject any sense that this is racist or xenophobic—it’s not. It’s about what types of political systems do we want to live under and how much pressure in a country like Australia should we be prepared to accept from the Communist Party of China in trying to dictate how the Asia-Pacific is going to run.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And so bringing it back to Australia, I mean, some of the things that I think have shifted the debate here, I mean, has been China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and its claim of it as being strategic interest. Does that matter? Should we be concerned about this sort of the building of islands in the South China Sea and the increase creep of what China considers to be its spheres of influence? Is that something we should be concerned about or is it up, as the Chinese would contend, “It’s called South China Seas. So leave it to us”?

Peter Jennings:                  Look, I think we should be concerned. The last time the world was at war, at least in the Pacific was in dealing with the maritime ambitions of a Japan, which was determined to try to control its trade roots all the way down into the South China and through Southeast Asia. So we’re talking about a strategically vital bit of territory. The South China Sea is itself about the size of the Mediterranean. So it’s not a small area. And the fact that a country like China has come in the space of about 24 months, annexed it in much the same way that the Russians annexed the Crimea, I think it’s something that the entire world should really be outraged about. And this is I think very much a problem for Australia.

Peter Jennings:                  So perhaps another dimension to add just to that point, though, is that was the wake-up call. I think for a lot of people that might’ve said, “Well, we’ve never seen China behave in a hostile military way. Frankly, that’s a bit of a myth, but it’s a line that you often hear. But I think this has become a wake-up call for people to realize that in Xi Jinping and in the People’s Republic, what we have is a country which is now trying to militarily dominate the region. And for countries like Australia, Japan, and most others, that’s simply unacceptable.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So the question then becomes, how should Australia respond to this? Because you had traditionally maritime disputes that dealt with, through maritime law international courts, a ruling came down very clearly that did not rule in favor of China and its claim in the South China Sea. Basically got ignored. And increasingly what we’re now seeing is kind of payback from the Chinese government or countries that displease it.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Really good example recently is the Canadian arrests of the prominent Huawei CFO. And now you’re seeing these hostage diplomacy with those several individuals arrested in China, and then of course the banning of Canola oil or Canola seeds is imports from the Canadian economy. So, I mean, how concerned should we be about that kind of belligerent approach to independent foreign policy decision-making?

Peter Jennings:                  Well, firstly, I mean, the first point to make is so much for Huawei’s claim that they operate completely independently from the Communist Party because the party has been savage in its application of bullying tactics towards Canada over the arrest of Mrs. Meng. And, again, I think that begins to be a bit of an eye-opener, that we are dealing with a country that is quite prepared to go beyond legal barriers to promote its interests where we can.

Peter Jennings:                  My view is, to sort of answer the broader part of the question, how do we deal with this, I think firstly we’ve got to be very clear-minded in terms of our own thinking about what is strategically important to Australia. I’m perfectly happy, for example, for us to have a very successful trading relationship with China. That doesn’t bother me in the least. We win from that. The Chinese win from that. I’m much more concerned, though, about seeing Chinese ownership of Australian critical infrastructure.

Peter Jennings:                  So, for example, the fact that China owns of the electricity and gas distribution and transmission assets in Australia today is not something that I feel comfortable about from a strategic point of view. So where those types of issues come up, I think we’ve got to be very clear about where our strategic interests lie. And we should then be prepared to push back against Chinese opportunism either of an economic sort or indeed of a military type that we’ve seen in the South China Sea.

Peter Jennings:                  Then the second element to that is what can we do with allies and like-minded friends? And I think frankly the world has really failed to actually think about what is a type of concerted response that’s necessary to stop Chinese takeover of the South China Sea and a more assertive and outward-looking Chinese military posture. We’ve allowed China to kind of like split and stop the Southeast Asian countries from being able to develop sort of a shared position on the South China Sea.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, they want to do it on an individual basis.

Peter Jennings:                  Yep. And that’s a very obvious Chinese tactic is, “We’ll deal with the countries bilaterally.” And through the sort of, the bullying that you see, where they can hint that maybe your exports are not going to be received, or that they can stop students from coming, or they can stop tourists, it’s led to a whole bunch of countries that really should know better just kind of looking the other way in the interest of maintaining economic relations with China.

Peter Jennings:                  Now, I just think that that’s going to continue to be a problem for us; we’re going to see more and more examples of this come up. We governments will have to make hard decisions between making money on the one hand but looking after national security on the other. And this is going to be hard for whatever party’s in power in this country for years to come.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s a tricky question, though, when 30% of our trade is with China. It used to be 50% was with Britain. Then it was 25% with Japan. We’ve never had a situation like this before. I mean, do you think, is there a case to be made for trade diversity, diversification of Australia’s trading relationships, not withstanding we should continue to trade with China obviously. I mean, there’s a lot of mutual benefit there for everyone.

Misha Zelinsky:                  But that threat now that they … Well, it’s not really a threat. You’re seeing it being used against the Canadians and others. Is there a case for Australia to look to other avenues for its export relationships in order to limit the impact of those kind of things, for example, the coal that we’re seeing now being held up in Chinese ports for various reasons?

Peter Jennings:                  I think we desperately need to try and diversify our sources of wealth creation. And there’s an interesting question to ask. And our successors will look back and say, “How was it that policymakers over a generation allowed such a level of dependency to be created on a country which is so alien to the values and political system that we operate in?”

Peter Jennings:                  And indeed I think that we made some really quite terrible policy mistakes along that journey. So, for example, there was a time when there was a very aggressive sort of push inside the Australian public service to say, “Well, we are an Asian country.” And part of that demonstration of being an Asian country meant that we were reducing our ties with Europe. And we weren’t bothering to build ties in Latin America, say, or Africa.

Peter Jennings:                  And so if you look at the shape of Australia’s international relations, it is heavily skewed, particularly on the economic front to a handful of countries in North Asia. And I think that by definition that’s risky. So developing alternative markets, rediscovering Europe, looking, if you take a 30- or 40-year-perspective at what 900 million African consumers can do for the Australian economy, looking at Latin America, which is almost a closed book as far as Australia is concerned, I think there’s lots of things we can do to reduce our dependence on one country, namely China.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah. We’ve sort of talked a bit there about the trading relationship. The question, then, is also about moral leadership and the difference between … The Western liberal democracies, they’ve always seen themselves to be custodians of morality globally. The Chinese government has got a pretty questionable record of human rights violations. There’s a million Uyghurs locked up in detention, which gets very little discussion. Is this scenario where countries like Australia, first, we should call out this behavior, but also use it as a way to assert morality as a values-based projection of Australian leadership globally?

Peter Jennings:                  Yeah. So I think we talk quite a big game about individual human rights. We say in the 2017 foreign policy whitepaper that we have a foreign policy ultimately based on values. And yet I really don’t see much in the way of a practical demonstration of that. I think what we have is a foreign policy that’s ultimately shaped around pragmatism and trying to facilitate making money. Not that I’m opposed to making money, but I do think that I personally would like to see a stronger Australian foreign policy approach, which emphasized individual human rights as articulated in the UN charter as being something which really should be a sort of a guiding point for how we think about our role in the world.

Peter Jennings:                  We’re always going to be dealing with countries that perhaps have a poorer record on human rights than we do. And I would not say that it’s smart to kind of like boycott those in those countries and say we will have nothing to do with them, because if we were to do that, we’d have a pretty lonely existence talking maybe to New Zealand, and that would be about it. That’s not sensible. But nor should we shy away from the reality that, for example, in China we appear to have over a million people in Xinjiang Province, the Uyghurs, now in essentially reeducation camps. This is just unacceptable. And to sort of just kind of like meekly accept a Beijing line that what this is is sort of like school education is just fatuous. So, yes, I think a strong stand on individual human rights is a natural part of what should be a principled Australian approach of standing up for our strategic interest.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And so one of the important things about values of democracy is the integrity of elections. Increasingly globally we’ve seen a lot of foreign interference from hostile state actors. You’ve got very well-documented Russian interference in the 2016 election. There’s hints of Russian interference in the Brexit vote. Recently we had a hack of our Parliament but also our major political parties by a sophisticated state actor, which it could only be a few. How concerned should we be about this type of sort of hostile attempts to interfere with democratic institutions by foreign state actors that are not democracies?

Peter Jennings:                  Well, we can’t afford to imagine that it somehow doesn’t relate to us. I think we do have to be concerned about it. I think the Russians and the Chinese probably have different objectives when it comes to the types of interference that they’ve engaged in. When I look at Russia’s actions in the US and in some European elections, I think broadly I would say that there’s a kind of a wrecking objective, which is to create a sense that the democracies frankly are as bad as we are. So what does it matter? How could anyone kind of put a democracy forward as being in some way inherently superior to the type of system that exists in Moscow under Putin?

Peter Jennings:                  I think the Chinese probably have a different set of objectives than that, which would be to engage in doing their best to try to produce outcomes in elections, which suit Beijing’s interests more than other outcomes. And here something that I think is going to become a bigger issue in Australia than we’ve seen at the moment is whether or not there is a sort of attempts on the part of the mainland to influence the voting behavior of Australians of Chinese ethnicity.

Peter Jennings:                  One thing we know is that for a certain group within that community of Australians with Chinese ethnicity, there’s this strong reliance on getting their information from Chinese language newspapers, which in this country are almost all owned by mainland interests. And there’s a strong capacity to shape how voters might behave through WeChat and other forms of Chinese language social media that is pretty much impenetrable to non-Chinese speakers.

Peter Jennings:                  And I think this is something that we’re going to have to look at very closely just to make sure that Chinese Australians are not having their democratic choices interfered with by people from the mainland that have an interest in trying to shape election outcomes.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So what’s the future, then? You kind of sort of touched on it earlier, talking about this splitting of standards, but what’s the future? I mean, the West, and the Internet have always been priding themselves on the openness of the systems, the openness of the political process, the transparency. The openness of the Internet is fundamentally information should be liberally and freely available, and that will conquer all.

Misha Zelinsky:                  You know, I’ve got a very deliberate situation where autocratic regimes are having closed systems. So we got a contest now not so much between nations as much as we have one between an open and closed system, and the Russians very deliberately recently have attempted to basically disconnect the Internet, if I can put it in very … I’m not a … In the words of our former prime minister, I’m not a tech head, but they are deliberately unplugging themselves from the rest of the world because they don’t want their domestic population to be influenced by information flows from the open Internet, and whereas we have a pretty much a hands-off approach. How do you see that future? Can Western liberal democracies remain open and remain their integrity, or if they close themselves, almost lose something that’s inherent to them as well? So it’s a really difficult one to grasp.

Peter Jennings:                  It sure is. And I don’t have a solution for you. I mean, I find both ends of the spectrum pretty scary. It’s obvious that what we’re seeing in China and quite a number of more authoritarian regimes is that in fact the Internet and everything that comes with the Internet of Things and 5G technology is a tremendous mechanism for authoritarian control of populations. It means that you can control what people know. You can see and understand what people are reading to a degree that no one could’ve anticipated when George Orwell was writing 1984. And that’s deeply scary.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah. I mean, you can change history in a way. If you just Google Tiananmen Square in China, it’ll just tell you that Tiananmen Square is a lovely place to visit, and you’ll never know that there was a horrible-

Peter Jennings:                  That’s right.

Misha Zelinsky:                  … suppression and killing of domestic citizens.

Peter Jennings:                  In fact, most Chinese under 30, mainland Chinese, would have almost no knowledge of what happened in Tiananmen. On the other hand, you come into the democracies and you’ve got a sort of almost like a Wild West of badness at the extreme edges of the Internet.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Nothing’s true. Everything’s true. Your opinion is as good as my fact.

Peter Jennings:                  That’s exactly right. And I had the experience after the Christchurch shooting of writing a newspaper article about the murderer and doing some research was literally within about 10 seconds of starting to see what was on the Net, watching this guy’s shooting video inside the mosques, which is just dreadful. Normal citizens of our countries have not up until the last 10 years had such open access to such violent imagery. It’s the sort of thing that combat veterans might be aware of, but almost no one else. And that scares the living daylights out of me as well. I just think that that sheer openness of our system is one which is almost causing a sort of brutalizing of how people think about how they should interact with the fellow citizens.

Peter Jennings:                  So I don’t know what the solution is to this, other than we should probably spend less time on social media, all of us for our mental health. But at the end of the day, if I have to choose between those alternatives, I think there’s more to be said for an open system that’s less controlled than what we see emerging in China and indeed a few other authoritarian states.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So you’ve touched on the incident in Christchurch and the horrible events there. You wrote in that article about the dangers of right-wing extremism, and effectively you’ve said we’ve paid a lot of attention to the threat of Islamic extremism, but this threat of right-wing extremism, which is bubbled away in the dark corners of the Internet, as you say, and in plain sight in some instances with social media and other extremists in the political discourse. How concerned should we be about right-wing extremism?

Peter Jennings:                  I think we should. It has always been there, frankly. Before 9/11 probably that had been more of a focus of our intelligence agencies than Islamic extremism. But I do know that in the UK and in a number of European countries, there’s actually deep concern in police and intelligence services about the rise of the extreme violent right. And it’s here in Australia too. So that Internet that we’ve just been talking about is a way of actually connecting all of these groups. It’s a way of making people like that feel that they are actually part of a global social network and able to sort of radicalize each other.

Peter Jennings:                  And I think we are going to have to find ways to put more control and observation over that in order to prevent further attacks of the type that we saw in Christchurch. People have said to some extent correctly that New Zealand’s more open gun laws than Australia made it easier for Tarrant to access those weapons legally, which he did. But we would be fooling ourselves if we were to pretend that something like that couldn’t happen in Australia.

Peter Jennings:                  There’s intelligence research available publicly that says it’s about a quarter of a million long-arms weapons, so that’s to say rifles, and shotguns, and some military-style semiautomatic weapons that are illicitly out in the Australian population. So if someone’s desperate enough to acquire those types of weapons, they will be able to do so. And we know that there are Australians that have at least tendencies towards that kind of extremist ideology that presents a threat.

Peter Jennings:                  So, yeah, I do think this is a new problem. And I think we’re going to have to work amongst the Five Eyes intelligence partners, European partners to sort of collectively get a stronger grip over this extremist far-right movement to make sure that it never is anything more than just an absolute fringe part of our politics.

Misha Zelinsky:                  The thing about the incident, right, is that you could stand up in a crowded room and say something ridiculous. And most people would just call you out as being a nut. If you come and say the moon landing was fake or some other conspiracy theory of that nature, most people are going to just … But on the Internet, very quickly you can find people that agree with you and perhaps sell you something even more crazy.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So how do you grapple with the fact that it’s not just Australians coordinating with Australians, but it’s Australians coordinating with these right-wing groups globally and these global extremists that seem to export that into our domestic discourse?

Peter Jennings:                  Yeah. Well, it’s true, and I think in the case of Tarrant, most of his radicalization took place in Europe and actually reading European-sourced sort of radical commentary. And I don’t say that to try and say it has nothing to do with Australia. Very clearly it did. He’s an Australian citizen. But now you can be a part, you can be a nut in rural New South Wales and be part of a global group of like-minded nuts. And what’s the solution? Well, probably working more closely with European countries where I think has been a bigger and sharper problem for a number of years.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And more embedded in their political discourse as well, right?

Peter Jennings:                  Yeah. Well, there’s a history there, of course, and these countries are under pressure. And at the end of the day, those of us who aren’t nuts, we’ve got to kind of like I think reenergize the sensible center, if I could put it that way, to remind people that there are better alternatives. And mostly those alternatives are around robust democracy of the type that we have in Australia, thankfully. But, again, one of the regrettable points of the Internet is that it mutes sort of balanced, sensible, centered-type views, and it amplifies extremist radical views. And I think-

Misha Zelinsky:                  False balance almost.

Peter Jennings:                  Yeah, that’s right. And it’s we’ve just got to look at how we educate our kids and do a whole range of things that kind of damps down those extremes and sort of puts more emphasis on the sensible center.

Misha Zelinsky:                  One of the things I think a lot of people are concerned about just recently with, and you’ve talked about gun laws and the amount of … Everyone likes to think that there are no guns in Australia. It’s not true. But how concerned are you, some of the things about these things about attempts that would seem to infiltrate Australia’s political systems by far-right groups in the United States and the gun law be attempted? Because the world looks to Australia as the kind of the prime example of how you can go from having guns to not. How concerned are you about that attempt? Because I think that surprised a lot of people.

Peter Jennings:                  Well, it was appallingly misjudged. And I think it’s to the eternal criticism of those fools that felt that it was a smart ideal to go to Washington, D.C. to talk to the NRA to ask for money. It’s not a defense to say that they got a bit sloshed and started talking, because they certainly were sober enough when they were planning their trip, and they knew pretty clearly what they were doing.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It was a hell of a bender otherwise.

Peter Jennings:                  Otherwise it was a hell of a bender. But I think something that’s not been clear from those Al Jazeera programs is did the NRA or the Koch brothers at any stage ever think that it was a smart idea to offer money to these people? I don’t know that they did. And maybe that tells you that even those, that that American institution has got more sense than we might give them credit for for not handing over money to those folks.

Peter Jennings:                  I was part of the Howard government in the days when Martin Bryant was engaged in that appalling killing spree in Port Arthur in Tasmania. I recall very directly the pressure that Howard was under to compromise on the gun laws that he brought in. And I think that it was one of his best moments as prime minister to actually stick with it because it was actually quite a strong lobby that didn’t want to see as tough arrange of controls over automatic weapons that Howard put in place.

Peter Jennings:                  But we are, 20 years later, we are surely a better country for that decision having taken place. And I don’t, except at the fringes of Australian politics, I don’t see many people saying, “Wouldn’t it be a good idea to sort of go easy on the gun laws to make ownership of semiautomatic weapons more accessible?” So I thought that you really would have to say that the attempts of those individuals that went to the US to ask for money was about as ill-considered a political move as I’ve seen in my fairly lengthy career now of watching politics in Canberra.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So I always look for a segue on this, but it’s going super clunky on this one, but now I have a very lame hokey title called Diplomates. And I like to finish the interviews saying, well, three international guests got asked, who would you bring of three Aussies to a barbecue? But you get go pick three international guests. So who are three international guests coming to a Peter Jennings’ place for a barbecue?

Peter Jennings:                  Ooh, gosh, that’s an interesting one. Can they be political figures or could they be-

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, anyone you like.

Peter Jennings:                  Anyone I like. Who would I like to talk to? Well, I’ll tell you three people who I absolutely admire. One of them I know reasonably well, that’s Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the former president of Indonesia, who I actually as a young defense official escorted through Canberra on a trip, probably 25 years ago when he was a general, very fine individual. I admire him greatly. So I’d have him, Jim Mattis, former US Secretary of Defense, who I think was a fine general, someone who knew Australian fighting forces very well and who did for at least two years probably one of the toughest jobs in Washington, D.C., which was to be the defense advisor to Donald Trump as commander-in-chief.

Misha Zelinsky:                  He’s got some stories to tell, no doubt?

Peter Jennings:                  And he did, and a man that’s sort of much admired in Australian defense system. And I feel as though I should come up with a sort of quirky and different choice for you for-

Misha Zelinsky:                  Only if you feel quirky and different, man-

Peter Jennings:                  Quirky or different. I honestly don’t know. Seeing as I spend so much of my time traveling overseas, I think the person I’d most like to be able to see at a relaxed thing like a barbecue would be my wife, actually, who hears lots of stories about all of these fine people what I’m able to meet. So I’ll go for those two guys of great high standing and my own wife.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Most importantly, you’ve definitely got the right answer in the last one. But, look, thanks so much for your time.

Peter Jennings:                  [crosstalk 00:45:33].

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s been a great chat, and I really appreciate it.

Peter Jennings:                  Thanks, Misha. It’s my pleasure to talk.

Speaker 2:                              You were just listening to Diplomates, A Geopolitical Chinwag. For more episodes, visit www.diplomates.show or subscribe to the podcast on iTunes or through any of your favorite podcasts channels.

Announcer:                           This podcast is brought to you by Minimal Productions.

 

Bonita Mersiades

Bonita Mersiades is one of the most famous whistleblowers in world sport.

She is the author of ’Whatever It Takes: The Inside Story of the FIFA Way’ – a book that details the massive corruption inside the bids for the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cup including Australia’s role in the shady process. 

Bonita joined Misha Zelinsky to talk about the intersection of sport and politics, why when it comes to cheating its easier to punish individuals than nation states, the role that money plays in the corruption of sport and why it’s just so scary being a whistleblower. 

EPISODE TRANSCRIPT

Misha Zelinsky:                  Bonita Mersiades Mersiades, welcome to the show.

Bonita Mersiades:           Thanks, Misha.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Slightly different change of pace for what we typically have on Diplomates. You’ve got a very heavy sports background, but sports and politics are never too far apart. I thought, with your experience, let’s start right at the beginning. Why do people care so much about sport? Why do people care so much about men and women running around on a field kicking a ball or throwing a ball?

Bonita Mersiades:           There’s many reasons. I guess one of them would be that we’ve all done it, or most of us have don’t it, at some stage in our lives. The other thing is I think almost more than anything, perhaps music is the only other thing, is that it’s something which is part of a culture that goes through generations. Particularly in something like football, regardless of which code of football it is, the love of that and a love of the team for example can pass down from generation to generation. I think from an individual perspective, that’s why we love sport.

Bonita Mersiades:           From a bigger picture perspective, of society, it absolutely does reflect society and the values that we find important and the values that we like to instill for example in our children, of fair play and team work and perseverance and determination and integrity. For all of those reasons, it’s important.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Now, people often say, sports, it’s not a matter of life and death, it’s much more important than that. It’s also seen as an extension of the nation state. Do you see, in your experience, how much is sport an extension of not just communities but of the country itself? Do you think that that is an important part of sport, as well, the national identity?

Bonita Mersiades:           Yeah, especially for a country like our own. We’re very much tied up, our national identity is very much tied up with sport, even if not so much with ourselves. It is for other people. Having traveled a lot for work not just in sport, but in previous work in government, one of the things that people will often throw at you as a curtain raiser conversation is about the cricket team or the football team or whatever. It is pretty much part of our identity.

Bonita Mersiades:           I think, though, increasingly, too, is that a lot of nations are getting into sport and investing so much in sport because it is obviously a way of exercising soft diplomatic power. Along with arts and culture and fashion and food and all sorts of other ways in which soft power is exercised, sport is also very important to that.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s interesting you touch on that soft power, because it’s that murky bit between politics, business, passionate community interest. It strikes me sometimes what makes sport so special is what makes it inherently corruptible. What is it that we see with this questionable behavior from players, obviously, but administrators, high level bureaucrats? How is it that it gets so easily corrupted, something that is so pure when you start as a kid?

Bonita Mersiades:           I think a lot of the administrators in sport, particularly at high level, they forget what sport was about in the first place. My experience, for example, of FIFA is such that, whereas most of the people involved at a high level would have started off in the game as a kid once upon a time and came through the ranks as a volunteer and all of those sorts of things, they lost sight of that when they could see just how powerful that particular sport is, football … I’m talking soccer when I talk football … and the doors it opens for them. For example, if the FIFA president came to visit a country such as Australia, he would get a green light corridor which is reserved for heads of state. He would get to meet anyone that he wants to meet. The president of FIFA has, it doesn’t matter who it is, the president of the United States or the prime minister of the UK. They juggle about who they’re going to sit next to at state dinners. They are treated like a head of state and they see themselves as a head of state. In fact, they even refer to the FIFA congress, which has 212 member nations, more than the United Nations, as their parliament.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s really interesting. We’ll come back to that a little bit later on, about the way that sports globally govern themselves. You of course, you touched on FIFA. You’re the author of a book called Whatever it Takes, which is The Inside Story of the FIFA Way, but also particularly Australia’s failed bid for the World Cup in 2022.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Firstly, I suppose, why did Australia bid for this event? Why is it important to put taxpayer money … We put in $50 million, I think it was. Why do countries put money behind these kind of events?

Bonita Mersiades:           I think the number one reason is the one that we touched on earlier about soft power. If you look at Australia’s history with major world events, whether it be the ’56 Olympics, the 2000 Olympics, the Commonwealth Games, although that’s not as large, and things like that, Australia has leveraged those events to give it more power and more of a, I guess, credibility and notoriety, and I say that in a positive way, every time there’s been one of those major world events. That’s why nations use them. If you look at who won out of that 2018, 2022 process, and we’ve already experienced the 2018 World Cup, there is absolutely no doubt that Vladimir Putin and Russia used that to try and soften their image when everything else that was going on in their country would probably be a negative for most.

Bonita Mersiades:           Why did we bid? One, there was that. Two, I think from a football perspective, at the time and probably still, we have always seen it necessary to turbo charge our sport to realize its potential. This is what I’m really passionate about, is that football is a way in Australia for Australia to be closer to the world and the world to be closer to Australia. Yet, we’ve never really taken great advantage of that. Hosting a World Cup would have been a way to do that, as well as putting our sport onto another level financially. That was one of the reasons from a football perspective, as well as whatever legacy it may have left for the sport within our country. They were the three major reasons. There was a national reason, there was a football legacy perspective, and there was a football financial perspective.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah. In your book, you talk about the fact that … Famously, for those who … I’ll just quickly recap. There was two bids for the 2018, 2022. Australia was reasonably confident they were going to do well with that process. We then finished last. We got one vote. $50 million dollars for one vote. That vote was from the now disgraced Sepp Blatter who basically told us he voted us, I mean, effectively out of sympathy. Otherwise, we would have got zero votes.

Misha Zelinsky:                  The thing that you talk about in your book, and I’d like for you to unpack this, at the time of the vote we knew we were going to lose, and yet nobody told the government. Can you expand on that a little bit, about that process of the vote itself?

Bonita Mersiades:           Yeah. I think that was … People have also asked me what really got me to the point where I was so unhappy with working through this. There was a lot of things, but that was one of them. We were standing in the lobby of the FIFA headquarters in Zurich after Kevin Rudd had been to visit. Kevin Rudd was a master politician and master showman. Put him up with Sepp Blatter and it was really a contest to see who was going to be smiling the most and being in front of the camera the most. Kevin Rudd was great on that visit, but after he left we were told point blank we wouldn’t win it because we would never be commercially competitive.

Bonita Mersiades:           From my perspective then, we should have at least as a minimum told the government that that was the case. The government may well have said, “That’s fine. There are other objectives we’re pursuing with this,” because after all, just by being a bidder we’re out there in the global community getting noticed. That’s not a bad objective as long as the government is able to make that decision, in my view. They were also bidding at the time for a security council seat at the United Nations, so there was that double act going on as well. But we didn’t. We didn’t do any of that.

Bonita Mersiades:           I think, when you come back to what happened at the very end of the whole bidding process and the fact that I revealed in my book, that Qatar, through what was then Al Jazeera, paid a $100 million what they call production contribution if the World Cup was held in Qatar, I think it’s fairly clear that Qatar were also given the same information, i.e. you won’t be competitive commercially. In other words, their meaning against the United States, who was one of the other bidders for 2022. Qatar dealt with that because they had the state owned resources to be able to deal with it. They came up with some might say it was a clever way of doing it, and some might say it was sneaky. Nonetheless, it worked for them, from an organizational perspective. We didn’t do any of that. Instead, what we did was, oh, we’ll get a consulting company to do a report on why Asia is the next big growth area in football. My question to that was, there’s three other Asian nations bidding so why us rather than the other three.

Bonita Mersiades:           There was always this view that no one would want those other three, they’ll want us in Asia, not the other three. I think there was this sense that while we would host a great World Cup … We do all of that stuff really well … and it’d have been fantastic to have, there was never any sense, realistic view of what else was going on. At least publicly there wasn’t a realistic view of what was going on.

Misha Zelinsky:                  You’ve sort of touched on this process. A lot of people wouldn’t know that when they’re deciding a World Cup, there’s only 22 votes, as I understood it.

Bonita Mersiades:           At that time, yes.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah. Can you give a sense of some of the dirty trick … You touched on the Qataris have put up $100 million. You talk in your book and at other speeches around some of the examples from the then French president Sarkozy or Vladimir Putin in Cyprus. Can you give some examples of some of the stuff that other countries were doing in other to secure it? Given that the Russians won 2018 and Qatar won 2022, I think it’s important to think about exactly what went on.

Bonita Mersiades:           Yeah. Not just during the bidding process, but afterwards as well if you track some of these things. I think it’s important, too, because so many people have talked about Qatar and put it down to the traditional brown paper bag stuff. There may well have been some of that that went on, but there are also this other much more sophisticated and strategic interventions.

Bonita Mersiades:           I mentioned the $100 million production contribution. Not long before the vote, the person who is now the emir of Qatar went to France, had dinner with Nicholas Sarkozy, and Michel Platini who was then the FIFA vice president and one of the most powerful people in football, was invited along. Basically, it was put upon him that he and the people, his votes that he could manage, should vote for Qatar and in return for which Qatar would look after a number of things.

Bonita Mersiades:           The following year at the Dubai Air Show, Qatar Airways bought … I haven’t got the numbers absolutely correct, but certainly a proportion … bought approximately 80 Airbus aircraft and two Boeing aircraft. The following year, Michel Platini’s son ended up with a job with Qatar. The following year, Qatar, and they still owned, Paris Saint Germain, the most successful and the biggest football club in Paris. All of these things sort of went on both at the time and subsequent to secure those votes. That’s one example.

Bonita Mersiades:           In terms of Russia, I tracked this through a Greek newspaper, or through a relative who sent it to me actually. Vladimir Putin visited Cyprus in September 2010. This was about two months before the vote or six weeks before the vote. In a speech about anti ballistic missile technology, he said, “We Russia are going to share our technology with you,” which in itself is a huge issue and quite big, “But by the way we’re also bidding for the 2018 World Cup and we’d really love to have your vote.” Sitting in the audience is the man who’s going to vote. Now, was that you must vote for us or else or just the type of typical government to government deal or negotiating or trading that goes on during these things? That’s why I say there’s a lot of sophisticated and strategic interventions from countries and nation states around that whole bidding process and the voting process.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It was quite successful when you look at it, right? You look at the fact that there was a lot of concern at the time, certainly for the last decade, around Russia’s behavior globally, when you look at invasion of Georgia and so on and so forth, the annexation of Crimea. They bid quite high as you describe and then there was a tremendous soft power success for the Putin regime in Russia last year in the 2018 World Cup. Qatar, which is a tiny country, I think everyone was shocked that they won it. They’ve come under enormous pressure for some of the abuses of human rights and labor rights subsequently. They’re two really concerning examples.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Australia’s bid. I’m kind of curious. What about us? We spent $50 million of taxpayers’ money. Was our bid clean or not?

Bonita Mersiades:           It depends what you mean by clean. Is it clean in that anyone is being indicted or arrested yet? It was clean in that respect because no one has been. Was it clean in terms of using, as I’ve termed it, or in fact as the former attorney general of the United States termed it, the FIFA way? Yeah, we absolutely did. For example, we gave four million dollars to the Oceania Football Confederation, that’s based in the Pacific, for a really good project, that is to help kids in the Pacific play sport with better facilities. No one can doubt that that’s a good cause, but it was only given because we were bidding. I sat in the meeting. It’s not a question of I’ve read this somewhere and i think this is what happened. I sat in the meeting with the director general of [inaudible 00:14:59] on more than one occasion, what was then [inaudible 00:15:02], more than one occasion in which he talked about how he would require additionality from the federal budget in order to fund this. There is no doubt about that.

Bonita Mersiades:           We, when I say we, Australia, the Football Federation of Australia, got an award from the Asian Football Confederation for a five million dollar donation, five million dollar donation that wasn’t particularly allocated to anything but we donated it. We gave half a million US dollars to Jack Warner, probably the most notorious of all of the characters, if I can call them that, around FIFA and world football. He wanted that to upgrade a stadium in his home country of Trinidad and Tobago. What they didn’t bother to do in terms of due diligence was to find out that the land on which the stadium was … Sorry, the stadium was built by FIFA money. The club concerned was owned by the Warner family. The land on which the stadium and the facilities were built was owned by the Warner family. Where did that US half a million dollars end up? In Jack Warner’s personal back account.

Bonita Mersiades:           Now, what Football Federation Australia officials or former officials have said in relation to that, “Well, we didn’t know that was happening.” Even if they didn’t know that was happening, they should have been able to figure out what was going on and they should have done better due diligence. Not only that, they shouldn’t have made a payment of US half a million dollars to one of the most powerful people in world football and a voter some six weeks before that vote, because it smells. There is no other word for it. It smells.

Misha Zelinsky:                  In any other context, if these people were elected, it’d be a corruption. Because again this murkiness of sport, it becomes less … There’s no proper oversight, no proper democratic oversight. Just going back slightly from the bid, we lose the bid quite badly, but ten months before that event you lost your job. Your book is largely about being a whistleblower. I was kind of curious. You called out some of the problems. Next thing you find yourself on the out. Can you maybe explain what caused you firstly to blow the whistle on this, so to speak, internally? Then why did you find yourself shown the door do you think?

Bonita Mersiades:           I kept raising questions while I was in the job. It’s worth bearing in mind that I was a very senior executive. I reported to the CEO, I had close contact with the chairman amongst the bid group. I was also doing my other work at FFA as well, which was the ordinary communications and PR and corporate affairs type stuff. I would ask questions about why were we doing this, why were we spending money here. I would call out … We employed three notorious, two of them especially, notorious international consultants. In my eyes, [crosstalk 00:18:05]-

Misha Zelinsky:                  Who specialize in the area of thief of bidding?

Bonita Mersiades:           Yes. That’s all they do basically.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Right.

Bonita Mersiades:           Having worked with consultants for years and years and years, having been in government and elsewhere, I knew that they were not ordinary consultants. They were getting paid $15 million between them. They weren’t like ordinary consultants who would provide reports or provide you feedback or have any … Except for one of them, they had no deliverables in particular. I kept asking questions about this. As I mentioned, we were told that we wouldn’t win and we didn’t tell the government. As far as I’m aware, we didn’t tell the government. Certainly from a management perspective, we didn’t. I just got more and more uncomfortable. After a while, I guess, I think it was just simpler for my CEO at the time because he had the consultants in one ear sort of complaining about me and me in the other ear complaining about them. I think he thought what price piece will get rid of her?

Misha Zelinsky:                  Like a lot of whistleblowers, you came under an enormous amount of personal pressure. Can you explain that the attempts to discredit you? There was a report done that deliberately targeted you and one other person. Can you sort of take us through that process? You’ve made the complaint and then you’ve then largely been left as the problem.

Bonita Mersiades:           Yeah. To this day, I’m still seen as a problem, even though there’s been a change of executive management [inaudible 00:19:35] at FFA. I think someone said I was an agitator and therefore I shouldn’t really be someone they talk to.

Bonita Mersiades:           The first thing they did was try to make out that the reason I was sacked was for reasons that were just not accurate. A little bit like what’s happened to the Matilda’s coach more recently. They would say, for instance, it was because I was responsible for relationships with the state governments and they weren’t going well. Actually, it wasn’t my responsibility. That was all about stadiums and that wasn’t my responsibility. There were those sorts of things. That was just the immediate aftermath.

Bonita Mersiades:           It became much bigger than that. There was sort of a fatwa put out against me by Football Federation Australia in terms of warning people not to have any contact with me, not to talk to me, not to take any notice, saying that I was bitter and twisted, saying the usual stuff when there’s a whistleblower. They do everything to discredit you and say that you’re only saying things because you’ve lost your job. Some people didn’t believe that because they had known me. I didn’t just go and work in football because I wanted a job. I worked in football because I love football and have done all my life. I grew up with it.

Bonita Mersiades:           Then it sort of elevated. When I started talking about governance, when I put it all together, I wrote it all down. I wrote everything down. I started putting together and I realized that what this really was was a governance issue at a much bigger level, at a FIFA level. I started talking about that, both here in Australia and also internationally. I actually coined the phrase the FIFA way back in 2011 and in fact I’m delighted to say that Loretta Lynch, the US attorney general, picked up on it.

Bonita Mersiades:           They then started a review of the 2018, 2022 bidding process by a person who is now a judge in the New York Court of Appeals. He was a paid consultant to FIFA. He interviewed approximately 75 people for his report, which took approximately two years to do. He got paid about ten million US dollars for it. In his report, he singled out two people to criticize. First of all, he said the decision was fine, there was nothing wrong with Qatar and Russia being selected. He did say that there was some dodgy things about the Australian bid and some dodgy things about the UK bid, but he singled out two people and identified them. That was me and another whistleblower, a woman. Of all people in the entire world of football that were seen as being a problem for football, it was the two whistleblowers and two women, and two quite vulnerable people.

Bonita Mersiades:           One of the impacts of having been a whistleblower, especially in a relatively small community in Australia, is it’s very hard to get a job when you’re up against one of the most powerful men in the country, i.e. Frank Lowy. For the other whistleblower, she was an American born Arab woman who … She has found it difficult to I guess really gain the employment that she would like to, just as I have. You continue and get on with life and do other things, but life changes a lot when that happens to you.

Bonita Mersiades:           I guess one of the telling things about all of that was that you do learn who your friends are and you do learn about people who say they stand for something and that they don’t actually stand for anything when it comes to it. Because they’ve never bothered to pick up the phone and ask you how you are or any of those sorts of things. I guess I’m glossing over it to some extent, because it doesn’t sound that bad, that it was just written in a report, but it was much worse than that in that this was global news. This wasn’t just something that happened in little old Australia. It was global news.

Bonita Mersiades:           When this report came out, I was in Perth doing some work. A friend of mine, a journalist in England, contacted me and he said, “You really need to look at the Garcia report straight away.” By the time I’d got back to the hotel to log onto the computer and have a look at it, I was inundated with calls. It changes your life. It’s one thing to have been sacked from my job and had to sort of reinvent myself after that. It was quite another to have this man who should know better, a lawyer, who had been the US attorney general for the Southern District of New York, so a prosecutor, he should have known better than to break the confidence of two women whistleblowers. It was just outrageous treatment and says more about him than it does about us.

Misha Zelinsky:                  You sort of detailed I suppose there the enormous pressure you came under. It’s quite a curious … A lot of people might have just gone underground. You’ve probably taken even more prominence since then. How did you go about fighting back against a very, very, very powerful not just in Australia, but global outfit?

Bonita Mersiades:           There were two options, and one was to sort of, and what they wanted us to do, was to get into a corner and curl up and die. Neither of us did that, I’m pleased to say. Certainly for the other whistleblower, her preference was not to bring any more attention to herself because she had some other issues that she needed to deal with. From my perspective, I thought I’m just not going to take this. I’m not the person who did anything wrong. I’m the person who’s brought attention to all of this. I’m just not going to take it.

Bonita Mersiades:           Fortunately, someone put me in touch with an MP in the House of Commons, Damien Collins, who is now the chairman of the Culture, Media, Digital, and Sport Committee at the House of Commons, and also an Australian businessman who is living overseas who is very interested in sports governance issues. We formed, in conjunction with a couple of members of the European Parliament, a group called New FIFA Now, campaign group. Soon after that, we turned up in the Brussels parliament and European Parliament and had I think about 250-300 people at a gathering in which we called for reform of FIFA. We called for basically an overthrow of FIFA as we knew it then and said that there was something terribly wrong going on, when that report had come out, when the two whistleblowers were shamed and disparaged the way they were, yet their whole decision making regime and rationale was not questioned whatsoever.

Bonita Mersiades:           Now that was before the May 2015 arrests.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, I’d like to … Let’s go to that now. This dodgy process happens. You lose your job. You come under a lot of pressure, start fighting back. FIFA are kind of largely sweeping things under the rug as perhaps they’ve done in the past. Then, of course, there are an enormous amount of arrests, huge worldwide press, that of Jack Warner, the soccer club that you just described, the $500,000 from Australia for the stadium upgrade that never happened, and then Sepp Blatter who was the head of FIFA and the person that voted for us but did so in a manner that was relatively back handed. Tell us a little bit about that and also how validating it might have been. Was it validating after everything?

Bonita Mersiades:           It was quite incredible. As part of our New FIFA Now campaign activity, there was actually a FIFA presidential election coming up in 2015. Sepp Blatter was standing yet again and he was up against at the time Prince Ali of Jordan. We had, as part of a campaign activity, we had organized something with Amnesty International and with [inaudible 00:27:55] to happen in Zurich. We also have put together this sort of fake newspaper, which we were handing out in the streets of Zurich.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Not fakes news, though.

Bonita Mersiades:           No, no, not fake news. Fake newspaper.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Okay.

Bonita Mersiades:           With stories about FIFA corruption basically. Sharon Burrow and Jamie Fuller and others were …

Misha Zelinsky:                  Sharon Barrow is of course the global head of the union movement. An Australian, former head of the ACTU.

Bonita Mersiades:           Yeah. Former head of the ACTU. They were in the streets of Zurich handing out this fake newspaper with the real news when all of the sudden the news came through that there’d been these arrests at the Baur au Lauc Hotel. That was yet another media onslaught. It was quite incredible. In a sense, Jamie and Sharon were sort of Johnny and Jenny on the spot in Zurich. Even again here, there was a lot of media interest in what went on.

Bonita Mersiades:           Did I feel vindicated? Not straightaway. It took a while for that to happen. It was certainly the case though that it was pleasing to see and to have confirmed that the FBI and the IRS were looking into these issues. I had known about it for some time that they were. It was pleasing to see that they’d got to the point where they’d made these arrests. After that, to learn that other things subsequently happened, such as the Swiss government started looking at it, the French government and the UK. I guess over time that has become vindicating. Even more so, I guess when the full Garcia report was released some three years after that summary report, which-

Misha Zelinsky:                  This is the report that named you as the …

Bonita Mersiades:           Which named me and the other woman. Almost three years after it was first released as a summary report, when that came out, everything that was in it in relation to Australia in which he had pointed the finger and said there’s something that needs to be looked into in relation to Australia, everything had come from me, which made it even more absurd what he had said. Because on the one hand, he’s saying this happened, that happened, this happened in relation to Australia. The person who had told him all that, he then said, “You can’t really take any notice of her because she’s a whistleblower.” I think that probably for me was really the point of vindication.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s a big decision to make, whistle blowing. Do you think it was worth it knowing that journey you’ve been on? Maybe you can’t answer that, I’m not sure. At huge personal cost, obviously, but seeing that whole house of cards come tumbling down, does it feel worth it in the end?

Bonita Mersiades:           Yes, it does fundamentally. Does it change your life? Yes, it does. Is it worth it? Yes.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s a very brave thing to do, to stand up to power.

Bonita Mersiades:           Thanks.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Turning to money in sport, we’ve talked a little bit about much money there is in sport. You talked about FIFA more generally in the sense that they’re an international body, they’re not government run, but they’re these quasi international bodies with sort of no democratic oversight, at least from people, democratically elected people. Given how much money they’re in control of, and these are multi, multi, multi billion dollar enterprises, but also receive billions and billions of dollars from governments, from taxpayers, what do we do about overseeing these entities? What’s the role of culture and governance and how do you actually bring these institutions to their heel? The FBI raiding them and investigating and arresting people is one thing, but you want to see good governance more fundamentally like you would in an ordinary government. What’s the role of governance and culture?

Bonita Mersiades:           It’s a really interesting question, and especially at the moment when you can see what’s happened since 2016 in particular. What happened then is we got a new FIFA president. He brought in a CEO who was a senior bureaucrat in the United Nations. Now, United Nations has had its own governance and financial management problems, but what she has done is introduce a lot of good process and good reporting. I would say that where there’s an issue of process versus culture, culture wins every time. What they haven’t addressed, and I don’t think anyone who’s in the game could address it, they haven’t addressed the culture of FIFA and they haven’t addressed the culture of world football.

Bonita Mersiades:           You’ve got to go back to what the FBI said, I think it was James Comey at that very first media release, sorry, media conference, after the arrests, where James Comey and Loretta Lynch was there. James Comey was still the director of the FBI and he said, “This is a mafia style organization.” I was at a conference not long after that where one of the FBI investigators was speaking. He actually explained what a mafia organization looks like. You take one person out, e.g. Jack Warner, and you put another person in.

Misha Zelinsky:                  The show rolls on.

Bonita Mersiades:           Yeah, the show rolls on. In fact, that’s exactly what happened in the Caribbean. Jack Warner came out, the next person came in, and he’s since been arrested as well.

Bonita Mersiades:           What do you do in terms of governance and culture? One of the things that we called for at New FIFA Now is that there needed to be … It was like being a company. You needed to treat it like a company, an administration, that you would bring in an outsider who had an absolute [inaudible 00:33:47] to make the necessary policy and operational and cultural change and force that through. That takes a generational thing. That isn’t what’s happened. What is clear, though, is that the whole circus keeps rolling on.

Bonita Mersiades:           FIFA’s financial statements came out I think yesterday or the day before, and they showed that their cash reserves have increased to $2.6 billion, their revenues over four years have increased to around about, I’m talking US dollars here too, seven billion dollars. Despite, when you consider that those four years to 2018 includes 2015, despite all of that and despite a 100 million US dollar legal bill, sponsors are still putting money into the game. The question is, where is that sponsorship coming from nowadays. This is the big issue for sport, I reckon. It’s coming from Russia. It’s coming from China. It’s coming from the Middle East. There’s still some money coming from the US, but it is less so as a proportion of all the money. There’s a real pivot happening in world sport. That could just reflect society in general, where the world is going in geopolitical terms. Going back to the very first question is how the sport reflects society, I think it’s worthwhile looking at where the big money in sport is coming from.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s interesting. I didn’t really link the concept of sponsorship, soft power, and the control of those institutions, but there’s actually … My next question just goes to this point. There’s this issue of national systematic cheating going on in sport. You’ve seen the Russians with Sochi, then the question of the nation states interfering in the bidding process. We’ve seen some pretty severe penalties for Sepp Blatter, for Jack Warner, but the penalties seem to be on the individuals and on the nations less so. Why? Is that about power? Is it about money? It seems to be the World Cup, the 2018, the 2022 fiasco, Putin would be the center of it and he’s gotten away with it scot free and put on a triumph of soft power in the 2018 FIFA World Cup in his home country. What is it that you can actually … How are we going to stop countries getting away with this rather than the individuals?

Bonita Mersiades:           That’s a really good question. As to why, it’s much more difficult to I guess get at a world leader in that respect than it is to get at a recipient or someone who may be a recipient of a corrupt payment for example. That’s what’s interesting about what’s happening with FIFA so far, too. Most of the people they’ve arrested, indicted, charged, or have been sentenced have been those who have been in receipt of the payments, not those who have made the payments. I think that’s a really interesting issue because it’s not always that companies have made the payments, it’s been individuals as well. Yet, every single indictment so far has been around an individual. It hasn’t gone beyond that. How you stop that, I don’t know. I think it’s a big issue for the world. It goes beyond sport, but of course it gets back to the fact that sport reflects that very much so.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s definitely a challenge, though. These countries and these individuals, sorry, companies and countries, when you look at countries like Russia, countries like China, the distinction between a company, an individual, and the nation state is incredible blurred.

Bonita Mersiades:           Very.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That-

Bonita Mersiades:           [crosstalk 00:37:24]

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s right. Exactly. The top down pressure and the top down influence is enormous. To say these are just rogue actors is to a fair minded person, I think, relatively heroic kind of way of framing it. What’s the answer? Is there cause for hope in this? Ultimately, sport … Sport is a funny thing because it relies on you and I putting importance on 11 women or men running around on a field kicking a piece of leather around wearing different color shirts and giving import to that so people can make billions of dollars out of it. It matters. Once you puncture that myth, sport kind of dies. These things chip away at it. Is there hope for sport in the longterm, do you think?

Bonita Mersiades:           I think there’s hope for sport in the longterm. I would have perhaps three and a half years ago we were at a tipping point where things may change more quickly than they have. I think what an organization like FIFA in particular has done very well is manage the crisis they’re in quite well. I would argue, as I said earlier, that the culture hasn’t changed though. One of the things we have to bear in mind is that the FBI and the IRS and the Swiss and all of them keep saying this is an ongoing investigation. They haven’t gone beyond North and South America yet. They haven’t looked at Asia. They haven’t looked at Oceania. They haven’t looked at Africa or Europe. That’s, I would think, is still to come.

Bonita Mersiades:           What can sport do? I think the other potential is in the general changes we see in society where younger people in particular are not taking crap like this. My generation, obviously there are exceptions, but my generation has tended to sort of play within the system a bit more. Whereas I think younger people, don’t classify it necessarily as an age thing, but they are calling out this sort of behavior and they don’t want it. I am hopeful that that will have an impact over time.

Misha Zelinsky:                  You’ve talked about the age of idea. Another important [inaudible 00:39:41], it’s something that has been a certain movement in this area as well, gender, the Me Too movement and calling out bad behavior and power. Role of gender in sport, you took on basically the ultimate boy’s club arguably in FIFA. What was the role of gender in this?

Bonita Mersiades:           For the two of us, the two women involved, it was huge, but I’m going to say there’s not one woman in power in football, including in this country, who ever bothered to pick up the phone and say, “Are you okay?” Not one. I find that unforgivable because in fact the other woman whistleblower, she actually sort of came to my attention as being in a spot of bother quite a while before that. My first reaction, having met her once, was I must reach out to her and see that she’s okay because there’s obviously something going on there. I did that. That’s what I think I would do for almost anyone in that situation.

Bonita Mersiades:           There’s no doubt that because we were women, they saw us easy targets. She was even a more junior woman than I was in the whole setup. They saw us easy targets, thought we’d be people who would probably keep quiet. They certainly looked for areas, things where we were both vulnerable and found them, and that’s one of the reasons in fact why she has chosen not to be public about these things. Yet, there was no support from a gender perspective. That’s despite the fact on the FIFA executive committee at the time, sitting in the room, discussing these issues, was an Austrian woman, who’s gone on to get awards for being so wonderful on gender diversity in football, yet she didn’t once reach out to either of the two women who were absolutely treated appallingly by the male machine that was FIFA.

Misha Zelinsky:                  What do you think the reason for that was? Is that something that’s systemic as a problem in the sport itself, that it’s hard for women to support other women, the interests of the individuals involved? Is there anything in particular you could put it down to?

Bonita Mersiades:           I don’t think it’s the sport itself. It’s the sport itself in that I think one of the things I always characterize those who have got to the top of FIFA and in fact in football in Australia as well, they get to the point where they’ve forgotten why they are there. They’re more concerned about what football can do for them than rather what they can do for football. Therefore, if there is a line between right and wrong and good and bad and all of those things, they are quite happy to sort of dip their big toe over to the other side and dismiss anyone … This is true of any sort of whistleblower type situation … dismiss anyone who’s making a noise, a bit of an agitator as I said earlier, or a bit of an activist and say, “I’m not having to do with them because that won’t help me.”

Misha Zelinsky:                  Now, we’ve talked a lot about all the negatives of sport. We kind of touched on the positives at the beginning. One of the things, you can sometimes get depressed about the state of the world. This podcast often deals with a lot of the bad things that are happening in the world. Sport can be harnessed for good. We saw recently the issue in relation to Hakeem Al-Araibi, the entire soccer football community coming together, although the union movement globally coming together, and the players union movement supporting him and the incredible work of Craig Foster. Do you see that there are other avenues for sport to be that lightning rod for good? We’ve talked about the problems, but can it still be a force for good?

Bonita Mersiades:           Absolutely. That’s what it should be for. The Hakeem Al-Araibi situation is a good one. I first met Hakeem back in 2016 because the FIFA presidential election was on. One of the front runners for that was Sheik Salman of Bahrain and Hakeem was then living in Australia. He didn’t have refugee status, but he was brave enough to speak out against Sheik Salman. Hardly anyone in Australia took any notice of it, including Craig Foster and the UPFA, but nonetheless internationally it was a big story because the FIFA presidency was a big story. Hakeem did the right thing then and he’s continued to do so. It was a great example of the positive power of sport and the potential of sport. What we recently saw with Craig is the public face of that Save Hakeem campaign.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It was a great story and it’s very good to see him back safely at home here in Australia. The last question I like to ask all my guests … We could talk all day about sport, frankly. I could talk about sport nonstop. We need to put some kind of limit on it. .

Misha Zelinsky:                   Of course, the last hokey question that I have at the end of a very serious discussion about sport is about … It’s called Diplomates. Who are the three foreign mates you would invite to a barbecue at Bonita Mersiades’s? Who would they be?

Bonita Mersiades:           Three foreign mates or three foreign people who have-

Misha Zelinsky:                  Or three foreign people that you’d like to be their mates. I’d like to pretend that all these people that I talk to are my mates. You can have anyone you want.

Bonita Mersiades:           Okay, all right. The first I would suggest would be Vitaly Mutko. He is the deputy prime minister in Russia. He was the Russian sports minister. He was president of Russian Football Federation. He was the president of [inaudible 00:48:35] St. Petersburg. He is part of the St. Petersburg clique of Russia. He, of course, was the sports minister who was in charge when all of the doping issues were going on. He sanctioned it. He has lost all of his positions in world football and in the Olympics. I think he would be worthwhile having a chat to. Just to see if he’s ready to be a whistleblower.

Bonita Mersiades:           The other one would be, and this is terrible, I’m going to sit on the fence, either of the Obama’s would be fine with me. I’m a great admirer of Barack Obama and a great admirer of Michelle Obama-

Misha Zelinsky:                  I’ll let you have both. It’s your barbecue, so you can have them both. Is there a last one?

Bonita Mersiades:           Last, and I would like to say but not least, but this is a really different reason, I think it’d be fascinating to meet one of the people who controls a lot of the world, especially a lot of the world in our language, and that’s Rupert Murdoch.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Certainly does.

Bonita Mersiades:           Yeah.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Rupert Murdoch, a Russian politician, and the Obama’s. That’d be quite an interesting affair. Look, thanks so much for joining us. Thanks so much for being so open and honest and brave. Congratulations on your fight so far and appreciate it.

Bonita Mersiades:           Thank you.

 

Gillian Triggs

Gillian Triggs was Australia’s Human Rights Commissioner – and is someone that doesn’t require introduction.  Formerly the Dean of the Sydney Law School and now Professor of the Melbourne Law School – she is a globally recognised legal authority on human rights and is author of the book ‘Speaking Up’. 

Gillian Triggs caught up with Misha Zelinsky to talk about all things related to foreign and domestic human rights.

It was an incredibly diverse discussion covering issues such as the rule of law, the future of democracy, how governments use executive power to bully individuals, how do deal with indigenous reconciliation and why Australia lags so far behind in when it comes to tangible gender equality.

EPISODE TRANSCRIPT

Misha Zelinsky: So, Gillian Triggs, welcome to the show.

 

Gillian Triggs: It’s a great pleasure to be talking to you.

 

Misha Zelinsky: And, well, thanks so much for joining us. Now, I was thinking, there were so may places we could start this conversation. You know, global human rights, a lot of people will say that things are tracking terribly, and you can point to lots of data points that will say things are going badly. We’ve got rise of autocracy, populism, et cetera. Other people say things are going well. Infant child mortality’s on the way down. Living standards are up across the world. So, would you class yourself as a pessimist or an optimist? I mean it’s a broad topic but maybe we’ll start with it.

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, I’m definitely an optimist, and I think that there are significant improvements in human rights globally, partly because we live in a global environment, so that we’re much better informed about what’s happening than we ever used to be. But there are some pockets of absolute horror, one, of course, being the Rohingya, the civil war in the Yemen at the moment, the continuing problems of Palestine and Israel in the Middle East, and poverty in certain pockets in the world that is really appalling.

 

But I’d have to say that, on balance, I think that we are inching our way forward. I read, just by way of an example, because it’s International Women’s Week this week, I’ve been doing a number of speeches on the advances for women globally, as well as in Australia, and the irony of this report by the World Economic Forum is that women are actually doing better progressively, in developing countries, and in developed countries, they are actually regressing. Now that’s an extraordinary fact, apparently, documented by the World Economic Forum [crosstalk].

 

Misha Zelinsky: I think that would come as a big surprise to a lot of people-

 

Gillian Triggs: Yeah, it would.

 

Misha Zelinsky: … because I think the discourse at the moment would suggest, with the Me Too movement, et cetera … and we’ll probably pick up gender a little later on, but that’s just a … I’d like to return to that, actually, if we could.

 

Just in terms of one of the big trends we’re seeing at the moment, you know, the end of the Cold War, there was this sort of march of democracy, liberal democracy, and free markets, and now … and that seemed an inevitability at the end of-

 

Gillian Triggs: The Arab Spring. [crosstalk].

 

Misha Zelinsky: Yes. All these things, and now we’re seeing, perhaps, things swinging the other way. Not only the more nascent democracies falling into autocracy, but we’re seeing populists being elected in very established democracies. I mean, do you see that as a problem for human rights, more generally?

 

Gillian Triggs: I do see it as a problem. I think there’s been an extraordinary phenomenon of a rejection of some of the underpinning elements of contemporary democracy, that I thought would lead us onwards and upwards, but are now being challenged, particularly, of course, the major human rights treaties, the Refugee Convention. But the Convention on the Rights of the Child, where children are being detained, in unprecedented ways, for unprecedented periods of time.

 

So, I think that we are in a very disruptive, tumultuous global environment where we have … I mean, you almost can’t have this conversation without discussing the influence of Trump on the post-truth world we live in. The things that I thought were crucial in my early days from university, the 60s, the 70s, 80s, all the way through. Fact-based policy making was crucial. The reliance on evidence, science was king, in my youth. Today, governments may receive reports from experts on all sorts of issues, climate change, trade war issues, rising inequality, the loss of the manufacturing sector and the rise of IT, all of these areas are subject to factual reports and expert evidence, but governments are increasingly free to ignore them, and to challenge them, or reject them.

 

Misha Zelinsky: People are even making it a virtue. During the Brexit debate there was a … you know, people are sick of hearing from so-called experts.

 

Gillian Triggs: Right.

 

Misha Zelinsky: But what’s the way to address that? How do you actually cut through in that situation? Because, you’re right, when you don’t have facts, and when my opinion’s as good as your fact, that becomes very difficult-

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s right.

 

Misha Zelinsky: … to actually have an agreed starting point. Because it used to be, you know, you’d have, here’s where we’re starting, and perhaps we should go left or right, but now we can’t even agree on the starting point of the facts. So, what is a way that you think you can actually address that?

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, I’m hoping that this is a phase, that we’re dealing with a truculent child almost, and in some … some respects we are. There’s been a very interesting piece of work done recently in Australia, between the New Democracy group, which is a very interesting approach to expanding the role of the community in civil society and the democratic processes, along with the Institute for Public Affairs, which, in my view, is an extreme right-wing vehicle for misinformation. But nonetheless, apparently they’ve worked together, and I happened to be present at some of the New Democracy meetings, to get a sense of what was one of the most … what was a top priority for a good functioning liberal democracy? And both those entities, coming from different spectrums, agreed with their participants that the number one thing of importance now in Australia was evidence-based policy making.

 

In other words, there’s a … Those who think about these sorts of things, and see the threats, in my case, to classical, long-established principles of international human rights law and treaties, that underpin much of what was happening in Australia in this area, right up until the 90s, I feel that we must get back to that fact-, evidence-based policy making process. And it’s clear that the fact that we’re not, that governments are so quick to override them, ignore them, whether it’s on climate change or defense policy, that’s been extremely … I think it worries a lot of people.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Yeah, and so, interesting is you’ve talked about facts and evidence. You’ve got a legal background. Think of, what’s the role of the rule of law in all these things, in terms of human rights? You’ve mentioned before, the deficit of democracy is starting to creep in, and the advance of technology, so quickly, in a lot of areas, with data retention laws, and facial recognition, and all of these things. I mean, what’s the role of the rule of law here in preserving, particularly in advanced democracies, preserving human rights?

 

Gillian Triggs: Look, I think that’s an important question, because the phrase ‘the rule of law’ slips off politicians’ lips as it does off lawyers’ lips, and those looking for social justice or civil society. It’s a very key principle, and … but it’s made up of different ideas. One is that it’s absolutely dependent … Well, the rule of law absolutely depends upon a liberal democracy, a functioning liberal democracy. Separation of powers, between executive government parliament and the judiciary, which is severely under threat in Australia at the moment, with the rise of executive decision making and discretions that are not subject to judicial review, for practical purposes.

 

So, those are the elements of the rule of law. More precisely, it might be that one has to emphasis not so much the legislation passed by Parliament, which is the law, but the rule of law is broader than what Parliament might have just passed last week. In other words, it encompasses common law principles.

 

And if I could give you a very, very quick example, a federal court judge has recently ruled that a child with … who’s been attempting suicide on Nauru should be brought to Australia, ordering the Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Dutton, to do so, contrary to his views, it’s feared. The minister has stopped this over the previous nine months.  What this judge did was look beyond the precise terms of the Migration Act, to look at the duty of care that governments owe unto their citizens. Now that’s a sort of broad common law principle that’s embraced within the idea of legality and proper process, and what he said was that the government owed this duty of care to the child, and, therefore, the child had to be brought to Australia for psychiatric and medical care.

 

So, that’s one example, but there are many others that are essentially dependent upon transparency, fundamental common law principles, the right not to be detained arbitrarily without charge or trial, for example, the right of criminal trials before you’re detained. These are fundamental ideas of the rule of law. So, that’s what I mean by the rule of law, and I think we’ve lost track of what that means. I think many Australians, if you ask them on the street, they’ll say, “Well, you know, if that’s what the Parliament has passed as a law, then that’s the rule of law.” It isn’t actually the rule of law, the rule of law is the … are deeper fundamental principles.

 

Misha Zelinsky: That’s an interesting point. So, in terms of … you know, the rule of law, these things have tended to come from western liberal democracies, in the way you’ve just explained it. Do you think that this … the lack of … as we’ve eroded our principles in this space, and … has it made it more difficult to prosecute a human rights agenda more globally? Because if you’re not living up to your own ideals, how do you … You know, when you look at some of the examples you’ve cited, the Rohingya, or if you look at the Uighurs in China, is it a-

 

Gillian Triggs: Yes, indeed.

 

Misha Zelinsky: … difficult thing to highlight in other countries, perhaps, that are more autocratic, when they say, “Well, you know, you guys aren’t living up to your own ideals at home”?

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s always a difficult position to be in. I mean, other governments in the Human Rights Council, for example, have been very critical of Australia’s incarceration rates for Indigenous Australians, the highest in the world, violence against women, deaths of women in domestic violence, and of course, asylum seeker refugee policies. So, Australia is getting a lot wrong, but when we come to, say, dealing with the Chinese, on, let’s say … let’s take the Uighur in China or Myanmar on the Rohingya, it’s very hard to argue, and persuade those countries, because they are not culturally, historically, as committed to the rule of law, in the way that I’ve described it.

 

They will see the autonomy of the state, the right to … for a state to manage its own peoples, in the way they see fit. Human rights are for the state, not for the international community. It will be interference in their domestic policies. The Chinese will always say that, so it’s extremely difficult, and that partly adds to the argument that human rights are not universal, but they are a Western construct. I don’t believe that that’s true. The truth is that China, and Japan, and many other Asian countries, African, Latin American countries, support the basic principles of the rule of law. And the Chinese talk about the rule of law. The trouble is that there’s a huge discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Well, it’s often easy to talk about, but what are the safeguards … I’d like to get your opinion on this. One of the safeguards that those who have studied democracy, and when you go to the United States, prime example, the Bill of Rights, and the way the concerns you had, where if you … the primacy of parliament over all laws, or if … to say, well, there’s a check and balance, and they typically have the courts. Another way to do that is to have a Bill of Rights. Now, Australia, of course, doesn’t have one. There’s always been debate about whether or not we should have one. What’s the role of a bill of rights in human rights, from the respect … within a democracy?

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, I think we have to be … firstly, distinguish between the sort of American system, where they’ve got a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights. That gives the Supreme Court, and other courts in America, an enormous level of power. They are a very powerful check and balance on the power of the executive. Executive … the decision-making of the current government, for example, and on the powers of Congress. In other words, if something is passed, or a low is passed, which breaches those fundamental rights, the right to equality before the law, the right to freedom of speech, et cetera, then the American courts have the right to strike it down. And that’s a very powerful remedy.

 

But then we have the other kind of model, which most other countries are more familiar with, and more comfortable with, and that is a legislated human rights charter. Britain, Canada, New Zealand, just to name a very few, have legislated human rights charters. Australia is the only democracy in the world, and the only common law country in the world, that doesn’t have one. So, if you’re in Canada, New Zealand, France, Germany, many, many, many countries have these charters, you can go to the courts and say, “The Parliament is passing laws, or proposes to pass law, that is in breach of the Charter of Rights.” The court, depending on the terms of the legislation, may, and this is what’s called the dialogue model, will be able to say, “Well, the law that Parliament’s planning to pass, or has passed … is in violation of these … of one of the rights in the Charter, but we now are … we won’t … we’re going to strike it down. We can’t make it invalid. What we can do is send it back to Parliament, and ask Parliament to re-draft what they’re doing, so that it complies with the Charter.”

 

So, it’s creating this sort of dialogue between the executive parliament and the courts. But it’s nothing like as powerful, really, as … Well, most models are not as powerful as that. It’s interesting that … the state of Victoria, here in Australia, has such a dialogue model, and Queensland just voted for one, two or three days ago.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Do you think … you know, notwithstanding that … So, the constitutional model brings with it its own problems. The United States Supreme Court now has become a battleground for partisans, in a way, and particularly, you see problems around, you know, the Second Amendment, with gun rights, and those types of things. Do you think this sort of consultative model is a better way? Leaving aside how realistic it would be to get a referendum up in Australia on a constitutional bill of rights. We have a checkered history here with getting referendums passed. But do you … Which model do you think is better?

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, I think the best answer for me to give is to say that, in the current political and historical environment of Australia, we will not get an entrenched constitutional bill of rights. So, for practical purposes, you’ve just got to say it isn’t going to happen. I’m very much coming to the view that Australians, over time, have preferred, if you like, a parliamentary sovereignty model. They don’t like the idea of the courts being too powerful, but they want proper check and balance on executive governments. What they’d rather … I think most Australians would rather do is to give Parliament the stronger power.

 

Now, my problem with that is that Parliament has actually explicitly breached fundamental human rights in legislation, and particularly over the last 15 years or so, so that you can’t rely on Parliament to ensure fundamental human rights. So, where I come down is to say, I think, because things often have to be taken in steps, so that people learn to trust the system, I think if we had a legislated charter, a longer dialogue model, just to get everybody used to it, so that the courts could hold up Parliament and say, “You’ve just passed a piece of legislation that is in breach of fundamental rights under the Charter. We now ask you to go back and look at it again.” Now, that does make it … it politicizes it of course, but it’s not giving the power … absolute power to the courts.

 

Misha Zelinsky: How would you settle what goes in … So, let’s assume that a government of the day was to legislate the charter. What goes in the charter? I mean is it … is that [crosstalk]-

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, Queensland’s just done it. Now, one thing that a lot of people raised with me, on public debates about this is, “Oh, well, we don’t want an American system, because we don’t want the right to bear arms to be interpreted in the way that it has been.” Well, of course, I can’t imagine for a second that Australia would ever want a right to bear arms. Australians don’t have arms. We have no history of that.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Yeah, and I think we’re quite … I mean, the John Howard gun reforms, I think, are very well received and for all the-

 

Gillian Triggs: Very well received. It was a very, very important move that he made, to use that moment of power, to reduce the right of access to these kinds of guns, and I think the Australian public has been right behind it. So, with exceptions, I think, we just saw on the news last night two more people shot dead in Sydney and another couple in Melbourne, I mean, it’s going on all the time. People are still having guns illegally and killing each other with them, but it’s not in … not remotely comparable to the United States, and I don’t think Australians would be tolerant of any provision of a charter that allowed an individual right to carry guns. I think that’s out of the question, so I think we can put that one to one side.

 

Perhaps the more controversial one, that we probably would have to think about, because you’ll have right to freedom of speech, right to privacy, right to freedom of association, et cetera, et cetera, but the one that would be likely to raise the greatest level of debate, I suspect, would be the right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination, or to recognition of their culture, and right to, let’s say, an advisory voice to Parliament. Well, you could include provisions of that kind in the charter, and many, perhaps, would be … will be concerned about that.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Would you bundle the two things together? I mean, it strikes me, perhaps Indigenous issues … I mean, that … You know, and I’ve experienced … You know, I was formerly a defense lawyer with the Aboriginal Legal service, you know, so these issues are dear to my heart. But I wonder whether or not there is a case for that to be dealt with-

 

Gillian Triggs: Mm-hmm (affirmative), separately.

 

Misha Zelinsky: … on its own merits. I mean, I don’t know …

 

Gillian Triggs: I think it … Just as it was odd to have a constitution that didn’t really talk about our First Nations peoples, I think it’d be very odd to have a charter of rights that didn’t. The Queensland one has got recognition of the cultural and spiritual, sort of heritage and importance of the Indigenous peoples to Australia. I forget the exact wording. But I think that’s a pretty powerful recognition of Indigenous as the First Australians, and that their right to be consulted in relation to matters that concern them.

 

Now it doesn’t have to be all … well, it could be along … with that kind of language, cultural respect, and so on. But I am … I mean, I haven’t thought through in my own mind how to handle this, really. I would hate to see us not go forward with constitutional change to recognize Indigenous Australians at the … you know, in order to get a charter of human rights. I think constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians and to eliminate the race power from the constitution are absolute constitutional priorities. And I think with political leadership, we could do it.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Where do you think the debate’s at on the Indigenous acknowledgment question? Because it seemed we were moving towards a Respect-

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s right.

 

Misha Zelinsky: … campaign, and then suddenly there was Uluru Statement from the Heart …

 

Gillian Triggs: The Recognise campaign. Mm-hmm (affirmative), that’s right.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Sorry, the Recognise campaign, apologies.

 

Gillian Triggs: Yeah, and then the … the Uluru-

 

Misha Zelinsky: And then the Uluru, and then, seems now there’s a split, and you know, history shows, unfortunately, that you need bipartisan support on referendums in Australia, given the high bar to get over the-

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s right.

 

Misha Zelinsky: … you know, the vote.

 

Gillian Triggs: I think that’s right. I’ve come to see political leadership and bipartisanship absolutely vital to really moving forward. It’s very, very hard in Australia in the current polarized, and really quite toxic, political environment. I think it’s a tragedy, but I do think it’s enormously important that we get recognition. I mean, it was extraordinary, after the Uluru Statement from the Heart and the Australian Human Rights Commission was engaged with assisting with the collaboration and discussions, across the whole of Australia, to get some agreement on that Uluru statement. So, we were a little bit involved with it, but mainly through Mick.

 

But I think the key point is that that was dismissed by the then Prime Minister within 48 hours, with no explanation. I think that’s horrified a lot of Australians. I think they see that as grossly disrespectful of a process that was actually a coherent process, over about 10 months, I think, and not easy for the Indigenous community … communities across Australia, to agree on that statement. They had to compromise, and they had to work it through and I think that was very commendable.

 

And what they were asking for was so little, just to have a voice of advice and consultation on the matters that concern them. It’s not a major … You wouldn’t have thought it was a major request. The Prime Minister could easily have said, “Look, this is terrific. Let us go away and work out how we can make this work.” But with the leadership of the Prime Minister, I think we could have got there.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Well, it’s also strikes me, on this question, that we need to have a national … There’s a whole heap of issues bundled in with this. You’ve got the Australia Day thing, and then you’ve got the question of a republic, and then the Indigenous question, and how to deal with reconciliation. It strikes me that … I’m a person, I think a republic is a good way to deal with some of these issues, because it’ll allow us to update what it is to be … have a modern and inclusive Australia, and perhaps, within that, the Indigenous question could be resolved as well, without the colonial symbols. But do you think that’s a pathway forward for it? Or is it, again, these are all sort of … you know …

 

Gillian Triggs: I don’t really. Not anymore. I think there was a time when we could have got close to it, and that would have been the wonderful springboard for sort of modern Australia. But that moment’s lost now, I’m afraid. I think the republican movement’s going nowhere. It’s going backwards, from what I can gather, and that’s not happening. So, I think, with the extraordinary popularity of the Royal Family at the moment, and the weddings, and the visits, it … I think, Australians, it’s way down their list of priorities. I suspect that if we had strong political leadership, again, at a bipartisan basis, I think you could probably get it across the line, but there’s no political will to do it.

 

Misha Zelinsky: It’s tricky. I mean, we just had two Prime … well, we had a Prime Minister, up until recently, and an opposition leader who were both republicans. We had the Prime Minister who led the republican movement in 1999, and unfortunately, couldn’t get there, even within that. And now, obviously, a whole heap of issues on the … that I won’t delve into, with the Turnbull government. I mean, he had capacity to make those decisions, but it doesn’t fill you with confidence when you notionally have bipartisan leadership, without that-

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s right.

 

Misha Zelinsky: … without that outcome.

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, I was in Parliament when we did have bipartisan leadership, with Julia Gillard as Prime Minister, and Tony Abbot as Leader of the Opposition. And they passed the legislation, it was about five years ago now, for a process, and it was a very exciting day in Parliament. I was there with a … some people from the Human Rights Commission, and I really thought, now, for the first time, we’re going to get somewhere on Indigenous recognition. And five years later, it’s fallen into yet another black hole. It’s going nowhere. It’s disappeared completely. Now, it may be … and that’s why I’m an optimist about these things. It may be that we’ll get a change of government in three months, and I think with … over the turn of that government-

 

Misha Zelinsky: I’m touching wood on that, for the tape.

 

Gillian Triggs: … I think … That’s right. I think there’s a chance that the Labor Party would bring these matters back and progress them. But the difficulty is always going to be that there’s not going to be bipartisan support.

 

Misha Zelinsky: And that’s the bit that worries me. I mean, I think Labor has good policies in this area, but the history has shown that, even when Labor’s been in government, with referenda, that they’ve failed.

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s right.

 

Misha Zelinsky: So, I mean, just to bring us back to Australia in a … maybe a discourse, you sort of touched on, you know, maybe once upon a time we could’ve got some of these things done, and you know, Wayne Swan gave his valedictory speech the other day and he talked about the Tampa crisis, how it changed everything, in 2001. I mean, do you see that? Do you agree that that was a pivot point in Australia’s discourse?

 

Gillian Triggs: I do. Although I’d add to that. If you look at the timing, it was really fascinating. Earlier in the year, we had the Howard blatant lie that asylum seekers, Muslims, were throwing their children overboard. Now, a year or so later, a Senate inquiry said there was not a scintilla of evidence to support that, and the government, and government officials, had falsified photographs to pretend that that … to support the argument. There was a really pretty disgraceful moment, but the problem was that, some months later, we had the so-called Tampa crisis, a really confected crisis, and then within weeks of that, we had the 9/11.

 

So, that what you … In that momentous year, you had asylum seekers arriving without visas by boat, you had … and you had international terrorism against the Pentagon and the World … the Twin Towers. And what the Howard government did, and governments did around the world, was conflate these issues, and that you’ve got asylum seekers, who are Muslims, who are terrorist, and that’s how the logic progressed. And that has been very, very, very difficult to dislodge in the public mind.

 

If you could trace the beginning of the decline of Australia’s role as a good international human rights system, that was the year. And Howard then abused the power, and used power as a vehicle for getting through laws that are more draconian than we’ve ever had in the past. For example, we had no counter-terrorism laws at all at 2001. We’re now one of the most, if not the most, heavily legislated country for counter-terrorism laws, that every so many weeks or months, we get more counter-terrorism laws, that become more and more draconian as the time goes by. [crosstalk]-

 

Misha Zelinsky: Things such as data retention laws?

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, the data retention laws, dealing with, obviously, sort of picking up things that might be relevant to spying, but also, the prevention orders, and control orders, the periods of time people can be held for questioning [crosstalk]-

 

Misha Zelinsky: Without a lawyer?

 

Gillian Triggs: Without a lawyer. Without going before a court-

 

Misha Zelinsky: And it can’t be reported on, either.

 

Gillian Triggs: And they can’t report on it. The draconian penalties for those who have reported on surveillance operations by … or any operations by the security agencies, whereas the officers of the security agencies have total immunity from the jurisdiction. No one can … They can never be sued for anything they do, right or wrong. And so, we’ve had an extraordinarily disproportionate range of laws introduced, based upon this notion of fear that the government has promoted, without very much evidence.

 

And if you look at, by way of comparison, more than one woman a week is killed by her partner, or former partner, in domestic violence in Australia. Some of that being particularly, or much higher, in the Indigenous communities, and remote and rural communities. The government announces 78 million to support domestic violence refuges and accomodation for women. Well, you know, in the same time, we’ve paid, or will be paying, 50 billion dollars a year for more submarines, and for funding of offshore detention centers, and expanding the powers of the Ministry for Home Affairs, and Mr. Dutton. I’m not saying we don’t have submarines. I’m not saying we shouldn’t support national security, but I am saying that there’s such a gross disproportionality, that this has been made possible because of the politics of fear.

 

Misha Zelinsky: It’s interesting, politics of fear, because what’s your take on this question of secure borders and sovereignty? Because I think that’s something now that … we look at the Brexit example, when you look at the way populist extremists are arising, in Europe in particular, and when you look at, you know,~ the Hungarian example, particular, Polish, how do you deal with being secure but humane?

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, I think it’s possible. In other words, there’s the Abbott government, in particular, adopted very successful slogans that, in effect, you have to have offshore processing, and all of the other aspects of asylum seeker policy, to stop the boats and save the drownings at sea. In other words, he conflated the two. It’s a false binary. My argument, and that of many others, of course, is that you can both stop the boats, stop the people smuggling, stop people arriving by sea without visas, and take a humane approach to those who actually come to Australia. That’s the bit of the argument that’s proved so hard to convince people about.

 

But one of the reasons is that I don’t think the Australian public realizes the sort of steel cordon sanitaire of shipping that’s up there on the north-west of Australia, that literally stops the boats coming through. Stopping the boats has not been done because we’re cruel to children and their families on Nauru. There’s no evidence to suggest that at all. But that is the public perception, because governments have seen it in their interests to conflate the two. So that we now have people in detention for nearly seven years, without charge or trial, contrary to the fundamental principles of the Magna Carta, let alone anything more recent. You don’t have to go past the Magna Carta. But Australia has … our government, at least, has completely disregarded those standards.

 

Misha Zelinsky: So, what’s the role of language here? Because one of the things that, you know, is … You’ve talked about how to be humane and it’s also … There’s an element of dehumanization in the language used. Do you think that’s an important part of this? In the way that, you know, the fear of the other, and the fear of people that are coming by armada, as Abbott said. Do you think the-

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s right.

 

Misha Zelinsky: … dehumanizing use of language, of boat people, in a … I mean-

 

Gillian Triggs: Yes, that right, and illegals. Yes. Oh, it’s-

 

Misha Zelinsky: Illegal immigrants, you know-

 

Gillian Triggs: … it’s absolutely crucial. This is the world we’re in, of global media, and the snappy phrase, and the slogan. So, people Make America Great Again, and Save Our Children, and Save Our National Borders. I mean, this is how today’s politician speaks. There’s no depth to it, there’s no analysis, there’s no nuance. It’s absolutely crystal clear for a massive voting public that actually doesn’t want to get much involved in politics, in any event, so it’s … it’s been a brilliant marketing exercise, if you like. It’s no accident, of course, that our current Prime Minister is a marketing man. I mean, this is what they do. They conjure up these slogans.

 

The trouble is that the slogans are very often straight out lies, or creating binaries that don’t exist, they’re false binaries. Or they are deliberately obfuscating the real issues. Language has always been important, I’m not suggesting it hasn’t, but in recent years, particularly in Australia, the use of the slogans has really stopped people thinking. They’re very, very dangerous, and I certainly encourage anybody to look behind the slogans and say what’s there.

 

One that I’ve been working on recently, for example, is the Zero Tolerance in sexual assault and harassment. Now, you know, from … I’ve just finished a report for the United Nations on this question, and leaders of, even of United Nations bodies, seem to think that all you’ve got to do is come up with a slogan, ‘We have zero tolerance for sexual harassment in the workplace,’ and it’s fixed. But of course, it isn’t. It’s just a slogan, and it means nothing unless you put money, and programs, and cultural change, and all sorts of things behind the slogan. Only then do you start to actually get anywhere. But the harsh reality is that this is the global media environment we live in.

 

Misha Zelinsky: It’s very challenging, and then the media tends to reward the snappy phrase, and-

 

Gillian Triggs: Oh, they love it.

 

Misha Zelinsky: … they’re the things that cut through-

 

Gillian Triggs: They just love it.

 

Misha Zelinsky: … and, despite the fact that they tut-tut about slogans, they like to report on them.

 

Gillian Triggs: [crosstalk] they report on them all the time. They do it all the time, and they love the … you know, if you … for … Just by way of personal example, I’ve been talking a lot recently about … for the International Women’s Day, and I use the phrase, you know, that we’ve got to disrupt, and we’ve got to stand up, and I’ve used the word, and we’ve even got to be more vulgar. Now, the word ‘vulgar’ isn’t used very much in contemporary parlance. The media picked up on it, and suddenly all my speeches are about being vulgar.

 

But that’s what they do, and in the end, you learn to use a word deliberately, because you know that’s the word that’s going to be picked up. I can write a 50 minute speech of … you know, a really considered, calm piece. they’ll pick one word up, and you know the word they’re going to pick up. You know what they’re going to do.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Well, if you know, I suppose you can use it to your advantage.

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, exactly. Once you’ve realized how to do it, then you realize that that’s what … It’s a deliberate decision, and then, in other words, you don’t fall into the trap. You know exactly what you’re doing.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Now, you sort of talked … which, going right back to the beginning, we talked a little bit about checks and balances on government, and in the absence of a bill of rights here, or a charter of rights, that we rely on our court system, our parliaments, but … and our civil societies, but you know, what’s the role of individuals? You were a Human Rights Commissioner. You very famously stood up to the Government. Can you tell us a little bit about the pressure that comes to bear from the executive, on someone speaking out against government policy?

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, as I think Australia saw, it’s huge pressure, but I had the remarkable protection of the statue of the Australian Human Rights Commission, which meant that I couldn’t be sacked by the government, unless I’ve committed a criminal act, or was bankrupt, and as I was neither at that time, still aren’t, then there was nothing they could do about it. And the government was really … and the Murdoch press was absolutely beside themselves, because they realized they were absolutely powerless, unless they could find something that would damn me, in terms of the statute, which they didn’t.

 

But I think your point about the individual is quite an important one, because I certainly would never have put myself forward for this role, but you find yourself in it, and in the end, you just accept the challenge, or you don’t. I felt that the laws that were being breached were so important to a working democracy that I couldn’t really back away from it, and so I just stood firm. But I didn’t see myself as being any kind of hero for doing this. I very much saw myself as acting as a lawyer would, in that situation, because I was saying, “This is the law. These are the facts. This is the outcome.” It was simple.

 

But I have come to see that people are moved by stories, and moved by individual stories, and an institution could put the arguments I was putting, but it wouldn’t have quite the same effect as an individual. And in a way, the government drew attention to me, and that then gave me a vehicle for speaking up about the things that I thought were important as President. So, I suppose the lesson to be learned is, one should never underestimate the power of the individual, because it can be very, very effective.

 

Misha Zelinsky: But, you know, how do you stand up in … without the … would you have been able to stand up the way that you had, without all those safeguards around you?

 

Gillian Triggs: No, I would have been out of there in an hour. I couldn’t have stopped it. But because the law protected me, the statute protected me, and the community, to a very high degree, in a more subtle way. But no, without those protections, I would have been gone instantly.

 

Misha Zelinsky: That’s a really … It’s a profound point because you know … And they’re the safeguards that are gradually being eroded right … as we’ve sort of discussed.

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s right. That’s right. Exactly. Yes, exactly, I mean, and that’s … You know, I wouldn’t be surprised that a future conservative government, which we’re probably not going to get for a while, but I wouldn’t be at all surprised, if they had the numbers, they would amend the statute to ensure that doesn’t happen, in other words, that if they don’t like a president they can get rid of them.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Sounds like an argument for a charter of rights maybe, but …

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, that’s another … it’s another point. Exactly.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Now, so, we’ve sort of touched on gender as we’ve gone along. I kind of want to come back to the point about the advanced democracies, and the rest of the world. Sorry, just for the tape here, we’re pulling down the blinds. You’ve said that, basically, perhaps against discourse, or, like, against the narrative, that gender rights are on the decline, which is a surprise to me. Can you talk about that a little bit? Perhaps in a global sense but also in Australia?

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, if we go to Australia first, I’ve been surprised myself, and I’ve … over the … I’ve not done a lot of gender equality work, as President of the Commission, because we had a sex discrimination commissioner, and so, really, I would leave that side of the work to, at that time, Elizabeth Broderick. But since leaving the Commission, I’m asked to speak a lot on the subject, so I’ve been trying to keep myself up to date. And I use, as my benchmark, and it’s a very good one, the World Economic Forum’s Gender index, and that, not at all surprisingly, lists Australian women as number one in the world for educational attainment, along with the usual suspects of Finland and Denmark, I think.

 

But then, when you look at the other indices measured by the world economic forum, health, labor force participation, and economic empowerment, and political engagement, Australia is woefully behind, and we’ve slipped from a global assessment of us at 15th in the world in 2006, to 46th a couple of years ago.

 

Misha Zelinsky: 46th?

 

Gillian Triggs: Yes, and we’ve risen to 39th, but we are well outside the usual zone of countries that we will compare ourselves with. So, for example, on health, we’re ranked at 103rd.

 

Misha Zelinsky: 103rd for women’s health? Wow.

 

Gillian Triggs: Yes. For women’s health. We’re ranked at 46 for economic empowerment, and about 45 for political empowerment. We’re 77th in the world for ministerial appointments.

 

Misha Zelinsky: What do you put that … That’s startling, and I can’t sort of … As an economist, I’m trying to put together that data. First in the world for education-

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s right.

 

Misha Zelinsky: … which I think, it’s outstanding achievement, so-

 

Gillian Triggs: But way down on all the others, and then that … when you come together, it creates a mean of 39, I think is how it works, but … and you can criticize methodology, [crosstalk]-

 

Misha Zelinsky: Oh, sure. But nevertheless, I’m sure there’s-

 

Gillian Triggs: … but the figures are so powerful that you can’t dismiss the trend.

 

Misha Zelinsky: So, then what are we getting wrong in public policy? Because the kind of standard thinking is, if you get people educated they should be able to get jobs, and they should be able to get a higher income and-

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s right.

 

Misha Zelinsky: So, what’s going wrong?

 

Gillian Triggs: Well that’s the great disappointment for me, because when I did my law degree in the 60s, I thought, “Education will unlock this world for women, and it will be fine once they’re educated.” The truth is that higher educational attainment for women, it’s higher than for men, has not unlocked the door for me, or not fully. One of the biggest problems, I think, and it’s shown by the statistics, is … two things, one is lack of political empowerment, and we’ve seen that in the governments that have been in, in the last few years, particularly. Obviously, the Liberal Coalition, with so few women, is a real problem for the Liberal Party, but whereas the Labor Party’s adopted quotas in the 90s and they’ve got … they’re in an entirely different position.

 

But the other, that we’re all concentrating on now, much more than we ever have done, is the deleterious effect on women of a workplace of sexual harassment and bullying. And that is more of a systemic problem than I think we’ve realized, until the last few years, and now it seems that the evidence is very, very clear.

 

The other problem that I think needs to be addressed is that women do two thirds of the caring, unpaid, in Australia, and it’s true throughout the world, so that a lot of women’s time is spent on, essentially, caring roles, for which they’re never paid. The other is that women tend to be squeezed into fractional, flexible contracts, casualization of work, they’re way … in ways that men are not, to the same degree. The end result is that, in Australia, women retire on 46 percent of the male superannuation.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Yeah, that’s a huge challenge.

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s a very, very big gap, and, just to illustrate what happens when women don’t have superannuation, is that the fastest growing category of homelessness in Australia is women over 55. In other words, they are not able, if, once they’re running out of work options, and women over 55 find it very hard to get work, except in some areas, like hospital cleaners, factory cleaning, basic factory work.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Which is all very lowly paid.

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s right, very low paid, casual, subject to the employer’s needs, in particular, time. It’s nothing they could … couldn’t get a mortgage on it. They can’t pay the rent after 55. They lose their partners, sometimes. Their children have grown up and gone away, and they’re sofa surfing. They’re ringing their sons up, saying, “Can I stay on the sofa for a few weeks?” But others are living in cars. And we know, from the group that I chair, Justice Connect, just how many people. They’re in a really powerless position, and many of them women.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Homelessness for women is very hidden, as well, because of the domestic violence questions associated with it as well, and fleeing from domestic violence.

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s right.

 

Misha Zelinsky: But it’s not always … People tend to think of homelessness … I mean, my experience of the issue, as rough sleeping, which is not necessarily the case, is that … and maybe, could you explain that a little bit?

 

Gillian Triggs: That right. That’s right. Well, I think we think of a homeless person as being an 18 year old sleeping under a bridge somewhere, or some of the people that are in the shopping malls, with blankets, and the dog, often quite young. Not always, but often. We don’t realize that the homelessness that we can’t see is far more troubling, in some respects, and people are shameful. They live in their cars. They find shacks on the beach. I mean, they do extraordinary things to hide their situation, to try to survive, and then they become subject to crime, or commit crimes themselves. But it creates a downward spiral.

 

Misha Zelinsky: So, how do we fix some of these issues? I mean, you … Just going … pulling apart some of those figures, the health one jumped out of me, but also the ministerial one, at 77, and you know, you talk about quotas. Is that the way that we need to address? Do we address it through hard legislative sort of rules? Or is it about cultural shifts? Or what’s the way to do it? Or both?

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, both. Both. There never is a single answer to these things, just as education proved not to be the single answer. I think we need quotas. It’s worked for the Labor Party. It can work for the Liberals. [crosstalk] encourage-

 

Misha Zelinsky: And would you want to see it in the corporate sector, for example? I mean is that a way to break up that-

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, I’d like to see them with serious targets, for which directors of companies are accountable. At the end of the year, in other words, there’s a checklist, “Did you achieve these targets across the company? If not, why not? And what are you going to do next year?” And also, what’s the accountability mechanism? Because there’s almost no accountability for failing to meet a target, and that’s the point of targets, they’re voluntary, and people-

 

Misha Zelinsky: If they’re linked to bonuses they might happen, but …

 

Gillian Triggs: Well, we’ve just seen, I gather, the salaries of the major banks going down by a significant amount. I think maybe there should be consequences, that … If you gave it a monetary value, and that’s the society we live in, give it a monetary value, there’s every chance you’ll get an outcome. It’s a pretty tough way of doing it, but they’ve had long enough to do it. It’s not as though they haven’t had the time to do it. I think these tougher solutions really have to be made.

 

I think also, frankly, that we need many more programs to support families, so that women aren’t subject to domestic violence in the same way. We need much more workplace cultural change. Now, cultural change is easy to say, and extremely … it’s much easier to have a quota or an accountability mechanism. It’s very, very difficult to change cultures. But I think you need huge leadership from within the organizations, and often those in charge aren’t that passionate about it. What they do is, they establish a working group, and they leave it over there somewhere, in the working group reports, but that’s really not their concern. They’re not there to manage that problem. But I think that, now, we’re going to have to put things like the workplace environment front and center.

 

But I also think we need to look at this superannuation problem, and I think when a woman is leaving … or a man, for that matter, is leaving full-time work for caring for children, or caring for an older parent, or somebody close to them, then I think the employer and government should ensure that their superannuation payments continue at the same level. And then you won’t get these huge gaps. They come back into the workforce, but they haven’t missed out on their superannuation.

 

Misha Zelinsky: And it’s a very important thing, because super compounds over a lifetime-

 

Gillian Triggs: Exactly.

 

Misha Zelinsky: … so losing those earnings isn’t just their contribution, it’s the compounding effect.

 

Gillian Triggs: Yes, I think the American financial gurus say, “Never forget the power of compound interest.”

 

Misha Zelinsky: It’s the eighth wonder of the world, they call it, yeah, that’s right.

 

Gillian Triggs: That’s right. I can see that, it’s a wonderful thing.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Indeed.

 

Gillian Triggs: Once you’ve worked out what it does, compound interest is very, very nice. But that’s been the tragedy for women. And some men too, I mean, this is not only a male, female thing. You don’t want to position women against men, in any sense, it’s just that, because women tend to do the caring, they’re not paid for it, they lose salary, they lose their position with superannuation payments, they lose their promotional opportunities within a firm, and then they just slide back. And then … if their husband or partner dies, or they go off with a new model, these women are left to fend for themselves.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Well, it’s been a very serious conversation. I’ve been looking for a way to segue into my hokey question at the end here, but unfortunately I’m going to have make it a really clunky segue. But you know, I’ll always ask everyone on the show, if you’re an Aussie, who are the foreigners you’d like to bring along to a barbecue. In your case, who would you like to bring to a barbecue at the Triggs house? You know, three people.

 

Gillian Triggs: I’d really like to meet Theresa May. I think she’s dealing with one of the most intractable and difficult problems. I’d love to sit down and talk to her about what she’s proposing, and how she thinks she’s going to pull Britain through this.

 

Misha Zelinsky: She might have a bit more time in about three weeks.

 

Gillian Triggs: They might be extending it. There you go, they’re going to have to. But I think she’s … She seems to be emerging as quite a remarkable woman. So, I’m rather … I’d love to meet her.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Hard job.

 

Gillian Triggs: Mm-hmm (affirmative). Very, very tough job, the toughest job that one can think of just at the moment, and she seems to be pretty resilient, and she’s not very flexible, but she might have to be in the next few weeks.

 

Misha Zelinsky: So, Theresa May. Was there anyone else that you would bring along? To the …

 

Gillian Triggs: Oh. Nothing … Nobody … I’m sorry, this is a terribly boring answer, but I really can’t think. I’d love to have known Maria Callas.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Okay. Right.

 

Gillian Triggs: Because I love opera, and I think she was, again, quite … a quite remarkable woman. And I think I’d love to meet Obama.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Oh, okay, well …

 

Gillian Triggs: And Michelle [crosstalk].

 

Misha Zelinsky: Well, there you go. A couple of politicians. Well, I’ll let you have four, and why not?

 

Gillian Triggs: You’ll let me have four.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Why not? They’re a package deal, and a just actually read Michelle’s book. It was a fantastic book.

 

Gillian Triggs: Oh, I haven’t read it yet. I must read it.

 

Misha Zelinsky: Oh, well. Anyway. Well, thank you so much for joining the pod. It’s been a fantastic chat, and really appreciate it, and good luck with everything that you’re doing.

 

Gillian Triggs: Thank you very much.

 

 

Elaine Pearson

Elaine Pearson is the Australian Director of Human Rights Watch.

As a graduate of Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson school, Elaine is a global expert in human rights law and has worked all over world – including stints at the United Nations and various NGOs.

Elaine joined Misha Zelinsky for a fascinating chat about the intersection of democracy and human rights, the fate of Hakeem Al Arabi currently detained in Thailand, China’s use of hostage diplomacy and its muslim reeducation camps, whether autrocrats are winning the global PR battle and what role Australia has as a middle power in global diplomacy. 

 

Misha Zelinsky:                  Elaine Pearson, welcome to Diplomates. Thank you for joining us.

Elaine Pearson:                  Thanks for having me.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So, you’re the head of Human Rights Watch in Australia, so a lot of places we could start, but it seems a good place for us to start the conversation might be the news related to the young soccer player, Hakeem, who’s now been detained in Thailand. Maybe you could just give us a bit of background about that before we start to discuss it?

Elaine Pearson:                  Yeah, sure. I mean Hakeem al-Araibi went on a belated honeymoon to Thailand in November with his wife. He’s originally from Bahrain. He got refugee status in Australia in 2017, and when he got off the plane in Thailand, he didn’t even make it to Bangkok, or anywhere, because a squad of police were waiting for him. And what had happened was that there was an Interpol red notice out for him, which was actually a massive screw up. Interpol should’ve never issued the red notice because he’s a refugee, but he was sentenced in absentia in Bahrain for a crime that he says that he didn’t commit, to 10 years in prison, for supposedly vandalizing a police station. So since that time, Bahrain has basically issued an extradition request. Interpol got rid of the red notice, because as I said, it should never have been issued. And he’s sitting now in Bangkok jail, awaiting, basically the trial for extradition proceedings to be carried out.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And of course he is a refugee in Australia, subsequent to the Arab Spring in Bahrain. And so he came to Australia when?

Elaine Pearson:                  He came to Australia in 2014.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Right. And he’s a permanent resident, but not a citizen?

Elaine Pearson:                  He is a permanent resident. Actually, he was days away from being able to apply for his citizenship. And at the moment, there are moves underway to file those papers and make him a citizen, because we feel that that might strengthen his hand in dealing with the Thai authorities. But in any case, whether he’s a permanent resident or a citizen, he should be returned to Australia. He should not be returned to a country that he fled persecution from, and was found to be a refugee from.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So he was just days away from applying to be an Australian citizen?

Elaine Pearson:                  That’s right.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Wow, that’s really scary for him. So, a little bit about, why has this captured the attention of so much, so why is it such a big deal for someone to be arrested in an airport the way that he has, to be sent to face charges? I mean, is that something that you’d be worried about or is it not a big deal? I mean …

Elaine Pearson:                  Well, I think it’s a really shocking case, and I think it’s very scary for people who flee their home countries, think that they’re then safe in a country like Australia. He then subsequently spoke out against a member of Bahrain’s ruling family, who’s a president of the Asian Football Federation, and it’s because of his criticisms of the Bahrain government that he feels like he is being punished. That’s really what this is about, and that’s why this case, I think, will have really global ramifications, because it means that if he was sent back to Bahrain, anyone who’s been found to be a refugee who comes an authoritarian country, will have to think twice before taking holidays to third countries, because of the risk that something like this potentially could happen to them.

Elaine Pearson:                  As far as Thailand’s concern, unfortunately, Thailand has a really horrible track record of collaborating with countries like China, Bahrain, in the past, Cambodia, Vietnam, and basically sending back their citizens on the result of these extradition requests, and many cases, these people have been activists who, yes, may have been convicted on national security charges, but I think there’s very big concerns about how those people were convicted, and whether those people actually committed these crimes or whether these are people who were thrown in jail, basically for peaceful acts of free expression.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And what about Bahrain’s record in human rights? I mean, it’s not a country that’s really got strong rule of law despite their guarantees, as I understand it, coming from the leader of the country. It’s a place that if you had fled from it, you would have valid concerns, would that be right?

Elaine Pearson:                  Well, yeah. I mean, Human Rights Watch has reported on the torture in Bahrain’s prisons. We issued a big report just a few years ago. There were five deaths in custody as a result of torture in, one year alone. So this is a country that has a really big problem with basically torturing dissidents, in order to get forced confessions out of them. So the claim by the Bahraini government that, we have an independent judiciary, he should just come back here and face charges. Look, in the last time that Thailand send someone back to Bahrain, the person was beaten so badly, before he even got off the plane at Bahrain’s airport, that he had to be hospitalized. So that’s why we’re so worried about the fate of Hakeem, if he was returned to Bahrain. And he says that he was tortured before, so we have no reason to believe that it would be any different this time, if he’s sent back.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And, one of the things I’m never clear about, I mean, I think you hear about Australian’s being detained, well what’s the role of the government here? Because we’ve got people … you’ve got similar emissaries like [Fozzy 00:05:03] going over there to intervene, and we’ve had the soccer unions getting involved, and the player’s association. What’s the role of the government here, because I think people think, well, the diplomats will come in and save it, but how easy is that? I mean, is that more difficult than it seems, once you actually been in custody in another country?

Elaine Pearson:                  Well, it can be quite difficult. I mean, our government tends to adopt a sort of quiet diplomacy approach. Often when these cases come up, they’re dealt with very quietly, behind closed doors, with our government believing that that’s the best way of resolving these matters. But in this case it’s a bit different, and part of it is because there was a massive screw up on the part of the Australian Federal Police, who actually notified the Thai police about the Interpol red flag.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So that came from the AFP?

Elaine Pearson:                  That came from the AFP. I think it’s an automated systems, but in any case, they should have obviously checked his status and realized that he was a refugee. And I think because of the intense pressure from the media on this case, from FIFA, from the football groups, actually the Australian government has taken a much more robust and public stance, and I think that’s really important. But there are many other cases actually, where the Australian government is dealing with similar cases of people being wrongfully detained abroad, where they haven’t had such a strong response. I mean, there was James Ricketson, for instance, last year in Cambodia, he was eventually released but he was also someone who was tried and convicted on espionage charges, and unfortunately spent many months in a Cambodian prison.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And so, just before we act, because I’m keen to talk about some of the detainments, how is Hakeem? I mean, how is he coping? This would be a terribly … I mean, I can only imagine what he’s sort of fearing in terms of being in a Thai prison, in of itself. And then the prospect of being sent somewhere where you fled political persecution, I mean how is he doing, given the circumstances?

Elaine Pearson:                  Well, he’s not doing that great. I mean, the conditions, as you can imagine in Bangkok jail, are not particularly good. He’s been a bit sick in recent weeks, he’s sharing a cell, I think, with about 35 other people. He’s also extremely worried about his wife. I’m in pretty much daily contact with his wife, who’s here in Australia, but you know, she’s also terrified about what’s going to happen to her husband, and she was with him when he was arrested, but has not been able to have direct communication with him since, because he’s not allowed to have telephone calls.

Elaine Pearson:                  So, they are now allowed to pass messages to one another, but obviously, he is extremely scared that he’s going to be sent back, and he’s really worried about spending the next few months in prison. The next court date is not until late April. April in Thailand is incredibly hot. I mean, it’s hot enough … I’ve lived in Bangkok, in an apartment without air conditioning. You can just imagine if you’re in a jail cell with 35 other people, how uncomfortable that is going to be. And clearly he shouldn’t be there. He should be back in Australia with his wife, and playing football with his team.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And, how hopeful are we that we can get a positive resolution for him?

Elaine Pearson:                  Well, it’s unknown. I mean, I think the great thing about this case is there has been so much support and pressure coming from the Australian government, also from the international diplomatic community. They turned out in force at his extradition hearing, last week. But I think, in any case there’s big questions around, why the Thai government seems to be prioritizing and entertaining this extradition request from Bahrain, and why it would be prioritizing that relationship, over its relationship with Australia. Because clearly, Thailand and Australia also have a very long relationship.

Elaine Pearson:                  Australia has provided a lot of security training, development aid, over the years. Obviously, a lot of Australian tourists [crosstalk 00:08:52] Thailand every year. So, it makes you wonder what incentives the Bahraini government has offered, or why, basically, Thailand is doing this. The Thai government’s now saying, they put out a statement recently where they said, this is a matter between Australia and Bahrain, and Australia and Bahrain should sort it out, and we just want to win, win result for everyone, which obviously is kind of ridiculous, because there can’t be a win, win result. Someone’s going to have to lose here.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, that’s why effectively, you can only be in one country at a time. So-

Misha Zelinsky:                  Indeed. Well, I mean, keep up the good work and no doubt, I think a lot of Australian’s obviously sending a lot well wishes, but you talked a lot about the high profile this case has but of course there are other Australians being detained around the world. Is it getting increasingly dangerous to travel the world as an Australian, or any sort of citizen from a Western democracy, into perhaps places that are more autocratic? I mean, because there are a number that you can think of.

Elaine Pearson:                  Well, I mean I have to say it just somehow seem that way a little bit. I mean, in recent months there have been a number of these high profile cases. China in particular, there’s the case of the Australian writer, Yang, who was detained just a few weeks ago in China. Obviously, there’s been a number of Canadians, including some really high profile Canadians who’ve been detained in China. I don’t know if it’s actually increasing, but I guess in a globalized world, people are traveling more and more, and I think we are seeing authoritarian governments basically becoming more aggressive, in the stance that they’re taking. And particularly if they see people as potentially a threat to national security, because they’ve spoken out, that this is one way of, I guess, lashing out at those people. So I think, the people who are particularly at risk, are people who are dual citizens or who have come originally from authoritarian governments, and if they’re visiting that country again.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah. So you’ve raised a Chinese example, and one of the things that people discussed, is the Chinese detainments of both the Canadians, and obviously the young Australian … Yang, the blogger, came hot on the back of a decisions made in relation to, Huawei’s banning from participation in telecommunication networks, in Australia and other countries, but also the arrest of the CFO of Huawei in Canada. That kind of sort of retribution, arguably from China, or and a payback of detainment of people, where they’re effectively holding people hostage, how concerned should we be about that?

Elaine Pearson:                  We should be very concerned about it. I mean, I think this kind of hostage diplomacy … I mean, in some sense, it’s not new tactics from China. We have seen them use these tactics before. There was the case of Stern Hu, which Australians might remember, an executive from Rio Tinto, who was detained I think for nine years, in China, over allegations of bribery and I think sharing state secrets. But while all of that was unfolding, obviously Rio Tinto was also having it’s issues with the Chinese government. But, now it seems like the Chinese government is becoming increasingly bold, and even more blatant, in the way that it’s going after people.

Elaine Pearson:                  And it is unusual, I think, that it has chosen to go after Yang at this point in time. We don’t really know why, but I think we’re very concerned that he’s someone that they’ve been saying is being held in residential detention. That doesn’t mean house arrest. That means he’s being held in an unauthorized place of detention, where sometimes quite frankly, the conditions can even be worse than in regular jails and prisons in China. And he could be held up to three months, in residential detention and that could be extended for another three months. So potentially, we’re looking at six months without him even having access to legal representation, family and friends, and so on.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Which is terrifying when you think about it. So, comparing and contrasting, because Hakeem, who’s currently detained, it’s a global story, national story set in Australia, but a global story because of the football component. You’ve got a situation with another Australian, in another country. Why is there so little attention, comparatively, and now of course it’s been reported, but not nearly to the extent as it captured public imagination, and are we doing enough as firstly, from a discourse point of view, but is the government doing enough, and why is it different when you can contrast Thailand and China, is it the countries involved, or something else?

Elaine Pearson:                  Well, I guess Thailand is a lot more open, so obviously, people have been able to go to Thailand. Thailand’s media has a lot of foreign correspondents being able to report on Hakeem’s case. Foreign correspondents have actually been able to go to the jail and talk to Hakeem. Thailand hasn’t prevented that from happening. Whereas in China, we don’t even know exactly where it is that Yang is being held. There’s very little information, it’s very difficult for journalists that work in China to get information about this case. So they are different, I guess, in that way. But obviously, yes, I mean we think also the way to address these cases is to bring more pressure to bear on the Chinese government.

Elaine Pearson:                  And I think many governments, including Australia, have been very reluctant to criticize China about human rights abuses, about detentions of human rights lawyers in China, but also of our own citizens, of Australians, are precisely because the Chinese government has so much clout, and it’s so powerful. And so at the end of the day, I think that’s also a big reason why we haven’t seen the prime minister speaking publicly about letters that he’s written to the Chinese government, in the way that he has spoken publicly about letters that he’s written to the Thai government, on Hakeem’s case.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It does make you wonder, because I mean, I always think of Hillary Clinton’s off the record comments about arguing with China, that it’s hard to argue with your banker, given the debt situation and underwriting of the US economy. And for Australia perhaps it’s hard to argue with that best customer, and when you look at the trade relationship, but should the government be doing more, irrespective of … is it possible to ignore those kinds of realities, or did they have to be managed in that way? Because some people will say, well, there’s no real … words are bought in diplomacy, and you’ve got to sort of talk quietly, but is that beneficial in these situations, or is it better to, for lack of a better phrase, blow it up in the media?

Elaine Pearson:                  I don’t think a quiet diplomacy is enough. And look, quite frankly, until Hakeem’s case was blown up in the media, the Australian government had not been as responsive on this case. It was really the public attention that this case brought, the fact that football associations we’re getting so involved, that really upped the ante in terms of the Australian government’s response. But no, I mean I think, look, where, China is concerned, it’s not like a very strong robust, response from Australia will necessarily win Yang’s freedom, but I think the danger of not speaking out, is that China will become more and more emboldened, to take these actions, because there’s no repercussions. And so, I think it’s actually really important that Australia have a more robust policy of speaking up on human rights issues, so that it doesn’t come as a shock to the Chinese government when the Australian government does speak up in cases like this.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Good. You’ve actually just touched on the next thing I want to talk about, which is a human rights record in China. And, you’re right, we don’t talk about it much at all. So, one thing that I’d be … and I know Human Rights Watch has done some work in this area, about the situation related to the Uighurs in the Xingang province. Are you able to get a little bit of background about that, and then we can perhaps talk about that issue in a little more detail? Exactly what’s going on there, in respect to the camps?

Elaine Pearson:                  Yeah. I mean, the situation of Uighurs in China, has always been dire in some respects. They’re in a far western province of China. Uighurs and Turkic Muslims have always been somewhat viewed with suspicion, by the Chinese government, but the repression really has been turned up a notch in recent years with the establishment of these political reeducation camps. And so now you’re looking at a situation where you have more than a million people, according to the UN, detained in these political reeducation camps. These are arbitrary detentions, so there’s no court. You can’t protest your detention. You don’t know how long you will be there, and living life in the camps, it’s very militarized. They’re forced to sing Chinese songs, they’re forced to pledge their allegiance to the Chinese state, and it’s really about eradicating any sense of Muslim identity or Uighur identity, and effectively trying to brainwash these people to become loyal Chinese subjects.

Misha Zelinsky:                  I mean, that’s terrifying. I mean, a million people in a reeducation camp, to be forced to pledge allegiance and give up their religions. I mean, these are the sort of things we haven’t seen, globally, for a very, very long time. Why are we not talking about this? I mean, again, we’re talking, and we should be talking about one Australian detained, in a Thai prison, but a million people detained in reeducation camps in a large country, is really quite scary. So why isn’t that not anymore attention?

Elaine Pearson:                  Well, it’s a very good question, and I mean certainly, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty and a bunch of organizations, are really trying to up the profile of what’s happening, and try and get governments to address this issue. So at the moment, we just launched the campaign, we wanted the March session of the Human Rights Council, governments to issue a resolution which would force the Chinese government to allow a fact finding mission, to come to China to look at the situation in Xinjiang, particularly with regard to the political reeducation camps.

Elaine Pearson:                  The problem is because the Chinese government is also a member of the Human Rights Council, a lot of governments and it’s … it tends to retaliate against governments. Frankly, a lot of governments don’t want to take on China, and so they don’t want to support resolutions like this because they’re worried that the Chinese government will retaliate, financially. A lot of countries in the world, involved with the belt and road initiative, and frankly that’s been a very effective way for the Chinese government to buy the collaboration and complicity from a lot of governments.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah. Just before we turn to that, because I think that’s really a fascinating topic, about Chinese assertiveness in the region. The other thing I’d love to get your take on, because you talked about Chinese, this urge to control its population. They’re very autocratic regime, obviously, very controlling of the media, but this latest thing, and maybe you could talk a little about this concept of social credit. And when I first read about it, the notion that you can … they’ll basically be scoring everyone for everything that they do. Jaywalking, whether or not you pay your bills on time, if you’re polite to people and then everyone has this score. It’s sort of almost like an Orwellian nightmare, or for your younger listeners, it’s something from a Black Mirror episode, and literally was an episode of Black Mirror. So, I mean-

Elaine Pearson:                  It was.

Misha Zelinsky:                  … Tell us a little bit about that because, that is legitimately scary.

Elaine Pearson:                  Yeah. I mean, the social credit system has been rolled out in China over the last few years. I think they expect it to be fully operationalized by 2020, and it’s basically a big data system that collects a whole lot of information, and scoops it up. So it could be all sorts of things as to whether you parking fines, court orders, what kind of shopping you do, where you go out, who you’re associating with, what kinds of comments you’re making on social media. And it basically uses that information to give you a score, and it determines whether you are a trustworthy member of Chinese society, in which case you will be entitled to all sorts of benefits from the Chinese state.

Elaine Pearson:                  Or if you’re in the untrustworthy a category, then you might actually have trouble in booking flights, or booking a fast trains to get around. And you know, it also has repercussions in terms of your social credit score for applying for government jobs, or if you want to send your kids to a good government school. So it is extremely scary, that the Chinese government has embarked on the system. I think it’s part of the broader efforts of the Chinese government to have this mass surveillance state. And unfortunately, because China is becoming increasingly totalitarian, there’s no real way for Chinese citizens to really object to this, because if they do, they likely to bend themselves, find themselves in jail.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Or with a low score.

Elaine Pearson:                  Or low score, indeed.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And so, in terms of, so if the ability to protest these things internally in China is difficult, and we’ve seen in the past with Tiananmen Square, where attempts have been made, that the dissidents have been brutally crushed, but also the hunting down of people that blog online, or tweet online, and the great firewall of China, I mean so, it really falls to other countries to call out this sort of behavior. So, can you talk a little bit about the way that China tends to sort of bully it’s neighbors, or coerce its neighbors, into silence? And we’ve talked about trade and that kind of bilateral nature, but you know things like the BRI with diplomacy, where China lends money for projects of questionable value, and then when they can’t pay it back, they either take the asset or reach some sort of accommodative arrangement with you. I mean, how worried are you about that as an organization, when you look at human rights, globally, and in China?

Elaine Pearson:                  Oh yeah, I mean we’re extremely worried about it. I think we’re seeing that happen all over the Asia Pacific. I think now, Australia for many, was the biggest donor to Papa New Guinea, but now that’s been dwarfed by China. But most of the money that the Chinese government is giving to the PNG government, is not aid, it’s loans, and it’s for infrastructure projects. And so I think there are real questions about what happens when that money has to be repaid. But the fact that China has this ongoing, with so many different countries around the world, it means that it is also effectively able to buy the silence of these countries when it comes to raising human rights violations. So when we were talking a bit about Xinjiang, this is happening to a million Muslims, you would think that Muslim majority countries would be concerned about this, because this is happening to their brothers and sisters. And in China, they’re not even allowed to say Salaam alaikum anymore. They have to say nǐ hǎo, because if they say that, they might get sent to a political reeducation.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Right.

Elaine Pearson:                  But we’re not seeing the criticism coming from these governments, because many of these governments are also indebted to China. I was just in Indonesia a few weeks ago to talk to the Indonesian government about this, because we saw the Indonesian government really show a bit of leadership on the Rohingya issue, ethnic Rohingyas and Muslims. And as you might remember, many of them had to flee to Bangladesh because of the Myanmar militaries mess campaign of rape, murder and arson. And in that case you saw countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, really taking a stand and calling on the Myanmar government for accountability. But, Myanmar and China, I guess, are two very different beasts, precisely because of China’s economic clout. And so actually it’s been much, much more difficult to get governments to speak up about what’s happening in China right now.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And so, thinking about the way that typically human rights has been led by liberal democracies, are you concerned about, and is the organization concerned about this sort of increasing divide where, so leaving aside China, but increasingly divided between countries that are democratic and countries that are either autocratic, or democratic in name only, we’re starting to see increasing divides emerge, when you look at the countries that have recognized the new president of Venezuela, they’ve tended to fall along the lines of countries that are broadly democratic, or countries that are broadly autocratic. What is the role of that, in the human rights discourse, and how important is democracy to civil liberty?

Elaine Pearson:                  Yeah look, I think that’s a great question. And I think democracy is really important to civil liberties. I don’t think you can have … it’s very hard to see how you could protect basic civil rights of free speech, freedom of association, free press, if you don’t have a democratic system or a way in which you can raise … basically call for your rights. I think we’re very concerned about the sort of sweeping populist, autocratic movement around the world, and I think we’re seeing democracies, even the established ones, are really fraying at the edges.

Elaine Pearson:                  And the rise of these populist leaders, they’re coming to power because I think they see the world as a complicated, difficult place. They were able to really tap into the fears of a lot of people, and they’re basically scapegoating minorities, and here it might be asylum seekers, in other places it’s migrants or Muslims. In other countries, it might be LGBTI people. And I think the other thing that they do is they really erode away the checks and balances that we need in place in order to defend our basic civil liberties. And so, it’s eroding away a free press, an independent judiciary, a vigorous civil society. And we’re seeing that happen all around the world.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And, so you just touched on media there, which I think is a really important one, because media model is collapsing of the exact same time we’re seeing these problems emerge. I mean, and then there’s a further complication, I think around sort of social media, and then you kind of got this post truth, this fake news phenomenon, so what’s real, what’s not? Do you find that it’s kind of almost like a propaganda, it’s like a almost an autocratic propaganda playground, because you can always contest what’s true and what isn’t, what’s real, what’s not, and increasingly it’s very difficult to source what actually is the case. And so, quality reporting from areas that are subject to human rights abuse is becoming increasingly difficult, if you can obtain it at all. Do you find that to be the case?

Elaine Pearson:                  Yeah, I think it is becoming a bit of a propaganda war now, in some ways. And I think in the past, Human Rights Watch use to diligently do it’s reports, put its reports out there and then we would kind of think, well, the facts speak for themselves. But frankly, that’s not enough anymore. So it’s also about getting visuals. It’s about using video. It’s about effectively using social media to get your message out there, because otherwise, I think there’s also so many counter narratives around the world. But I also think, we are seeing that certain sources of information that are considered accurate, that are considered independent, are actually even more important in this world today, that’s being dominated by fake news and by spin.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Because there’s that saying which is, a lie gets around the world before truth even has time to get out of bed and put on his pants, or something – I probably butchered the quote, the quote. But that’s even more true now with social media and the way things can quickly be spread. I mean, do you think in this battle, are the autocrats winning this PR battle? I mean, I think increasing you look at polling and even in advanced democracies, in Australia, you taking the example where, young people had to be convinced that democracy is the best model, which is quite scary. I mean, do you think we’re winning or we’re losing this fight, in very broad terms?

Elaine Pearson:                  Yeah, I mean it’s hard to say. I mean I think, look, working for human rights organization, you have to be an optimist. You can’t be a pessimists because we work on pretty depressing subjects. So, I mean I think the good thing … I think we were at a really low point, particularly after Trump won the US election, and I think at that point it did seem like, you know, all of these autocratic leaders, also in Europe, were basically coming to power and how we going to stop this? But that’s not true.

Elaine Pearson:                  I mean we have seen some positive stories in Malaysia, in the Maldives recently, where they’ve been able to oust authoritarian governments through having democratic elections. And even looking at the US midterms, I mean, I think that’s another example that gives us hope. But ultimately, it is up to people to vote for the type of leaders that they want. And I think, the Philippines is an extremely concerning example, where Duterte didn’t even hide about extrajudicial killings. He openly flaunted that he wanted to kill people who were involved in the drug trade, and-

Misha Zelinsky:                  He made it a virtue as a part of his platform-

Elaine Pearson:                  Yeah. And unfortunately he maintained a lot of popular support, despite those positions. So, I think now we seeing, in the Philippines, some of the independent media that were really reporting quite strongly on the war on drugs, also facing a lot of problems from the Duterte government. So I think it’s a matter of being vigilant, everywhere. And I think it’s also about ensuring that the way in which we fight back against these autocratic governments, might be trying to get more people to come out and protest, getting people to understand the impact that this has on their rights, and I think we are starting to see that around the world. I mean, even in places like Poland, I think the fact that you had the judges protesting and saying, no, we’re still going to come to work, you can’t just dismiss us, was actually really moving. And in Hungary too, you’ve seen massive protests against Orban. So it’s not like people are just suddenly sitting back and accepting, suddenly, these more repressive governments.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s a really interesting point. And it’s good to hear some positive news sometimes, because we do often focus on the negative. But yeah, again, we’ve sort of talked a little about the contest between democracies and autocrats, and the old divide of … the old cold war divide, but what’s the role of values projection in foreign policy? Because, I mean we talk a lot about hard power, and things in a national security frame, about cyber security and military and alliances. But what’s the role of values projection in it, and also, how much is it dependent on western credibility, and has some of that eroded over time, that we can’t really talk about these things as confidently as we once did?

Elaine Pearson:                  Yeah, I mean, I think there’s definitely some truth to that, that if you’re going to talk about respect for international law, and get other countries to agree to that, then you also need to apply those same principles at home. And we have seen basically hypocritical governments, from the US to Australia, on a number of these issues. But I think the role of values in diplomacy is incredibly important. And even if you read the foreign policy white paper that came out, it talks about the need for an international rules based order, and how Australia’s interests will best be protected in a region that respects the rule of law. Well, if you want a region that respects the rule of law, then it is about also promoting those values, because you’ve got the Chinese government at the other end, throwing all its cash around, in a lot of these countries in this region.

Elaine Pearson:                  And so I think, it is really important for democratic countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea. It’s not simply, I guess, the place of Western governments to be speaking out for these things, certainly at Human Rights Watch, we’ve been investing more in middle power countries, not just western countries, because we think that they’re really crucial to the global fight to press for human rights. So it depends, a really good case example, the Japanese government gives massive aid all around the region, yet never has really raised human rights concerns. It never comes with any conditionality attached. So we’ve certainly been working with a Japanese MPs, to talk about the importance of making sure, at least in the aid packages, that there is some human rights benchmarks, or human rights monitoring that they’re doing, and trying to get the Japanese government to be a little bit more outspoken on some rights issues.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Okay. So you mentioned Australia, so circling back to us again, which we sort of started, I think it’s a good time to talk about it. What is Australia’s role in maintaining … we’ve said, and it’s very clear that Australia benefits, middle size economy, we’re down at the bottom of the world. We benefit from a liberal rules based order. What’s our role in maintaining that? Do we have a role? I mean, how does a middle power navigate this sort of uncertain times, where there’s these sort of emerging tensions between titans, globally?

Elaine Pearson:                  Yeah, so look, I mean I think, it’s about standing up. Consider having a consistent principal position on human rights, and standing up for those values, and those principles, wherever they under threat. And this doesn’t mean megaphone diplomacy, or … I hate that term because the whole idea that you would shout at someone through a megaphone, obviously is never going to be effective.

Misha Zelinsky:                  We do it at the unions, but …

Elaine Pearson:                  But maybe not, maybe not in senior meetings between prime ministers and foreign ministers. And it doesn’t mean lecturing other countries, but it also means finding ways to support civil societies, support human rights defenders, to support the lawyers and people in those countries, who frankly are under attack for their views. And so it might be simple things like, you know, inviting them to embassy functions, providing support to organizations who really need that work to document human rights abuses. But I think it’s also calling governments out, when people are unfairly prosecuted, or when political prisoners go to jail, and showing governments that the Australian government cares about these values.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And so, I mean, I think Ozzie’s often wonder, when we look at the world, we think, do we really matter? We’ve got our alliances, and they kind of taking care of us and the world and we just sort of ride along. Does our opinion matter in this space? Are we seen as a serious player in the human rights space? I mean, how much should we care about this, and what’s our influence, in a realistic sense?

Elaine Pearson:                  Yes, it totally matters. I mean, I think particularly now, given that the traditional countries that spoke up very strongly about human rights, for better or for worse, the US and the UK, they’re pretty absent now. The US is completely absent on a Trump. The UK is totally preoccupied by Brexit. That leaves the EU. Canada has been pretty good, in raising these issues, but I think that really sort of opens the space for middle power countries like Australia, and particularly in the Asia Pacific region. I mean, Australia is a really important player. It has important trade and security relationships with a lot of these countries.

Elaine Pearson:                  It’s provided a lot of aid over the years, and so our voice does matter. But I think it’s not just about Australia speaking up on its own, it’s actually about Australia working in coalition with a bunch of other governments, and especially if you’re dealing with a very strong, powerful country like China, it’s not going to be effective if it’s just Australia raising its concerns on its own. But in a case like Yang, I think it’s effectively trying to get joint demarches by embassies, getting other embassies to also speak up, and speaking with a united voice on these issues.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, I think it’s been a really fascinating chatting, and we could talk all day about this, well I certainly could. I bore people to death with my podcast. But, so the last question I ask everybody, so Ozzie’s get asked … so the mirror version, but foreign guests get asked which Australians they’d invite to a barbecue, so three foreigners at a barbecue at Elaine Pearson’s house. Who are they, and why?

Elaine Pearson:                  Three foreigners at a barbecue? Well, I think I would have to say Kofi Annan, because yeah, I have long been a fan of Kofi Annan. But at the other end of the spectrum, I would probably love to have Jacinda Ardern, the New Zealand Prime Minister there, and he had her insights as a young female leader of the country. And then, maybe because this is a podcast, Ira Glass, who does, “This American Life”, I just feel like I’ve listened to his voice for so many years, I would love to have him around for barbie.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Very good. A podcaster, a politician, and a diplomat. It would be a great time to be a fly on the wall there. I’d like to record that barbecue, it would be a very fascinating-

Elaine Pearson:                  Well, maybe I’d let you come along too.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s kind of implicit in the Diplomates title I’m coming, but no, thank you so much for joining us tonight. It’s been a fascinating chat. Appreciate it.

Elaine Pearson:                  Thanks, Misha.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And we are done.

 

Gordon Bajnai

Gordon Bajnai was the prime minister of Hungary from 2009 to 2010.

Banjai took charge of Hungary in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and lead the country through an incredibly difficult period in its history.

As prime minister, Gordon was the last socially democratic leader of Hungary before the country took a turn towards a more right-wing, populist and now largely autocratic regime. Gordon is now the chair of global investment firm Campbell Lutyens.

Gordon joined Misha Zelinsky for a fascinating discussion about, Brexit and the rise of populism, the role economics plays in politics, the march of nationalism in Europe and just how fragile democracy really is.

To my fellow Diplomates out there – if you’re enjoying the show, please be sure to subscribe, rate and review. It really helps! 

 

Misha Zelinsky:                  Welcome, Gordon Bajnai to Diplomates. Thank you for joining us.

Gordon Banjai:                   Thank you for your time.

Misha Zelinsky:                  No, thank you, but I was just seeking before as I was walking here there were just a couple Eastern Europeans in London, so you’re we’re really living the European-London cliché right now, but given that we are in London, and I’ll say it for the recording. We’re in London right now that obviously Brexit is top of the mind here. Where to from here? From Australia, it all seems quite mad. The clock’s ticking. Where do you think this is actually heading now as we head towards the cliff with the potential hard Brexit?

Gordon Banjai:                   Well, every country have their own special kind of populism. I think the special tailor-made populism of the United Kingdom is the hatred towards Europe, and that’s probably a result and it’s a lesson for other countries that if for 40 years politicians try to blame everything on Europe and take all the credit to themselves, that’s then sometimes people start to believe them. Brexit, but it’s been a very clumsy two years since the vote.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, and it has been two. It’s gone quick.

Gordon Banjai:                   Quick, but two years after it’s still unclear what’s going to happen as we speak. We are just a couple of days from the first vote in the House of Commons about the deal that was negotiated by the British government, and they are not very likely to win that vote. The uncertainty will remain and be honest, in 80 days to go out to Brexit.

For people in business, or people with investments, or people with jobs in the UK, it’s a huge uncertainty with a very short time to react. It is clearly hurting the economy longterm. Whatever happens, it’s going to be negative for the economy, and then even in the best scenario, but there are further down downside scenarios that can hurt the UK better. But instead of, just let me give you two very interesting polls that I’ve read recently.

Within the voters, the committed voters of the Conservative Party, 54% would support no-deal Brexit, hard Brexit, and only 18% of last week, 18% was supporting the deal proposed by the Prime Minister. On the other hand, if you look at the whole country, the latest poll I have seen was 54% against Brexit, only 46% for Brexit. At the national level, it’s a turnaround-

Misha Zelinsky:                  From 52-48.

Gordon Banjai:                   52-48 yeah, the other way.

Misha Zelinsky:                  In 2016, yeah.

Gordon Banjai:                   Just still not the huge shift even [crosstalk 00:03:01], but it is a shift. It shows how far committed hardcore politics can go from the national mood if we believe both [parties 00:03:14].

Misha Zelinsky:                  Just going back to the original value, sort of touch on populars and then anti-European sentiment in the UK, but was that what drove the Brexit vote? Were there other factors? It’s been sort of debated to death, but what’s in your mind drove that vote, the leave vote?

Gordon Banjai:                   Every such political upsets or surprise votes combine many factors, but I think that the specific nature of these referendums, direct democracy, is that they give a chance for many different groups in society to express their protest by a single vote against something.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So something’s annoying you and you just vote, leave.

Gordon Banjai:                   So many people, I think, have felt disenfranchised, sort of inequality in the UK has grown significantly. It has always been one of the most unequal countries within the European Union. Inequality has grown significantly after the global crisis. That’s one factor. But that seems like a social problem, and still it transferred somehow into an identity crisis. That’s very similar to the US, where many of the disenfranchised Midwest voters who lost their jobs have turned into a kind of identity politics, who are supporting ‘America first.’

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s right. Similarly, we see the Northern England vote to leave, which is where you’ve seen a lot of deindustrializations. It’s similar to Trump, the industrialization in the Midwest.

Gordon Banjai:                   That’s a global phenomenon, that populism, which is collecting the vote of those who are losing on the social economic agenda. Populism is often able, at least right wing populism, because this is just one form of populism. But right wing populism is able to collect that vote with an identity message. That’s very varying, and that’s very similar to what happened in the 1930s.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s interesting on the 1930s. Sometimes it’s seen as a very basic analysis, but do you think it’s similar? Is it 1929-1939 all over again, where you have a major economic event? The Depression is somewhere, the global financial crisis. Then the rise of communism and fascism, et cetera, across Europe. Is this the same thing again, or is it something different?

Gordon Banjai:                   Well, I think there are similarities. We are living in a different age and with different history experiences. But, yes. There are similar trends and rules applied here. First, there is a time lag between the economic crisis and the rise of populism. Second is the interesting switch from the social problem to the identity politics. Then the problem with identity politics is that it’s often cynical politicians use identity, be it the national or religious identity, or regional identity against a national identity. They use this to get into power, and to stay in power, they need to continuously escalate the feelings. They need to pump more steam into the steam room until it blows up.

The permanent escalation is an inherent feature of this kind of politics, and it usually doesn’t end well. That’s probably a commonality.

Misha Zelinsky:                  To put it mildly, yeah.

Gordon Banjai:                   If you look at the whole global politics today, the system is breaking down. One consequence of the global financial crisis, technological change, the inequality in the developed societies all ending up is that the status quo, as we have known, as you and I have grown up, you probably less than I, but we have both grown up in the Pax Americana, the system which was guaranteed or supplied by the United States. This system is breaking apart because the US is pulling up, creating a vacuum. Then some actors, often maligned actors, are occupying that vacuum, taking it over.

That’s also a result of this kind of populism. Also of the fact, if you take one step back and look deeper into what’s behind populism, is that following the great financial crisis, the legitimacy of the status quo in most developed countries and the global status quo has disappeared, that the political reserve that was keeping the system together was used as a result of not just the crisis, but the way the crisis was managed in that. The real issue is, if there is a next crisis, which is going to come soon, that political reserve will not be there to back up the system.

So, we are going into the next crisis with much less political reserves, much less legitimacy behind the status quo, and less tools in the policy makers, especially economic tools. [crosstalk 00:08:52]-

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, [military 00:08:52] policy being so exhausted and fiscal policy being restricted.

Gordon Banjai:                   And in that context, Australia is doing quite well actually, compared to other countries.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, yeah. You wouldn’t know it though, looking at our politics, which is a little bit just as crazy as well. We’ve had multiples prime ministers in recent years.

Gordon Banjai:                   One experience that I can share, speaking from Hungary, from Europe, from this part of the world, is that there is a process of deterioration, gradual moral deterioration, but seems to be radically different today, will become the new norm tomorrow. Other things will appear radical, which the day after tomorrow will become the new normal. It’s a kind of amortization of centrist politics, ethics, and morale, play by the rules, checks and balances. Those countries which can stop this amortization early on are more fortunate than the ones who go through this long process, because it can always get worse.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Indeed. But before we get to the democratic question, I was to unpack a little bit about the drivers of populism. You talked about populism and inequality, the GFC as a trigger point, though inequality was probably on the rise before that, but middle class people really got wiped out during the global financial crisis. You became prime minister in Hungary during the GFC, so you understood this crisis very well. In retrospect, did governments do enough to protect ordinary people during the global financial crisis? Is economic equality the antidote to this sort of ethno right wing nationalism? Is more equality the answer to this? How do you see that?

Gordon Banjai:                   Fortunate countries who have enough room to maneuver, i.e., take on more, to survive the crisis, the deepest point of the crisis could, or are able to protect their middle class. But unfortunate countries like my own country, Hungary, was very indebted and not trusted by the markets with new credit. So we have to take a much bigger change and shift, more radical reform that my government was running. We just have to make sure that we survive, but there was not much room to maneuver in the social arena at the time.

But you know, crisis doesn’t have an ideology. There is no left wing crisis and right wing crisis. Crisis wants solutions quickly. Like military surgeon versus the plastic surgeon, you can’t measure by the millimeter. You have to cut 10 centimeters away from the wound to make sure that it doesn’t kill the patient. You have to act quickly and decisively and focus on the core areas to stop bleeding, so that’s what you do in crisis management, because that doesn’t have a philosophy.

To put it differently, in life you can’t choose what situations you get into. What you can choose is how you behave. If you are coming from a progressive center-left approach, you can try to manage the crisis, to stave it off, and still try to keep the texture of society together. One thing that we could learn, for example, from the Thatcher era in the United Kingdom is: if you let, in certain regions or geographies, the system of labor collapse, the social inept to collapse, then it can decades to recover. If you can hold together the middle classes, the systems of employment lower in the classes. If you kept people in jobs, or if you can keep them able to get back to jobs as soon as there is some rebounds, then after the crisis, there’s a chance to recover quickly. However, if you let it collapse under the weight of the crisis, then it maybe decays.

Misha Zelinsky:                  What is it then, do you think? We’ve had this crisis. and inequality is rising. Why do you think that the ring wing populism has taken hold much stronger, seemingly, than left wing populism of, say, redistribution, high taxes, more social safety? You’ve seen a lot more similarly nationalism style populism rise up, be it the UK, the United States, other countries in Europe. Why do you think social democrats are struggling to articulate a populism message on economics?

Gordon Banjai:                   I wish I had known the perfect answer.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Probably a lot of money to be made if you knew the answer!

Gordon Banjai:                   Interestingly in some countries, the progressive forces have done pretty well. If you think about, President Obama managed the economy pretty well in the crisis, and the US bounced back very, very quickly and very decisively. It’s one of the longest period of recovery, post-crisis recovery in economic history. There are some other good examples. Portugal has a progressive left government, and they are doing reasonably well, very well.

Misha Zelinsky:                  But Obama, of course, led to Trump, which is the question.

Gordon Banjai:                   But there are some other factors in that, because if you look at when Obama left, he was very popular. Maybe it’s also the campaign and the candidate explains part of that.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Absolutely, yeah.

Gordon Banjai:                   But clearly there is a phenomenon of identity politics, and typically progressive and left parties are much weaker identity politics than right wing parties.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Which is ironic, because it’s the ring wing that often accuses progressives of wanting to play identity politics, because they’re-

Gordon Banjai:                   [crosstalk 00:15:29].

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yes, but also through the promotion of women’s rights, or the promotion of minorities groups, is that somehow that is identity politics, whereas nationalist politics is identity politics as well. It’s quite ironic in that sense. We’ve talked a little bit about economics. One issue we haven’t really talked about here, and it’s probably that when you look at the Brexit vote as well, is this question of immigration. Because when you look at some of the countries that have become more populism right wing … Poland, it’s done quite well economically, really.

Gordon Banjai:                   That’s a perfect example of how contrary to what Bill Clinton said in 1991 or 1992 in the campaign, you remember is

Misha Zelinsky:                  “It’s the economy, stupid.”

Gordon Banjai:                   “It’s the economy, stupid.”

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah.

Gordon Banjai:                   And everybody thought he had found the stone of wisdom. There are times when it’s the economy, stupid, and 25 years later, his wife long the election despite the fact that the US was booming economically. In Poland, there was a regime change despite the fact that Poland was the only country in Central Europe, or probably the only country in Europe, which was growing in the middle of the crisis as well.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Correct.

Gordon Banjai:                   It’s not just the economy, stupid. Sometimes it’s identity. If I need to find an explanation, the one that is closest to my heart and brain probably is that every democracy is built on middle classes, broad and stable middle classes. If the middle classes start to fear of losing their status, their stability, if they lose their perspective, their horizon looking into the future … If you think about, this is the first time in 70 years in the western part of the world, developed world, is that the middle classes fear that their kids will do worse off than themselves.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Interesting. There’s an interesting statistic on this where in the United States in the 40s, 90% of Americans believed their kids would do better than them, where today, it’s more like 40%. That’s kind of indicative.

Gordon Banjai:                   In some countries, it’s even less. If you think about youth unemployment in Italy [crosstalk 00:17:47]-

Misha Zelinsky:                  50% in some places, yeah.

Gordon Banjai:                   France as well. Youth unemployment and the general perspective is the horizon is looking down, not up. That’s a factor that explains the volatility, the anxiety of the middle classes. If the middle classes are trembling, then populism is on the growth. Just to quote you one famous English historian, “Revolutions are not made by the poor.”

Misha Zelinsky:                  [crosstalk 00:18:18].

Gordon Banjai:                   “It’s made by those who get disappointed.”

Misha Zelinsky:                  Hm, interesting. This anxiety around immigration, you’re seeing it Trump, you’re seeing it in Brexit, you’re seeing it in Europe. Merkel’s intake of Syrian refugees … Does immigration come up as an issue when the economy is doing badly? Or is it more of a cultural problem? Some people say, “It’s inequality and that’s what’s driving everything.” Others say, “Well, it’s the cultural changes that make people anxious.” Do you have a take on that?

Gordon Banjai:                   What right wing populists do is they transform the economic problem into an identity problem. They say, “Immigrants take your jobs,” although in fact, very often it’s automation or other forms of technology that take your jobs. Protectionism is the economic policy of nationalism. If you think about the trade wars that are revived in the world, and they are threatening, probably the single biggest geopolitical threat at the moment, is the US-China conflict, which goes well beyond a trade war. If you think about that, there is direct translation of identity politics into economic policy.

It’s interesting. I’m spending a lot of time in the UK. Since Brexit, there is a sharp downturn in immigration here. There is a shortage of labor in certain segments of the economy. But still, many people are opposed to immigration because they don’t see the cause of the problem and the problem together. Coming from the progressive side, we have this tendency of trying to explain all these technocratic policy different questions. In the era of populism, policy is not really a question. Policy is not the main topic of politics, it’s identity. It’s security. If you want to win elections from the progressive side, you need to develop your vocabulary, your politics, and catch up on those arguments.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And make people feel, rather than explain to them how something is going to work. Right?

Gordon Banjai:                   You have to find an answer to the issue of identity emotions, as well. Technocratic explanations make people feel … Let me take a step back to explain what I want to say. I think there was a consensus for a long time that these egg-headed technocrats are running these countries based on policies and complication explanations, which nobody understands, but they make the world run smooth, so it’s okay. The GFC just blew that up. Many people say, “Look, you egg-headed technocrats! You are corrupt. You played only for yourself. You messed up, so you were not that smart as you pretended to be. So why should we listen to you? Why shouldn’t we listen to ourselves or our own instincts? Or people who deliver, who cater for those instincts?”

That’s what populism is. You have to regain that trust, and it’s very, very, difficult. You have to find the language, and you have to find the right messages and as well as underlying policies.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Coming back to this question of democracy in Europe, after the fall of the Berlin wall, there was a kind of a democratic bloom. Everyone thought, “Well, these democracies are going to just be on the march inevitably.” Now we’re starting to see, you’ve got Poland, and Hungary, and Turkey, and Russia that are more or less autocratic. Then you’ve got Italy now that’s elected a pro-Russian government. How concerning do you think it is for the future of democracy in Europe right now? Is there any positives there to draw on?

Gordon Banjai:                   Don’t forget that democracy is a tool, not a means. It’s a means, not an end, to put it in proper image. It’s a means, not an end. I’m convinced that that’s the best means to the right end.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Sure.

Gordon Banjai:                   But for most people, they want a solution.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, they want the outcome.

Gordon Banjai:                   The outcome, and democracy doesn’t deliver. Compared to that, they believe rightly or wrongly, I think wrongly, that other types of systems deliver better results. Then democracy can go out of fashion.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah. I think that’s a really good point. I say this to the people. In ’89, people didn’t sit there and read Jefferson, and then read Marx, and then say, “Well, what Jefferson’s argument is a lot more compelling, because I believe in liberal democracy.” They looked at the results, right? Middle class growth in wester countries was much better than the equality of everyone being poor in the Eastern Bloc.

Then how do democracies deliver for people? What should the focus be? Should the focus then be on economic inequality?

Gordon Banjai:                   I think it should be. Irrespective of whether it’s a democracy or autocracy or dictatorship, the leading elite tend to get corrupted unless they are very well checked and controlled. Democracy is the best way to control that, but even then, there can be a kind of self interest of people being … If the elite in any society don’t realize that they need to [keep 00:24:48] integrating people at the bottom of society, and keep broadening, stabilizing the middle class, and keep letting people into the middle class from the up, then they can destabilize themselves. It’s not a new idea. There was this Italian sociologist and philosophist, Pareto, who developed his ideas in the 1920s, 1930s. He said, “Societies, where the elite stops integrating, the best people from the bottom are breaking down sooner or later, and the elite will lose power because people are rebel against them.”

Misha Zelinsky:                  Now, that’s interesting. We’ve talked a little bit about countries, maybe, that people say, “Okay, Hungary and Poland. Then there’s autocracy in these countries, and Russians have always been a bit different.” You bring it a little bit closer to the main game, and England’s, the UK’s going through its things. But France, we’ve seen these really quite scary demonstrations in Paris with these yellow vest demonstrations against what Macron’s doing there. Democracy … He’s attempting a reform agenda, but it doesn’t seem that people are going along with him, and there’s been a violent backlash to that.

Gordon Banjai:                   First of all, France has great traditions in going out to the street, and sometimes being very violent.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s true.

Gordon Banjai:                   It’s not long ago. I remember in 2005 or 2006 in the outskirts of Paris. People were burning shops and cars similarly, so it’s not new. That’s part of the French political culture, which would not be part of other country’s culture. On the other hand, clearly Macron has a very difficult job to do, because he needs to reform a country which hasn’t really decided whether it belongs to the south or the north of Europe. France has this identity issue. It loves its southern identity, but it’s hard, but its brain knows that it’s better to be in the north.

So France, which is one of the biggest economies in the world, and is quite a good economy, I have to say, but it is need of some of these reforms. The problem is because of they’re relatively high in debt, it means there is little room to manoeuvre. If you want to introduce reforms, if you want to be more labour-friendly, if you want to reduce taxes to mobilize entrepreneurship, then you have to take away from somewhere else. While Macron was delivering much more than any of his recent predecessors on economic reforms, he hasn’t or couldn’t deliver on the social part to keep people happy, because he didn’t have the room to manoeuvre. So, I’m kind of understanding of his problems, but I think he realized he needs to change also style. The art of politics, it’s not just policies and facts and figures, but it’s style and explanation, and explaining people why you do things.

Misha Zelinsky:                  But the French are very important to the European project, because for a long time, Merkel was really the central figure in Europe maybe holding the show together through the crisis, but she’s now exiting and has gone out, taken a lot of damage on the immigration issue with the million refugees. But Macron was meant to be the man to lead a European renaissance. But with him under pressure, you can start to see the beginnings of what holds Europe together, what are the things that hold Europe together. Because you’ve got … We haven’t really talked about it yet, but I think we probably need to, which is the interest of Putin to very much break up Europe. There’s very much those links between Le Pen and the other nationalists in the European countries, linked to the Russian destabilization of those countries. What is the future of Europe in terms of holding itself together where Macron’s under pressure, Merkel’s gone, and the Russians are meddling?

Gordon Banjai:                   Well, there are two ways to assess this context: one is the internal, then the other is the external, naturally. The external dimension that Europe is under multiple pressure, at least three different directions: Russia, which is interested in weakening and sort of breaking up and negotiating directly in each country. And also the US recently, under the Trump administration, is interested to have a bilateral relationships. Then China, thirdly, which is interesting in maintaining the rules-based global trading system and access to the European market, but it is also trying to access countries one by one, because with many of the countries individually, each of these countries can have a much bigger, much weightier, much more sizeable player than as if Europe kept itself together.

Europe together is a 500 million market. Even after Brexit, it’s 460 million [crosstalk 00:30:34].

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s a big-

Gordon Banjai:                   Still very big.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah.

Gordon Banjai:                   And it’s one of the first world’s, probably the world’s most valuable market if you look at number of people times GDP per capita. It’s the most exciting marketplace in the world. It has actually delivered on much of the promises of a single market. It is quite a single market in many aspect. But on the other hand, if Europe starts to utilize its weight of 500 million market, and starts to negotiate in a more assertive way with other powers … Says, “All right. You want access to my market? I want access to your market as well. You have to play by the rules.”

If Europe starts to develop as a military union … If Europe starts to behave as a financial union, which it hasn’t delivered greatly on … And if Europe starts to deploy united policy on migration, and starts to protect its external border, then Europe could be a much more heavyweight player in the global order.

Europe’s natural self interest is to organize itself as Europe and not as individual states. If you think about Germany, the largest country is Europe is 82 million people. What is it compared to China, US, or Russia? But if you look at Europe with 450 or 500 million people, that’s a size in which you can remain a player at the table. Because Europe’s real question, looking ahead 20-30 years, whether it remains part of the rule setting table or will become the rule taker. It will be quite a shift compared to its last 500 years.

You could look at Europe as a kind of Noah’s ark in the flood of globalization for the nations of Europe to survive. It’s quite [balancing 00:32:54] to jump off Noah’s ark. It’s reasonable to discuss about the direction, but to quarrel at the wheel is not very good, because the ark can capsize. [crosstalk 00:33:14]. You want to keep it together. You want to discuss what is the right direction to go, but you also want to act in an orderly and coordinated way on the ark, so as that you can land in the good course.

Misha Zelinsky:                  How concerned should European countries then be, as they go through their election seasons, about Russian interference? There’s suggestions there was interference in Brexit. There’s suggestions you’ve seen it with Le Pen and the yellow shirts. How concerned should European countries be about that?

Gordon Banjai:                   I think Europeans should be concerned about external influence. There’s a asymmetric situation, because maligned powers are looking at democracies and saying, “Where is the [oculus 00:34:11] here of democracies?” And that’s elections and the daily operation of democracy. Through social media and other means, and corrupting occasionally certain parties in these countries, promoting radical parties, they can destabilize democracy.

Those countries which don’t have this nitty gritty problem of democracy and free voting, they can exploit other’s weakness this way. That’s an asymmetric war. Europe and even the United States, in that sense, should react to this by protecting themselves, protecting their democracy, but not allowing any interference.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s a challenge, isn’t it, though? The thing that won the Cold War was the openness of the west versus the closed systems of the Communist Bloc, and the other countries. It seems almost that openness is being used against the west in a way that we’ve never seen before. With social media, through economic means, and others. And as a result, democracy lost a bit of the swagger, so to speak. So how do you make openness a virtue again, is the question. I’m not sure about-

Gordon Banjai:                   First of all, openness is inside a country or a region, externally, you have to assert your powers much more strongly. First of all, you have to create the community of democracies and coordinate against those who don’t follow those principles. Second, you have to punish bad behavior. Thirdly, people will tend to exploit the rules-based system unless you very stiff, very firm in protecting that system. What I see today, because many of these [maligned 00:36:28] actors are exploiting these internal divisions, and that can be lethally dangerous unless re-protected. The Australian election system so far has proved to one of the most successful in the world. I don’t know if you feel that way in [crosstalk 00:36:46], but look from the outside … For example, the mandatory voting system cuts out certain things like the fight for mobilizing. Because you don’t need to fight to mobilize voters, there’s a natural gravity to work for the can tre.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s right.

Gordon Banjai:                   That’s a big benefit of the Australian electoral system, which others could learn from. Because in many countries, think of the US. Many politicians are working on trying to keep voters from voting.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, that’s right. Yep.

Gordon Banjai:                   Or asymmetrically, trying to mobilize their voters and keep others away. If you think about Cambridge Analytica and what they have done in the US elections, that was tactics about that. How do you keep the voters of Hillary Clinton away from voting while mobilizing the Trump voters? Those are nasty games. If you don’t have that problem, that’s already a better place.

Misha Zelinsky:                  The last thing I want to ask you about is: I’ve been thinking a lot about democracy recently. Over the summer I was doing some reading. It’s relatively new thing in human history, democracy. I take it for granted as something that’s always been in my life, but it’s really a blip in human history. What are the warning signs, do you think, that a democracy is headed down to the wrong path into an anocracy  or an autocracy? What are the things that we should be watchful for?

Gordon Banjai:                   Right. Great question. I love it. First, endangered middle classes, the destabilization of middle classes. Second, polarization of politics, political language, which you mentioned. Behavior. Third and most important probably is media. If the mass media, and that includes social media, is losing its standards, ethical standards, or it gets under the influence of malign actors … If mass media cannot be held to ethics, or it loses its balance, the balance coverage, then if private or public forces get control of a significant part of the media, then media turns into propaganda.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah.

Gordon Banjai:                   And the propaganda, you can brainwash people into very stupid things. Think about the 1930s Germany. Adolf Hitler couldn’t have done in 1934 what he was doing in 1939, simply because of the Goebbelsian propaganda and brainwash. Then after media come the other institutions, independent institutions. The independence of courts, prosecutors, police, the control over political parties, checks and balances. These are very important things. Democracy is not simply the will of the majority. It’s also the ability for power to change hands if the majority changes its mind. It’s the right to change your mind and change your leaders.

It’s not only about the will of the majority. It’s also the protection of minority. Even when there is a strong majority, democracy’s about probably three years from now, the other side will have a majority. You have to maintain the probability. That’s what will keep power in control, in check.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, J. S. Mill talked about the tyranny of the majority, right? So you need to make sure that the majority is not necessarily-

Gordon Banjai:                   [crosstalk 00:40:36] countries, in many countries in central eastern Europe, in other countries, developed countries. That’s a phenomenon that’s only possible if there is a strong control of media and propaganda, because that facilitates, that’s the anteroom for dictatorship.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, thank you so much. One final question that I ask all my guests is if they’re in Australia, I ask them about international people. I know you’re a huge fan of Australia, regularly attend, but if you’re having a barbecue at your place, what three Australians, alive or dead, would you invite along?

Gordon Banjai:                   My childhood hero, Angus Young from AC/DC.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Very good!

Gordon Banjai:                   In his shorts.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Playing the music, yeah?

Gordon Banjai:                   Yes. Prime Minister Keating. I’ve heard a lot of good things. I’ve never met him, but he seems to be a very smart and-

Misha Zelinsky:                  He’s more of an opera man than an AC/DC man, but he’ll-

Gordon Banjai:                   It will be an interesting group around the barbecue. Thirdly, I have a good friend who I think very highly of as an investor from my close profession. Mark Delaney from Australia, super.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Very good.

Gordon Banjai:                   He is a guru of investing, and I look up to him for his investments.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, you’ve got investing, politics, and AC/DC. It’d be a good combination at your barbecue. I’d like to be a fly on the wall at that. But anyway, look. Thank you for joining Diplomates. It’s a punny name, and it also implies that you’re my mate. I don’t often get to claim former prime ministers as a mate, but just so you know I am.

Gordon Banjai:                   [You’re welcome 00:42:19].

Misha Zelinsky:                  But also, Hungary’s not a country that gets a lot of discussion in Australia, but my assistant Google, I did some research. There are 100,000 Hungarians in Australia, so I’m hoping that at least some of them listen and I can build an audience off the back of you as well. Thank you so much for your time. Look forward to having you back someday in the future.

Gordon Banjai:                   Thank you very much, and greetings to all of those Hungarians in Australia.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Thank you. Including our current treasurer, who is a Hungarian and a Jew. His family fled after the … Josh Frydenberg is, but shout out to Josh from Diplomates. I doubt he is someone who listens to my podcast, but hopefully he listens sometime. Thanks, Gordon.

Gordon Banjai:                   Thank you very much.

 

Professor Simon Hix

Professor Simon Hix is the pro-Director for research at the London School of Economics and is the chair of Vote Watch Europe. 

Professor Hix is a globally renowned expert on EU politics, democratic institutions, parliamentary voting behaviour, political parties and elections – and to prove it he is the author of over 100 books and papers on these topics. 

We had a fascinating discussion about Brexit, where to for Britain as the deadline for a deal approaches, what drove the Leave vote itself as well as the worrying rise of right wing nationalism in Europe.

 

EPISODE TRANSCRIPT

Misha Zelinsky:                  So, Simon Hix, welcome to Diplomates, thank you for joining me.

Simon Hix:                              You’re welcome.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And I should say, for the recording, that we’re in your rather salubrious offices here in the London School of Economics. So thank you for having me along.

But given that we are in London and this is a political podcast, what better place to start than Brexit. So, as an Australian to a Brit, what the hell is going on? Because back home it looks kind of crazy. Is it as crazy as it seems?

Simon Hix:                              It is crazy. You know, I was away for a period over Christmas and came back and it’s the same old, same old, in the sense that we still don’t know where we’re heading. So, we’ve got a vote next week in the House of Commons on Tuesday.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And that vote is for … ?

Simon Hix:                              This vote is for Theresa May’s deal. So she’s done a deal with the EU which is called a withdrawal agreement. It’s an agreement that sets the terms of the UK leaving the EU and the terms are, essentially, how much money do we still owe as part of the divorce deal? What are the rights of the citizens in the UK and UK citizens on the continent? What happens to the Irish border, between Northern Ireland and the Republic? Republic, of course, is going to stay in the EU, Northern Ireland in the UK, of course is going to leave the EU. And then a transition arrangement for two years while we negotiate the long term deal.

So she signed the deal which is more or less the deal that we knew was going to be signed. It has to be ratified by the House of Commons for us to be able to leave on the 29th of March. So the 29th of March is the deadline bias.

So if they don’t pass it through the House of Commons, we leave on the 29th of March without a deal.

Misha Zelinsky:                  A hard Brexit, so to speak. Yeah.

Simon Hix:                              A hardest of hard Brexit. So, leaving without a deal has potentially enormous consequences. We’ve got one wing of the conservative party saying, No, leaving without a deal is fine. We’ll be fine. A lot of them are very Libertarian. They have a view that this is about creative destruction. Bring it on. And we’ve gotten to the point where you’ve got this left wing of the Labour party saying, Actually a no deal would be a good thing because it would be a crisis of capitalism and then they’ll be a collapse of the government. And then Labour will get elected and we’ll be able to implement socialism. And then we’ve got the right wing and the Tory party saying, No deal will be a good thing because there will be a crisis of socialism and then we’ll be able to slash and burn the British state and they’ll be this new Singapore-on-Thames Nirvana that we’ve wanted.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s almost horseshoe politics with the extreme left and the extreme right, both agreeing on the outcome.

Simon Hix:                              They can’t both be right, obviously, right?

But either way, they think there’s potential disaster. Most people accept that without a deal, it will be end of Just-In-Time production supply chains which could be the collapse of manufacturing. Tariffs and quotas on agriculture, most of our agriculture produce is exported to the European market.

So I think the planes will not be able to take off and land. You know, they’ll be a tail backs at Dover. They estimate a 10 minute delay on every truck going through Dover within an hour, leaves to a 30 mile tail back. So you can imagine what that cumulatively…

That super market shelves will start to empty out. The NHS is worrying about running out of drugs because their main supplier is in Holland. A no deal scenario is a disaster. Most people accept that. Most economists, most people who work in the supply chains will tell you that. All the business interests will tell you that.

What does it mean for the citizens rights? Nobody really knows.

So, it’s potentially disastrous if we leave without any kind of deal. But the right wing or the Tory party are using this as a threat because they don’t like the deal that she’s done. They feel the EU has got a better arrangements out of this. So we still don’t know where we’re headed. If they kick out the deal next Tuesday, which they probably will, all bets are off. We have no idea what’s going to happen after that. And the EU is willing to say, Bring it on. If there’s a no deal, you guys are going to suffer more than us.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s interesting because this sort of concept that Europe would get a better deal, why would they? I mean, there’s no incentive for Europe to encourage other countries to leave, I should think, right? So if you’re the European Union, you want to make it as hard as possible I would have thought.

Simon Hix:                              Yeah. So there’s kind of two sides of it. So one side, I don’t think it’s the EU wants to be seen to be punishing Britain, although there are definitely voices that say that. Particularly you hear that on the left in France or the left in Germany, where they blame the Anglo-Saxon bankers for the financial crisis. And so they say, It’s about time the Brits got their comeuppance. Sort of thing.

But the general view on the continent is they don’t want Britain to leave. We’re a major economy. We’re important for exports and imports.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Defense.

Simon Hix:                              Defense. For the whole credibility of the European project globally. The EU project in general is weakened if Britain leaves. So there’s a general sense of it’s a shame that the UK is leaving. So they don’t want to punish Britain, but equally, they’re saying, why should we give Britain a particularly good deal? You chose to leave. We have to protect our interests and our interests are the continuity of the single market that we’ve worked our butt off to create a continental scale single market with free movers and good services and capital within it. Why would we undermine that? Just because you guys want to cherry pick the good bits of this and not be responsible for some of the obligations that come with being part of this single market? Why should we give that to you? We don’t give that to anybody else?

So it’s not about punishing Britain, it’s about maintaining the credibility of the EU and holding the EU together. And of course, for the economic relationship between Britain and the EU 27 is pretty asymmetric. In London, these politicians here are very arrogant about Britain. We’re the fifth largest economy in the world. We’re this great global trading power. English language is the lingua-Franco globally. London is the world capital of the world services sector. Yada, yada, yada.

50% of our trade is with the EU 27. 15% of their trade is with us. That British trade with the EU 27 is worth about 20% of our GDP. Their trade with us is worth about 2% of their GDP.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Right. That’s interesting.

Simon Hix:                              And if you talk to trade economists here at LSC, they’ll tell you that those kind of asymmetries ultimately will predict what kind of bargain you get in a trade deal. The EU’s got far less to lose from failing to agree to a deal than the UK has.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s interesting.

Simon Hix:                              So the UK, the deal that gets done is bound to favor the EU. So, I remember a former student of mine is in South Korea, she’s in the Korean diplomatic academy and she’s one of their experts on Europe. And I said to her, hey, Wun, how’s Brexit look from east asia? She says, well, Simon -”

Misha Zelinsky:                  About as good as it looks from Australia, I’d assume.

Simon Hix:                              Right. Exactly. So it’s kind of interesting for an Australian audience to hear her say, she said, look, it doesn’t matter if you’re the fifth largest economy or the 10th largest economy, like Korea, or the 15th or the 20th, if you’re not the US, the EU or China, you’re a regulation taker. Those three markets make up 50% of the global GDP. 50% of global trade and goods and services. And they’re bargaining deal with any… It’s a reason why none of the three of them have got deals with each other in trade. They’ve all got bilateral deals with everyone else in the world. Because they say, ‘You want access to our market? Here’s the set of rules. Take it or leave it. You don’t want to accept these rules? You don’t have access.

And so that’s the way the US negotiates trade deals. That’s the way the EU negotiates trade deals. Why would it be any different if you’re the fifth?

So, Japan is the largest economy that’s accepted that kind of an arrangement. Canada, South Korea, those three countries. So Canada and South Korea both have trade deals with the EU and with the US. And the deals they have are essentially agreeing to apply European or American rules.

So for example, Canadian beef farmers have two fields. One field with cows destined for the US market and one field with cows destined to the European market.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Interesting.

Simon Hix:                              And the cows destined to the American market are pumped full of hormones, so you get these big fat cows destined to the American market. And the kind of skinny, vegan cows destined for the European market. You know, have to follow European Phytosanitary standards. So they’re regulation takers.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah. So, the Brexiteers are probably going to get mugged by reality then in the end.

Simon Hix:                              Of course they are.

Misha Zelinsky:                  But so, leaving aside whether or not you get a better deal, there’s a deal on the table. They’re talking through the politics of it with it going to a vote, it’s interesting to me a lot of the discussion is around May versus the Brexiteers within her own party. And the Parliament is bigger than one party or bigger than one faction.

Simon Hix:                              Well yeah. And she doesn’t have a majority.

Misha Zelinsky:                  No.

Simon Hix:                              Because [crosstalk 00:08:48]have majority.

Misha Zelinsky:                  But there’s not a lot of discussion about Labour in all of this and Corbyn. So I’m curious to get your take in all of that.

Simon Hix:                              Yeah so Labour, like the conservatives, Labour is also split on this. It’s split into three groups. One group are the very pro-European group that would like to cause as much problems with this ratification as possible. With the hope that there’s a second referendum and they overturn and stop Brexit altogether.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And these are the sort of Blair-ite types.

Simon Hix:                              They’re the kind of Blair-right wing of the party.

Then there’s another group, which is a more radical left group. They call them the Lexiteers. The left wing Brexiteers.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Right.

Simon Hix:                              Who have never liked the EU. They saw it as a kind of capitalist project. They want us to get out of the EU so they can have a sort of socialism in one country. Pull up the drawbridge. British jobs for British workers. Subsidized British industry. You know, they’re living in some kind of…

Misha Zelinsky:                  The old socialized, left, yeah.

Simon Hix:                              So, in a sense, I like to describe the two radical versions of Brexit are the Tory radical version of the Brexit as the Singapore-Thames. And the Labour radical version of Brexit is Venezuela on trend.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s good.

Simon Hix:                              That kind of epitomizes where they think they’d like to take us. Most sensible people don’t want either of those outcomes.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah.

Simon Hix:                              And Corbyn comes intellectually from that wing of the party. He’s never liked the EU. He thinks that we want to leave. To give these guys a bit of credit, though, a lot of people who did vote for Brexit in the North of England, you know, a lot of these cities in industrial decline are former Labour voters. So a lot of Labour seats have big let it, leave majorities in them. And the Brexit voting coalition in the referendum were two groups. It was kind of wealthy rural southerners who were just centerphobes who never liked Europe because they want Britain to go back to Empire.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah.

Simon Hix:                              Empire 2.0 is what they want. And cities in industrial decline. Post industrial cities, very angry voters who are really angry at the ruling elites in the south, in the establishment. And they’ve never liked… In a sense, voting’s really the EU’s symbolic vote against what has happened in those communities.

So I’ll give you an example. So in Sutherland in the Northeast of England, the major employer in Sutherland is the Nissan car factory. Employs about 300,000 people. It’s the largest car employer in the UK. 70 something percent of their production goes to the EU single market. Just-In-Time supply chains, meaning that any delay in their supply chains will massively increase costs. So Brexit will increase those costs because they’ll be customs checks and stuff. Sutherland voted to leave the EU and the majority of those car workers in Sutherland voted to leave the EU.

So Lisa Nandy is a Labour politician and she tells a story about being asked during the Brexit campaign, being asked by the management of the car factory to come and talk to the shop floor workers because the management was saying, we’re totally opposed to Brexit because of the risks to the factory. Can you come and explain to them that if they vote for Brexit, they could all lose their jobs.

So she stands up and she tells the story to a packed room full of production line workers, saying, you do realize that Just-In-Time production will end. They’ll be tariffs and quotas on your cars. So, Nissan, which is a global company, will probably decide to end production here and move the factory to France or Slovakia or somewhere else. And you guys could all be out a job. And she says, one guy put up his hand and he said, we’re not stupid. I’ve been working here for 20 years. Don’t you think I know how Just-In-Time production lines work? Don’t you think I know where our cars are going? He said, you know, with new technology coming along we’re not expecting to have this factory here in 20 years anyway. It’ll be robots doing this stuff. We’re not voting for Brexit for our jobs. We’re voting for Brexit for our kids and our grandkids. And to send you guys a signal that you’re not listening to what has been happening around here in the Northeast of England.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s interesting.

Simon Hix:                              And that’s a real challenge for the center left. And so there’s an element wing of the Labour party which is very sensitive to the fact that although the kind of cosmopolitan youth, younger voters, the Londoners, are opposed to Brexit, a lot of their core voters are saying, you’ve got to deliver this.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah. So we’ll get to the vote itself because I want to pick up on some of the things you’re talking about but just to stay with the Labour party, just very quickly, so Corbyn, one of the things that I find interesting is that there’s a real enthusiasm for Corbyn amongst young people. The so called Corbynistas.

Simon Hix:                              Yeah.

Misha Zelinsky:                  They would be remain people.

Simon Hix:                              They’re all remainers. In fact-

Misha Zelinsky:                  How is he getting away with being probably a Brexiteer in disguise whilst-

Simon Hix:                              It’s really difficult. And I think he can get away with it because they’re in opposition.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah.

Simon Hix:                              And so he’s able to oppose anything the government proposes. So in a sense, what he’s asking for, if you actually look at what he’s asked for from Brexit, what he wants is the UK to carry on applying EU social regulation standards, EU environment standards, frictionless trade, to try employment first Brexit, he calls it. So you want to keep as much manufacturing as you can in the country. But that’s exactly what May’s deal is. You can’t put a piece of paper between the deal that she’s negotiated and what actually Labour are asking for.

So they’re really only voting against this symbolically, to try and create a crisis. To try and bring down the government in the hope that there could be a general election.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Right. But is there any way, I mean, if you’re May, just to put on your sort of… Is there a way for her to turn the focus onto Labour in the vote and I mean, far be it from me to give advice to the Tory party, but it just seems interesting to me that rather taking all these seating internally, if there’s a way to force the opposition-

Simon Hix:                              But with the government’s opposition dynamics of British politics…

Misha Zelinsky:                  Government always owns the result, right?

Simon Hix:                              Yeah. And the opposition, nobody’s going to blame the opposition if this fails. They will blame the government, blame Theresa May. So they can get away with playing these kind of games. And if we end up with a no deal Brexit and that is a disaster for Britain, and it could be absolutely disastrous. There’s kind of a typical British sense of, oh, it will be alright on the night. People will figure it out. People come to their senses. There’ll be a managed no deal. People will just figure it out. The French aren’t going to be crazy enough to stop lories going through the tunnel. And the Dutch are still going to be sending us medicines for the NHS. Come on, people will still allow British airlines to land in Paris and Berlin or whatever. It’ll be all right on the night. That’s the sort of general attitude of the British public.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Big gamble.

Simon Hix:                              I think it’s a very big gamble.

Misha Zelinsky:                  While I speak of gambling, let’s talk about the vote. And correct me if I’m wrong, you were given the rather difficult task of being an advocate for the remain voters. You went around the country. There were a bunch of experts who went around as the go would say, so called experts. Maybe you’re one of the so called experts people speak of.

Simon Hix:                              I was, yeah.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Tell us about that.

Simon Hix:                              So no, I was part of a group of about 14 academics, political scientists, economists, lawyers, historians, who were funded by the British Economic and Social Research Counsel, so the main funding of the social science body in the UK, to be experts. We were meant to be neutral. We weren’t advocates on one side or the other. We were meant to be able to, you know, media could call on us and we’d go on TV or the radio or go on public platforms in local communities to referee debates or to be someone there who could correct facts, this kind of stuff.

And it was modeled on what had happened during the Scottish referendum campaign. They had this program for the Scottish referendum campaign and the perception was that it worked really well. They’d had a bunch of academics who could come on and sort of neutralize the craziness of some of the claims people were making.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And the remain sort of came from behind in that situation to remind of that.

Simon Hix:                              Yeah, exactly. So, we’d go to different parts of the country and it was a real eye opener going to places. I remember going to Spalding in Lincolnshire. Lincolnshire, east coast of England, very agricultural community. Lots of new Polish and Lithuanian fruit pickers and agricultural labor going into that town.

We were called by the local newspaper, can we come for a town hall meeting on Brexit. Can they send some experts? So three or four of us went out there. Difficult place to get to in the middle of nowhere on the east coast of England. We went London to Peterborough, a bus and a train and anyway. It was hours together. Just a sense of how isolated this place is. You know Britain’s a small country, it’s a really isolated place out there.

And the local town is sort of boarded up and the only places open are these Polish shops and very flat agricultural land. And, you know, about 150 people show up at this town hall meeting and it’s about 80% pro-Brexit. And we’re standing on the platform and whatever we say, they ask questions, and whatever we say goes down like a lead balloon.

So, you know, one guy said, well why do you guys think Brexit will be bad for the British economy? And my economist friend says, well, you know, 50% of trades for the year, about 20% of our GDP, 20% of the whole size of our economy. If there’s a reduction in trade that’s a reduction in the size of our economy. And no matter how different people mold it in different ways, the estimate is it will be between 2 and 8% of our GDP. A reduction of between 2 and 8% of the size of our economy. And the guy said, that’s your fucking GDP not mine. What should I care?

My initial thought was well that’s a stupid thing to say but then I thought actually, no, that’s actually a really clever-

Misha Zelinsky:                  Wouldn’t change the economy of that town for brief-

Simon Hix:                              Really! And what he’s saying is, it’s been shit here for a long time, you guys are gonna take the hit for this.

And someone else said, I’m a farm laborer and since all these polls have been coming over, my wages have gone down every year for the past three years and I bet you lot have had rise haven’t you? And it went round like that.

And then someone else said, I’ve been waiting for a counsel house and it used to be a four month waiting list and now it’s a two year waiting list.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Because the immigrants.

Simon Hix:                              Yeah. And someone else said, you know, my daughter’s at one primary school and my younger son was gonna go to the same primary school but now there’s no places left in the school so I’ve got to drop my daughter off in this school drive ten minutes to drop my son off at this other school and then I’m late for work and that’s cause all this, and all the places are full of the bloody Lithuanian Polish kids!

And we’re on the platform going, this isn’t EU’s fault. This isn’t, you know, these are choices the British government has made about not investing in public services in areas where there’s been large immigrant populations and they’d say yeah but no one’s gonna listen to us. Doesn’t matter whether we vote Labour or whether we vote conservative, you guys are not gonna listen to us, but you’re bloody gonna listen to us if we vote for Brexit.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Interesting. So out of this experience did you think the Leave vote would succeed? We’re asking ourselves after the fact now obvious, but on the night did you, after that experience did you think it was gonna go that way?

Simon Hix:                              Yeah I did. So the opinion polls are really tight actually and most people weren’t trusting the polls. The opinion polls have been so wrong in the 2015 general election-

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah that’s right.

Simon Hix:                              Nobody-

Misha Zelinsky:                  They predicted Labour was gonna win.

Simon Hix:                              Yeah, exactly and so nobody was trusting them in 2016 and so everyone was saying the opinion polls are obviously wrong and so then they were making up their own version of what they thought was gonna happen. So most people thought the remain was gonna win easily, the betting markets, the currency markets, the prediction models, everyone-

Misha Zelinsky:                  For the record I also said it wouldn’t happen so…

Simon Hix:                              Yeah so I was doing some consulting in various different places and I was showing opinion poll data to say this is too close to call. It really could go either way. And my experience of going ’round to different parts of the country suggested that was the case. So it didn’t surprise me on the night.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, okay. That vote itself had kind of, Brexit kind of reset the map for politics and we’ve seen a lot of things happen since like Trump. What does it tell us more generally, you’re a political scientist, what does it tell us more generally about politics?

Simon Hix:                              Yeah, I think we are seeing a lot of advanced democracies, a realignment with politics. A realignment away from… for a long time politics in the post-war period was pretty simple straightforward. Lower income people voted for the left. Left wing parties wanted redistribution of wealth, higher taxes, creation of public services. Higher income people voted for people on the right. Right wing parties wanted to cut taxes, cut public spending, liberalize markets, and so on. And that was the sort of standard politics for most of democracies for much of the post second world war period.

We’re now facing the situation where it’s largely an education divide and an urban rural divide. It’s much more geography driving it than anything else. So you’ve got cities that are globalizing cities. They’re creating growth in financial services and creative industries, film, fashion, art, design, media, tourism, higher education, and so on.

The returns you get on education are massive so the economic divide is really driven by whether or not you’ve got a degree or not so getting university education massively increases your economic opportunities. And the economic opportunities gap between those who have university certification verse those who’ve not has grown massively and the economic opportunity gap has grown between cities that are growing, that is fast growing cities, and other cities in industrial decline and then aging rural populations.

So you’re getting a kind of anti-establishment feeling which is a coalition of these aging rural populations feeling like what is happening to my country? It’s not the country I remember or the country I grew up in.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah. Sort of pathos nostalgia.

Simon Hix:                              Yeah, exactly, and often that’s around race and ethnicity and immigration and a backlash against gender equality. For example, interestingly, after the Gilets Jaunes demonstrations in France-

Misha Zelinsky:                  We’ll get to those.

Simon Hix:                              They set up a bunch of citizens assemblists out of the Gilets Jaunes and you know what the very first demand that came from those citizens assemblies was? Abolish gay marriage.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So that was them… interesting.

Simon Hix:                              Which is more kind of symbolic politics about the kind of rolling back, nostalgia, world’s moving too fast and so there’s that aging rural population.

And then you’ve got cities in industrial decline and there’s very angry, and sometimes this is young people, sometimes it’s older people, particularly men who used to be in industry, collapse in industry, decline in industry, and that coaliltion, that antiestablishment coaliltion is a new force that’s very much drawing support for populous parties and as far as they’re concerned mainstream centre parties are basically the same. They represent different postcodes of the capital city. So the Tory party, pre Theresa May, represented Notting Hill and Notting Hill set and the Labour party represent isn’t. And if in France the French socialists represent the Left bank and the French conservatives represent the Right bank of Paris. That’s what it felt like to the rest of the country.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And it’s just consensus around free trade, open markets, free movement of capital.

Simon Hix:                              Yeah, open liberal immigration policies-

Misha Zelinsky:                  And there’s some differences on the margin around how you sort of dice up the pie and that type of stuff?

Simon Hix:                              Yeah, exactly and whereas mainstream center right leans a bit more towards financial service interest and big business interest and the mainstream center left leans a bit more towards creatives industries and the new economy and higher education interest and this kind of stuff but neither of them really care about rural populations. Neither of them really care about cities in industrial decline.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s interesting that this sort of rural urban divide and the question of people being told what’s in their best interest and I think that’s interesting about the way that economists and people that are in the political game for the last 30 years are probably looked at the macro stories and look how good it is, right? But the thing about trade is it destroys and distributes unevenly.

Simon Hix:                              Trade and immigration. Both have distributional consequences. So in aggregate we know that trade is good for the economy in terms of increasing GDP, increasing opportunities, and so on. But you don’t look at what the local consequences of that are. So there’s loads of research now that looks at the China shock where you can locally, what has been the effect of globalization.

Misha Zelinsky:                  China between the WO in 2001.

Simon Hix:                              Yeah, exactly. David Autor is an american economist and a bunch of European political scientists, what they’ve done is for every region, for every local region, they’ve worked out what is the employment in each sector, what percentage employment is there in each sector in that region, and what is the exposure to global trade of that sector. And so you can work out what has been the globalization effect regionally. And what we know is that the bigger the globalization, the bigger the negative globalization effect regionally, the bigger the vote for populous parties.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Interesting, isn’t it.

Simon Hix:                              And the bigger the vote for Trump. The bigger the vote for Brexit in the UK and the bigger the vote for Le Pen in France, for the populous in Italy and so on and so on.

So that’s one. The other one is this distributional consequences of immigration. Again we know that immigration is great for the economy. It makes… new skills, new ideas, new resources, cheaper public goods, cheaper public services. On average immigrants our net contributors to the economy, they’re not recipients of money. The usual story.

Misha Zelinsky:                  All the facts.

Simon Hix:                              All the aggregate level facts. But increasingly what we know is that there’s local distributional consequences in two senses. One is an economic one, one’s a cultural.

The economic one is in certain sectors of the economy, wages have fallen dramatically as a result of immigration. In the UK for example, it’s agricultural labor and the building trades. Why? Because they’re cash.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yep, hard to regulate.

Simon Hix:                              They’re cash-based economies. All the sectors where there’s a minimum wage and the minimum wage is enforced, immigration has had no effect on wages. But it’s had a huge effect on agricultural labor in the building trade.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Interesting.

Simon Hix:                              Everyone’s got a Polish plumber and everyone’s got a Lithuanian fruit picker.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And they’re rural areas as well.

Simon Hix:                              And they’re rural areas. That’s where there’s been real wage competition.

And the other one, then, is competition for public services and that’s usually disproportionate. Cities of where there’s immigration being sucked into cities, public services are being cranked out and a lot of these rural areas nobody’s thinking about increasing school capacity. Nobody’s thinking about building another classroom in a primary school or you’ve got to provide more surgery spaces in the local doctor surgery. Nobody’s thinking like that. So the local population feels the squeeze in public services.

And then, of course, there’s the cultural aspect. A lot of these places have never seen immigrants before and that takes time. That’s a legacy. We forget too quickly… So my grandmother grew up in Northwest London and where she grew up in Northwest London it was very white at that time and then it became very big Indian population immigration in the 1950s and 60s.

Misha Zelinsky:                  How quickly did it happen?

Simon Hix:                              It happened in the space of about a decade.

Misha Zelinsky:                  They say the speeds often effective, right?

Simon Hix:                              Yeah, the speed. But at that time there was really vehement… I remember my grandmother being very racist, you know. Ugh they’re all moving into, why are they moving into my neighborhood type thing. And now of course we’re in London and nobody thinks twice about it, right? So we forget very quickly our own recent experience of what it was like with being whites with new immigrants.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Oh it’s a similar story in Australia as well. So before we get off Brexit because I want to step into Europe but there’s a lot of talk about second vote. I’m quite nervous about the consequence of second vote because after everything that we’ve just covered about the anger and telling people what’s what, there’s a sense to me that you didn’t quite get it right and we’re gonna give you another shot at it and I would be very concerned, and I’m curious to get your take of it, seems to be very concerning to suddenly flip and be 52/48 remain. It’s almost like it’s been stolen from people.

Simon Hix:                              I absolutely agree with you. I mean I agree with you for two main reasons. One, the call for second referendum ignores, actually, the history of Britain’s relationship with the EU which is that we’ve always had a semi-detached relationship. We’ve always been reluctant members. We weren’t members of the single currency, we weren’t members of the Schengen border-free zone, we were always semi-detached.

Misha Zelinsky:                  We had a deal.

Simon Hix:                              You know, and sooner or later we were gonna have to make a choice as the process of European integration is moving forward. Sooner or later we’re going to have to make a choice. Are we inside it or are we outside. So it made sense to have a referendum on this and the referendum was going to make the decision so you can’t pretend that history is now fundamentally changed so now we really want to stay and we want to sign up to the whole thing. Of course we don’t. So that’s the first thing we’ve noticed.

The second thing is, you’re right, it’s incredibly condescending so I get annoyed with someone of my arch remainer friends who seem to think that going around and telling people you’re stupid and you’re a racist and you’ve made the wrong decision and you’re a xenophobe and you were bought by Russians. You think that’s gonna persuade people to change their mind?

Misha Zelinsky:                  Hasn’t really worked in human history so far.

Simon Hix:                              The third thing is it would get really, really nasty and I do really worry about what the consequence is. I’m genuinely worried about violence, political assassination even. I mean we had a murder in British politics, Jo Cox was murdered in the 2015 general election campaign by a radical right extremist. The Labour MP in the north of England. I wouldn’t be surprised if we have that kind of thing again. It’s not to say that we should be scared about, it’s more the, there’s a legitimate angle which is that this was an antiestablishment anti-elite vote. It’s very dangerous in democracies to fuel an antiestablishment anti-elite movement. That’s when you really can get very dangerous types of things happening and I don’t want to fuel that and I do think there was legitimate reasons for people to vote for this.

I think my experience of traveling around the country, people were not thinking about this lightly, people were massively mobilized. They thought about this very carefully. And a lot of people say, well they weren’t considering the economic interest. Well whenever people have elections and make choices in elections, there’s lots of things that go into their mind when they walk into the ballot box. For some people it’s symbolic, for some people it’s careful economical interest of their family or their personally, for some people it’s national identity. There’s lots of things that go into what influences why people put the x where they do on a ballot paper and so that’s no different in a referendum. Why would we think it should be any different in a referendum? And it’s completely legitimate.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Now, talking about that nationalism, and you’ve got another hat, you’re the chair, I believe, of Vote Watch. It’s a European project so you’re very, obviously, across European politics. Kind of want to get your take about how loudly are you about what we’re seeing other countries across, you know, Poland, Hungary, Turkey, not in Europe but peripheral to Europe, obviously, and now Italy. More and more, sort of right wing-

Simon Hix:                              France.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, yeah. Like you said, more of these National upsurge but not only in opposition. They’ve taken control of governments and dismantling democracies.

Simon Hix:                              That’s right. What we’re seeing it-

Misha Zelinsky:                  Is this 1929 to 39 all over again or is a bit more complex?

Simon Hix:                              Too early to tell in that sense. So it’s true that what we’ve seen is part of this realignment of politics, it’s the rise in support for these populous parties and the populous coalition is the same coalition we’ve been talking about behind Brexit.

And almost every country in Europe now has a populous movement of some kind. Some of them a bit more radical than others but no matter what country you talk about there’s a party where it’s… I don’t throw around populism lightly so what I mean by populism is a party that says that we represent the voice of the people against the establishment. And it’s very antiestablishment type view, very simplistic policy responses. A classic mainstream party moderate their promises because they know that there’s certain things that it’s difficult to deliver on and you can’t promise this and promise that. Where as populous have no constraints so the populous will say we’ll shut down immigration. Populous will say we’ll stop globalization.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Simple responses to complex problems.

Simon Hix:                              In Italy, the populous parties say we’re gonna have a flat tax and introduce universal basic income.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, increasing spending and lower taxes.

Simon Hix:                              Right.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Great plan if you can pull it off.

Simon Hix:                              It’s that kind of pub politics, I think of it, and it’s very attractive at the moment, particularly post economic crisis and we’re growing in equality, people saying, well what the hell. Let’s just try this. Let’s just go for these guys. And it’s a wakeup call for the establishment.

Misha Zelinsky:                  But once they get control of the-

Simon Hix:                              So here’s the real test. The real test is in ten years time when we look back, there’s two possible outcomes. One outcome is you get, you know, democracy is a safety valve. If there are deep divisions in society surely Democratic institutions and elections are vehicles through which these things get thrown up and then we as mainstream establishment, we have to address this stuff.

One version is mainstream parties respond, we come up with new policy responses, there’s big infrastructure investment, we try to address some of these regional and individual inequalities that’s developed, we try and think about how to create new sectors of the economy, try to think about what do we do to address these inequalities that have come out of globalization. How do we address issues of social integration of immigration. If those things get addressed then they’ll be a restabalization of politics.

Another alternative world is these populous come to power and instead of just addressing these things they start to dismantle democratic institutions.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And you’re seeing that in Poland.

Simon Hix:                              And they say we represent the will of the people and you get a narrative which is popular in Hungary which is I’m not a liberal democrat I’m a iliberal democrat because I represent the will of the people. The will of the people is the majority, why should you guys constrain what the people want? Why should you judges and you media and you other political parties, why should you constrain the will of the people?

Once you gauge that narrative that starts to get dangerously close to the types of politics we saw in the 1930s and so we don’t know yet how robust our institutions are to that because you’ve not seen it. These post-war institutions we’ve built, they’re pretty robust so far and they’re relatively new in centuries in Europe in Parliament in Hungary and that’s why I think the judiciary and the media are quite easy to be attacked. Italy is the test case. You’ve got the populists now in Italy. How robust are the Italian institutions to what will be? And Le Pen could win in France or Le Pen’s niece, she is the rising star.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Let’s talk about the French because I think, maybe it’s an arrogance of major Western countries that some of the Eastern European countries have been on the periphery and maybe they’ll never really develop democracies anyway and maybe they’re experiments, France is a serious economy, it’s a serious country, it’s a serious democratic history.

Simon Hix:                              Nuclear power, the rest of it.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Right. How worried are you about France? If France were to become a notably autocratic nationalist sort of nation, I mean that’s the European project almost over, right?

Simon Hix:                              It is over. Yeah. They were saying you can’t have France without Europe, you can’t have Europe without France.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Right.

Simon Hix:                              So Le Pen almost won. The Nationalists in France have been growing in support.

Misha Zelinsky:                  But doesn’t feel like they’re losing momentum.

Simon Hix:                              They’re not losing momentum, they’re gaining momentum. France is the epitome of the rotation of this politics. Macron represents the global elite, Le Pen represents the will of the people against the global elite. That’s the narrative.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And the concern I had when he came to power was that, didn’t strike me as the man for the times because the inequality story, the cultural disconnect story, he’s just want to double down on all the things that people are pissed off about.

Simon Hix:                              To be fair to him, France is a bit particular because France…

Misha Zelinsky:                  They always have this history of-

Simon Hix:                              Yeah, but not just that. The structure of the labor market in France is quite particular because they’ve got highly regulated markets and you have a whole insider outsider problem meaning that a lot of young people are priced out of jobs because highly regulated labor markets make it very difficult for companies to take on new people knowing they may not be able to keep them in place in 6 months or 12 months or 18 months. So you get very, very high youth unemployment in France and so that’s very different to… So a lot of young people actually were supporting Le Pen in this election.

So Macron in that sense was saying I want to liberalize the French economy in return for big infrastructure spending. In return for big spending on new technologies like digital environment, trying to shift the economy away to new technology so in a sense it wasn’t your classic doubling down of globalization it was more of a, we’re not gonna stop the world, we’re not gonna stop globalization, we’re not gonna save manufacturing in Europe. We need to think about a new economy. How are we gonna build this new economy. So in a sense, I saw his agenda of coming to power, his policy agenda and some of the people around him were really thinking creatively about how to think about what is going to be a new economy or a new society in a globalized world in an advanced democracy. That’s a step ahead and that’s exactly what I want mainstream politics to be thinking about doing.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, absolutely. He had a lot of hope-

Simon Hix:                              The problem then is he only managed to get the liberalization stuff passed without the other stuff so then it just looks like he becomes a baby Thatcher. It looks like he’s doing what Thatcher did in Britain in the 1980s. And it looks like, well, we’re going even more down that path and so then you get the Gilets Jaunes movement, you know, the yellow vest-

Misha Zelinsky:                  The yellow vest.

Simon Hix:                              And so these guys, again it’s an odd coaliltion, the bulk of the movement are rural small town suburban and rural areas, older voters, and small towns in decline, farmers, farm related producers, social conservatives, quite Catholic, and then a small wing are kind of angry, urban, militant, radical, left anarchists. They’re the guys smashing up the Arc de Triomphe and the shops in Paris but the bulk of the movement is this quite conservative movement so it’s a kind of…

Misha Zelinsky:                  People often get hijacked with movements.

Simon Hix:                              They do. And so the radical left has hijacked the movement but the movement itself is quite a socially conservative movement.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Interesting. And one thing we haven’t talked about, we’ve touched around it, but Russia. Every nationalist movement you look at is Putin’s not too far away from it. What’s his game here?

Simon Hix:                              Yeah so Putin is trying to metal. I don’t buy the Putin is driving this but I do buy that Putin is benefiting from all this and so if there’s anything that he can do that makes life difficult for the mainstream establishments so for example Brexit. The allegation is that there’s Russian money that got into the leave campaign and there’s Russian data hackers that were used to try and identify who to target with the leave campaign and so on and so on and so on. With Brexit-

Misha Zelinsky:                  When these votes are so tight though, it’s interesting.

Simon Hix:                              It could make a difference but lots of things could make a different.

Why does he want Brexit? So there’s this sort of macro level thing, anything that destabilizes western Europe is good for Russia-

Simon Hix:                              Yeah. But there’s a micro level thing which is that Britain was the one country at the table in EU that was really pushing to maintain sanctions against Russia, right? With Britain off the table he reckons he’s got much more chance of getting the EU to back down on some of its sanctions. So there’s some really very concrete short term interests related to this. And so he’s playing both of those games. There’s often very concrete interests related to gas, relating to sanctions… The sanctions are hurting and with Europe staying together and the European Establishment have really held together with sanctions and those sanctions really are hurting Russia. So he really wants to try and loosen that so this is the game he’s playing which is not just the big geo-political one. It’s really concretial to economic interests.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, because he’s got the foot on the throat with these sanctions.

Simon Hix:                              Absolutely.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Interesting. One thing I want to get your take on, and we’re coming to the end now and you’ve been very generous with your time but right wing populous. I mean there’s this anger and very sort febrile political environment but why is it that the right wing populous are winning and you’re not seeing… in the 30s you had the communists popping up, the socialists, and all these social democrats, FDR, they’re nowhere and this ethnonationalism, this right wing populism is winning everywhere.

Simon Hix:                              And it’s interesting-

Misha Zelinsky:                  And inequalities there, I mean it’s there in the data.

Simon Hix:                              Similar circumstances in Latin America with the left wing populous so great, big impact of globalization, big economic inequalities between globalizing cities and rural populations. I think it’s largely to do with the fact that these are often middle-aged or older voters that are losing from these changes and so it’s not necessarily younger voters. So apart from what I’ve just said about France, younger voters tend to be the ones to be educated, younger voters and they seem to be the ones to support more radical left ideas. Whereas older, these are more socially conservative voters. They already got their protected interest. They’ve already got, you know, state pensions. Often they’ve got houses and they’ve paid off these debts and so this is largely driven by social values that they don’t share and so national identity.

In fact, 1930s when there was a major economic downturn and we saw votes shifting mainly to the radical right rather than to the radical left. In fact, throughout history of democracies, there’s a nice paper by simple economists looking back over from 1918 to the present looking at major economic downturns. Major economic downturns tend to lead to swing votes to the radical right or to the left and that’s what we’ve seen over the last ten years in Europe.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Interesting.

Alright well one last question I ask of all my guests and this might not wash so well with a Brit but with Australian audience-

Misha Zelinsky:                  After the last series, I’m not sure we’ve even won a game. We’ll need some sandpaper. Australian gets asked who they’d love to invite as internationals to their barbecue. So for international audience I’d say, which three Australians would you invite to a barbecue. Alive or dead, I’ll give you that.

Simon Hix:                              Oh boy, that’s a good question. Well Misha, he’d have to be one of them.

Misha Zelinsky:                  No, no, you can’t count me. Even thought the show’s called Diplomates and I know you as a mate now, obviously, so I couldn’t tap into the cult of Simon Hix online but…

Simon Hix:                              That’s a good- I’ve never thought about that.

Pauline Hanson.

Misha Zelinsky:                  As a political scientist, no doubt on that one.

Simon Hix:                              As a political scientist.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, okay, she can make the fish and chips.

Simon Hix:                              Yeah, I think it’d be interesting to know what makes her tick.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah.

Simon Hix:                              Rudd, I think.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Kevin Rudd.

Simon Hix:                              This is getting interesting.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And the third one would probably… the swimmer with the huge feet. What was his name?

Simon Hix:                              Ian Thorpe.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Thorpe.

Simon Hix:                              So Simon Hix, Ian Thorpe, Kevin Rudd, and Pauline Hanson. Wow. I mean, people like trying to get Kevin to stop speaking but… that would be an interesting barbecue to say the very, very least.

Simon Hix, thank you so much for joining the podcast and it’s been fantastic and I look forward to chatting in the future.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Have a safe trip home, cheers. Bye.

 

 

Governor Kim Beazley

Kim Beazley is the Western Australian Governor.  Governor might be his current job, but he was also the Australian Ambassador to the United States, Parliamentary Leader of the Australian Labor Party, Deputy PM of Australia and also served as Defence Minister – quite a CV!

Governor Beazley joined Misha Zelinsky to talk about Trump, Putin, China and how Australia can navigate the global rivalries that are fast emerging between our strategic allies and our regional trading partners.

We apologise for the quality of this audio. It was done in Government House in Perth, which is currently under extensive renovation. 

 

 

EPISODE TRANSCRIPT

Misha Zelinsky:                  Governor Kim Beazley, thank you for joining me on Diplomates. Now, I should note that we’re doing this in the rather salubrious surrounds of the Government House in Western Australia so thank you for having me along. Very lovely digs you have here.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Now, Governor, I thought it would be useful to start off here. You’re former ambassador to the United States. The U.S. under Trump, it seems to be picking fights with its friends in the European Union, it’s broken deals with the Iran Deal. Of course Australia was not immune in respect to the discussions around migration. The United States has been a very long term friend with Australia. Can we still count on the United States as a friend?

Kim Beazley:                         I’m going to separate Australia out from the rest. We’re unique. I suppose you could also include Israel in that uniqueness. We are not criticized by the U.S. in any way shape or form. That all the old verities were there and the language between us and the United States, all the old undertakings, all the old promises, they all still feature in the rhetoric of, not only the officials of the United States, but also President Trump. So it’s as though, excuse me, we’ve been frozen in aspic. The Australian relationship is carved out from the roiling of the rest of the U.S. relationships in the Western alliance. Most notable with NATO, but also, really, too, with Japan and South Korea and experiences that they have had. So there is no reason to say, in anything that has happened to this point, that Australia has been … had its relationship changed.

Kim Beazley:                         But the circumstances in which we conduct our own diplomacy in the region and further afield, yeah, that has been impacted. But that’s in a sense for us to work out how to handle it.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So we’ve had, recently the foreign minister come out and say that the relationship perhaps is changing. We’ve had the Shadow Foreign Minister in Penny Wong also talk about perhaps a new paradigm emerging. The U.S. president seems to be very focused on deals. He says that NATO’s a bad deal. The Iran deal was a bad deal. Various trade relations are bad deals. Could ANZUS ever be a bad deal, do you think? In that context?

Kim Beazley:                         I think the problem that we have with the President and others, is related to how he sees the world. And basically, American statespersons have run the United States since World War II on the basis of the post World War II settlement. Liberal internationalism, multilateralism, rules of the road in so far as the global commons is concerned, open trading relationships as far as the WTO is concerned. It’s at the heart of the liberal internationalist project of the United States. Trump is the polar opposite. He is a nationalist. He is a unilateralist. He has no permanent friends and no permanent enemies. He is an admirer of authoritarian rule. He sees essentially the paradigms that I described earlier on as essentially excuses for looting the United States. And in that position for a lengthy period of time.

Kim Beazley:                         He takes umbrage, therefore, at anything he thinks in past relationships with allies, in particular, as indicating that they’re users as a reason for him to bring them under a scalpel. And then he looks to Russia, probably in a quite unique way and we don’t know fully the reasons for that, but irrespective of his attitude to Russia, he is essentially not about an international order of liberal principles. He is about an international order of survival of the fittest, competitive and that order is ruled, not by rules, but by force de rigueur and the creation of facts.

Kim Beazley:                         Now that’s him. But his officials don’t agree with that. So you have these absurdities. You have the visit this month in July to Europe, Brussels, one or two other European capitals and then Helsinki with Putin, in which he exhibits all the, with NATO, all the facets of their changed ideological direction. But then the communique comes out. And there’s not a dime of difference between the communique from this NATO and any of the communiques in the past. And American officials are writing that.

Kim Beazley:                         He comes out with the picture I presented of nationalist unilateralism and his Defense Secretary, Mattis, personally writes the national defense strategy which is an enormous re-endorsement of the saliency of the American alliances.

Kim Beazley:                         So you’ve got the President out there with new directions. You’ve got the rest of his administration talking up the old storm, and most of Congress as well, doing the same. So this is, to say the least, a confusing time for Australian ministers.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Given the depth of relationship, I think it’s interesting because as you say the relationship is deep at a political level, it’s also deep at an institutional level. It sent us, for want of a better word, seems to be holding for now but given the extraordinary powers the president has, over foreign affairs in particular, can the relationship survive four years, potentially eight years of Trump? Can they potentially, given the importance of the U.S. relationship to Australia and it is, how do we maintain that relationship in the context of unilateralism and nationalism from a Trump administration?

Kim Beazley:                         If this was being pursued in an intelligent systematic way, based on our, what you’d call full court press of officials, and U.S. policy was proceeding with structure down the line that we’ve been talking about, the answer would be no to that question. But the essence of Trump’s administrative style is beyond the expression of an attitude. It’s impossible to develop a body. And so no one can really predict what’s going to come out of all of this, beyond volatility. And certainly there will be volatility and that volatility may produce crisis, particularly when they interact with other changes in the system.

Kim Beazley:                         See, I would say that Australia has more to think about in the much more rapidly changing distribution of power in our region, than simply Mr. Trump. And we do have to look very seriously at recasting the defense policy that we have.

Kim Beazley:                         And one of the things that Trump is doing, I think, inadvertently helpfully, and I put the helpfully in quotation marks because it’s not his intention, is that he’s forcing us to rethink the way we do force structure. And we put up global rules out there and global order up there and the relationships in the region as an equal force structure determinant with the defense of our approaches. That was a mistake when we did it and it’s now completely unsustainable. So we have to-

Misha Zelinsky:                  You mean the reliance on the U.S. underpinning security in the region?

Kim Beazley:                         Not reliance on the U.S. so much as the character of the region.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Right.

Kim Beazley:                         And the character of the region did not really reflect what we assumed of it and the fact that Mr. Trump is not actually prepared to pursue his side of some of the underpinnings means that what we should have done anyway, we absolutely have to do. We have to go to Plan B.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And so let’s talk a little bit about Plan B. You mentioned the shifting of power and I think, effectively, that’s a shifting to a more multi-polar world with the rise of China and the reset of Russia. And you’ve got Putin and Xi actively challenging some of these structures that we have and the alliance system, it’s not being helped by perhaps uncertainty around the U.S.’s position on those alliances. But in the region, with Australia and our relationship with China, we’ve seen [inaudible 00:10:11] assertiveness in the region from China militarily. How concerned should we be about China under the Xi regime.

Kim Beazley:                         There’s no reason that we have to engage with China. We have to calculate what the Chinese are likely to do in the future. We have to see how they interact with other powers in the region, including the United States. But I’ll just say this about President Xi, he has shifted China a long way from the vision of Deng Xiaoping. And there’s a big area of risk here that people just simply don’t talk about and that is, how does he keep his legitimacy going now that they’ve essentially moved away from collective leadership? It moved away from the trend towards constitutionalism. It reinserted the Party processes.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s right he was saying he’s a big reformer.

Kim Beazley:                         Yeah and everything. And they’ve done that. So you now have a totally different picture emerging from China. How does he keep legitimacy for what is a lifetime of leadership instead of the 10 years normally accorded. Well, he’ll run into trouble. All governments do run into trouble. The Chinese are not exempt from that. And when he does, people are going to start looking at him from a nationalist point of view and say things like, you made a big deal of re-incorporation of Taiwan. You made a big deal of enforcing our position in the South China and East China Seas. Why is nothing changed? Are you really the defender of the nation?

Kim Beazley:                         Now that’s not a question that would normally have been asked of any of his predecessors as president. It will be asked of him some time in the next 10 years.

Misha Zelinsky:                  What sort of event would ask that question?

Kim Beazley:                         The Chinese people are engaged. Yes, there’s oppression. Yes, there’s a failure to recognize rights, but there’s two things. One, they’re very courageous. Two, they’re very opinionated. And generally they’ve found out this, which is not a good thing, necessarily for the rest of us. They’ve found that if you go after the Communist Party from the right, you frighten them. If you go after them from the left, the super libertarian and the rest of it, you’re easily oppressed. And so-

Misha Zelinsky:                  So nationalism is the big threat to the regime.

Kim Beazley:                         Nationalism, you can always get them

Misha Zelinsky:                  Interesting.

Kim Beazley:                         And nationalism gets bound up in what we’ve just been talking about. So there’s that. There’s not just Trump out there on the landscape. There’s also these other changes and where on earth are we going to end up with North Korea is a further factor in this.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s right.

Kim Beazley:                         So what do we need to do? Well, we don’t need to move away from the United States for the very simple reason. In this more volatile region, where we have effectively a total focus on technological skills as our defense, staying ahead of the game technologically, we now only have one alternative and that is relationship with the United States. They are the only people really in the game, in technological enhancements, in capacity in weapons systems, military tactics, all the things that are associated with the next generation of military technologies.

Kim Beazley:                         The only other people in the game are the Russians and the Chinese. The Europeans are on the outskirts. So for us, if we want to survive in this zone, in the long term, we have no choice but to associate with the United States if we want to be anything.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Let’s talk about the United States, China, and the South China Sea. You’ve got the Chinese being very provocative, building manmade islands, taking ownership of other islands and then now militarizing those islands despite promises not to do so. The Americans are very keen for us to engage in the Freedom of Navigation exercises which is to go within the 12 nautical mile range of those sites. Australia has yet to do that. Should we be doing that? Should we be participating in those types of Freedom of Navigation exercises?

Kim Beazley:                         Well that’s a matter for the government. The government is quite clear on what it believes the legalities of the situation are. Also quite clear on what they believe the Chinese are already doing or not doing. Also quite clear on what the rights are of the states that have got counterclaims and the rest of the world in terms of movement of shipping, both civil and military through those areas. So there’s nothing you can complain about, I think, sensibly about Australian government policy and it’s quite reasonable for them to be presenting those policies to the Chinese in argument and discussion.

Kim Beazley:                         Before I became governor and was then less reticent about putting my views across about what government should be doing, what I used to say-

PART 1 OF 3 ENDS [00:15:04]

Kim Beazley:                         My views across about what the government should be doing. What I used to say was by and large, I think we should do these things on our own. That we have our own view about the legalities here and how these legalities ought to be pursued and we were pursuing it. The marginal zone about where we ought to operate in this regard is about island like features that are being created but do not attract island like legal rights. So that is when you take a rock and turn it into a base, that sort of thing, even when you’ve done that, that attracts no automatic rights to a territorial sea around it.

Kim Beazley:                         Most of what has been done has been turning features which do count as islands into bases. And the position of the Australian government over the years has always been that they treat those entities as though there was an owner because there is than owner. The question about who the owner is is to our mind not settled. But then we would observe the limits that would have been observed if an owner was in place.

Misha Zelinsky:                  How do we grapple with, as a democracy in Australia that we favor these rule based order, where you have contested claims in the South China Sea, they go to court, they’re ruling in one particular which is against China in that particular instance, and that has not subsequently been observed. If it does start to unstitch the entire system when countries don’t observe the outcomes of the great system, or the referee so to speak.

Kim Beazley:                         Well our view of course is they should. And hardly anyone can ever enforce its views on the rest of the globe. You basically have to simply influence folk or try to influence folk. Whether you do actually anything practical about it or not, at least when there is a discussion of these issues, you don’t back away from the principles that you evolved. So any argument that takes place you take the view of the legalities which we have supported for a very long period of time.

Kim Beazley:                         It’s not an embarrassment, I don’t think, for a country like Australia if the views we express are not entertained by others with whom we’re talking. We can’t force them to do anything. And in those circumstances, the best we can do is to articulate those concerns, keep doing so, give support to other people who are doing it who may be more directly effected than we are, and learning the maturity and toughness that comes with somebody or some nation that is prepared to stand up for what it believes.

Misha Zelinsky:                  I’d just like to just quickly talk about China’s relationship with some of the other players in the region. Some of the smaller countries of the Asian nations and also the Pacific in terms of this One Belt, One Road initiative. And we’ve seen initially it’s talked about one of the largest investment in human history to reestablish that trade route through sea and land.

Misha Zelinsky:                  But we’re also now seeing the so called debt book diplomacy where countries have signed dup for projects they don’t necessarily need at terms that aren’t that particularly favorable. Then when they can’t make the payment, that asset’s taken back. Most troubling-ly the example of Vanuatu it looked like there may have been a military lock base or Naval base being built there potentially. How concerned should we be about that the way that China’s asserting itself through trade or through debt in a region?

Kim Beazley:                         I think China might be concerned out it, not just us. International politics is pretty fluid. Reputational issues are very important. You start developing our reputation for using debt to essentially take over parts of other countries, if you start building installations which are of very little value to the country in which they’re built but a substantial value to yourself, if you start projects which can’t be paid for by their own intrinsic merits, or you can’t complete to the satisfaction of the folk concerned, you’re going to suffer immense reputational damage. And people will deal with it.

Kim Beazley:                         This is particularly so in the experience of countries in Africa, but also in Southeast Asia and South Asia. A lot of these things are self correcting. And China’s going to have to learn from that. and will learn from that as people respond. When you actually look at the completion rights of these projects, and then look at some others who engage the infrastructure of the region like the Japanese, at a much lower level the Japanese have a much higher success rate. And what the Japanese actually produce is something usually useful to the countries concern.

Kim Beazley:                         They don’t talk about belts and roads and endless highway of Japanese economic activity, but to all intensive purposes, when you look at the infrastructure projects they’re engaged in, they’re similarly geographically aligned to those which the Chinese do but with smaller amounts invested and better outcomes for the people that are concerned. It’s not just there, it’s Americans, it’s a lot of other people engaged in this.

Kim Beazley:                         But it is an opportunity for many countries, and there will be from time to time an intersection between what is fiscally sustainable and what is actually locally necessary. And that’s certainly, China’s a powerful country, it helps advance their influence. At the moment you’d say that the most impactful in political terms of these Chinese strategies is not so much on the region we inhabit but in Central Asia. And who loses out? In Central Asia, to those Chinese infrastructure initiatives, what? Russia.

Kim Beazley:                         So Russia has this relationship with China which sees Russia’s interests and influence effectively being subsumed.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s interesting. So you think that … A lot of people are now seeing it perhaps it’s a Cold War sort of prison, but a lot of people are seeing it as an alignment of interests between Russia and China. But you’re suggesting perhaps there are tensions that will emerge at Eurasian crossover region as China seeks to build up it’s sphere influence. Because Putin’s very concerned about spheres of influence.

Kim Beazley:                         Look, there’s no conflict of interest between the two except perhaps in the challenge to what they think is objectionable features of the rules based order. But the truth is there’s no symmetry there either. Putin just totally rejects it, the Chinese don’t. The are may feature of rules based order which they absolutely agree with. There’s no symmetry between the two of them on that.

Kim Beazley:                         It’s convenient to have that relationship with China, but there are contradiction elements of it too. The Russians built up a lot of influence and Vietnam and a lot of influence in India and South Asia. And the performance of the Chinese is causing all of our lives to be quizzical about them. And there’s no activity which when analyzed in detail to engage in which Russia does not look to complete in theory.

Kim Beazley:                         Putin may have had a triumph with his conversations with Trump and made the American president look ridiculous or as a satrap. And all of the allies of the United Stares might have been embarrassed by it. But where does it get Putin? Has it got him a relief of sanctions? Has it got him a non-engagement with the NATO powers along his border? Has it got him an American recognition of where he stands in Ukraine? Has it got him anything that actually matters to him?

Kim Beazley:                         And when you look at Russia’s situation, an economy the size of Australia with about four or five times that number of people to look after as Australia with about two and a half times out spending on defense, there’s a few people in Russia who are beginning to start to say to Mr. Putin, “Enough already.”

Misha Zelinsky:                  With a very low life expectancy evidently as well.

Kim Beazley:                         Yeah. Except the Russians are pretty courageous people.

Misha Zelinsky:                  They’re stoic.

Kim Beazley:                         They’re stoic as you say, they’re cynical. They like the fact that they’ve seen him stand up proud, take over property and the rest of it. They also want to be fed. And at some point of time, where Putin stands at the moment means they’re not going to be. So he needs those changes. If I was a Russian I’d be saying of the old lad, I’d be saying, “Oh yeah, you did real well. You poisoned our relationship with the United States, you’ve interfered in their politics in a way beyond any interference they’ve done in ours, you’ve got yourself in your mind a president elected at your own behalf. What’s on my table as a result of that please?” And the answer of course is nothing.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yes, well that’s interesting. So you talked about economics there, and I think in the old Cold War we had two separate systems that a lot of people now point to the economics being this, perhaps the destiny in terms of security. You have people that look at China’s projections in our region and then say well there’s no way the that US can compare against China’s GDP therefor game over. Some analysts will say that. Others will point to the quad. Now I’m curious to ask you about which is the alliance of Japan, India, the United States, Australia which is very nice and do you see that as a potential counterbalance in our region in terms of economic response and in security response?

Kim Beazley:                         No, I just see it as a useful engagement. We are moving. China’s not the only country rising economically. You’ll see the same set of statistics that you just quoted applied to India, show India in the second half of this century we’ll all be thoroughly dead, taking over that leadership position from China. And you’ll see a straight line projections are all terrific except there are human realities that intervene.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And India has a demographic advantage as well.

Kim Beazley:                         Yeah. That’s right. And at the moment there’s a writing America off which also doesn’t have population problems. It’s economy is going to expand. The relativities that work towards China are not based on collapsing the American position. It’s a the American position advances, US is now starting to compete in new technologies, having let it go to some degree. And they’ve just put humongous amounts of money into it. Another great triumph for Putin. Gets out the and boast about a bunch of hypersonic missiles and related technologies which he doesn’t possess. And threaten to incorporate nuclear weapons within technical strategies which he hasn’t arrived at. He may arrive at that.

Kim Beazley:                         But with his 78 billion a year that spends on defense, he just massively tweaked the tail of somebody spending 715 billion. Brilliant move. You really scored with that one. So what do the Americans say? Oh well, we better got on with the hypersonic, we better get on with a different technical nuclear weapon usable in the battlefields. We’d better get on with the lasers, we’d better get on with the Artificial Intelligence and the rest of it. He’s just invited competition for an outfit spending ten times what he’s spending on defense. Fled losers.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Which is exactly what happened in the 80s with Reagan handcrafting the Soviet Union.

Kim Beazley:                         Exactly. And we need to take a look at that. There’s an awful lot of what the Americans are doing with their massive new defense spending that I think is a bit unwise. They’re focused too much on platforms and personnel and not enough on the new technologies. Though they’re spending a lot on the new technologies. I think the objective of the 350 ship Navy works against the rapid incorporation within the platforms they do have which is about 280 of them, of some of the new technologies which they brought forward very substantially particularly in related to direct energy weapons like lasers.

Kim Beazley:                         Their demand to put another 100,000 men or whatever it is in the Army works against the Army’s clear preference for next generation technologies on the battlefield. So there’s that tension going on. But the amounts of money is so huge that they may well be able to sustain the apparently contradictory priorities.

Kim Beazley:                         So there’s all of that going on at the moment which gives absolutely no attention or focus here at all.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And Australia benefits from that because we use a lot of the same combat systems as the United States, is that right?

Kim Beazley:                         And also we are very adept in sitting down with the Americans and converting those technologies into things that are usable in our environment. And I notice for the recent meeting of OSMET that the American Defense Secretary was pointing out our membership of the industrial recognized, industrial and inventive capabilities that the US will want to partner with. So we have got the possibility of engaging a lot of these technologies given that we can’t any longer do that ourselves. Or count on getting it from anywhere else. At least we are now heavily engaged with the Americans on that front. And we have at our defense …

PART 2 OF 3 ENDS [00:30:04]

Kim Beazley:                         … the Americans on that front, and we have at our defense, science and technology organization exactly the sort of capabilities that we need to ensure that we prioritize those technologies rightly and incorporate them effectively. We’re on the verge of a [walk 00:30:18] in the next generation systems, but only on the verge of that because of the continuing relationship with the Americans and nothing Trump has done threatens that. Trump creates a difficult international environment for us. He has not created a difficult military development environment for us.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, that’s very assuring. Just to bring it, we’ve talked a lot about international defense policy. I’m curious to get your views on some of the things that are happening at home in a foreign policy context. We’ve had Chinese interference in our domestic affairs, and all the debates between the so-called China Hawks or the Panda Huggers, how seriously should we be concerned about Chinese interference in our democracy with various financial interference into major parties, and how hard should we be pushing back on that?

Kim Beazley:                         Most countries, and this country is now included, but wasn’t, most countries extract themselves from the contribution of other countries and involvement in domestic politics. It doesn’t necessarily work regarding the subject of illegal penetration on the scale that you saw from the United States and Russia, but there are some protections there and the protections have come in here. I think we have to be very careful here in how we handle this. We do not want to make the many Chinese Australians uncomfortable in their own country.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Absolutely.

Kim Beazley:                         It is important that they feel welcome, that they are Australians like the rest of us. We have a blessed tendency in this country not to refer to ourselves as Italian Australians or Irish Australians or Chinese Australians or Indian Australians. The Americans do that.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yes.

Kim Beazley:                         We don’t.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yep.

Kim Beazley:                         We just talk about Australians and then we may get in the conversation go down the line to look at ethnic origins, but we assume that in the end they get absorbed by the great Australian, lovely cultural system.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Absolutely.

Kim Beazley:                         We’ve got to think about that. That means that when we have a disagreement with the Chinese, and we will from time to time and we do look at the sorts of issues that come up here, we need to be polite. We need to be firm, but we also need to be polite, and we need to avoid humiliation wherever we can. The debate that we had on these various issues at the time of Sam Dastyyari put out of the show late last year. I’m not defending him. I’m suggesting that he shouldn’t have gone, but it spiraled out of that into mutual insults, and there certainly is enough to go around in the political process about engagements of the past, in a way which I could understand why Chinese government would start to look at you sideways.

Kim Beazley:                         See, you’ve got to be sensib;e about it. The Americans are the biggest investor in this. The Chinese are our biggest trading partner. Chinese Australians are critical contributors to the stability of this country and its success. We need to bear all those things in mind and grab some maturity in handling it.

Misha Zelinsky:                  No, that’s interesting because I think there’s some difficulty in how to handle the relationship. You mentioned earlier about reputational concerns that the Chinese have, but also there is a, there seems to be a tension between calling out behavior from the Chinese, be it in island building in the South China Sea, or perhaps in meddling in democracy, but it seems to be the tone that is a concern rather than the … How would we be better to manage that?

Kim Beazley:                         Adopt a reasonable tone. You can make these points without getting hysterical. The points need to be made and you want to be able to incorporate those issues in your conversations without necessarily creating massive damage to your country while you do it. One of the problems is this, and this just doesn’t apply and this issue applies in any issue, if you go out of the top and you create a situation where you were tricked and you left worse off than before when you went over the top in your response. The point is, the object of your attention is no longer the issue. You are the issue.

Kim Beazley:                         Now, how do you deal with that? Well it’s a maturity and it also means too that there are a lot of areas of politics when you’re a nation like us, which is not all powerful, you need to actually learn to manage your words and manage your approaches. We’ve done it in the past. We now have to do it full time.

Misha Zelinsky:                  I was just curious just to peek a little bit about the tension that exists, and it’s kind of the elephant in the room where we say we don’t have to choose between our secured relationship with the United States and our trade relationship with China. Can you see, what are the potential triggers where a choice may need to be made? There’s a whole, Hilary Clinton famously said you can’t argue with your banker. How do we argue with our best customer at the same time as wanting to perhaps stick with our best friend in the United States?

Kim Beazley:                         A good start is not to ask the question, and to actually look at how governments handle issues and not the commentary. Commentary has to ask the questions because there’s nothing else to say. The government doesn’t operate like that.. We decided that it was in our interest to proceed with membership of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This is a big deal, a far bigger deal than any of the things that we’ve been talking about so far.

Misha Zelinsky:                  The Americans didn’t want us to do it.

Kim Beazley:                         The Americans did not want us to do it, but we decided, particularly with the south east Asians who are very important to us, [inaudible 00:36:45] to us, wanted us to get involved. We decided to get involved, so what do we do then? We go around saying, “Well, we’ve chosen between the US and China and we’ve chosen China.” That would be the height of immaturity, stupidity, and factually wrong. We chose to be a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. That’s what we chose. What we did with the Americans was to say to them, “Look, we think that we need to get into this.” I used to say to them, “You look at China through the prism of the geographic relationship, through Confucian societies, Indochina.” We look at China from a north south perspective. We go through a whole variety of other cultures before we arrive at the Confucian ones. They are important to us and we take some guidance from them. We take the view that we need to listen to what they want us to do and they said that they would feel much more comfortable in that bank if we are there, so we’re going to do it.

Kim Beazley:                         What we will do is we will firstly say that we’re going to try and make the government’s terms as close to the Asian Development Bank as we possibly can, and we are going to keep you advised on each step that we take. That’s how you handle those issues. We didn’t running around asking silly questions about whether or not we’re choosing between China and the US. You do what is in your national interest. That’s what you do.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s interesting, so I would like to actually ask you a questions following on from that because you’ve talked a lot about the economic rise of China and the choices there. Australia has been at every war with the United States, certainly the twentieth century and twenty first century. Is that relationship too strong? Should we be more independent given that what we know now with the Iraq war and the subsequent knock on effects of that? Is there a situation where we can perhaps not necessarily go all the way with LBJ so to speak?

Kim Beazley:                         You make your own decisions. Every one of the wars you referred to we made our own decisions. There was always a factor in those decisions about, at least since World War II, about the character of the relationship we have with the United States is one of the issues that we thought through, but it was not the only issue. We thought through those issues from the perspective of our own national interest, particularly recently, our involvements in Afghanistan and our involvement in Iraq, not the original one. I would say that these are issues which we’ll have to keep on thinking about all the time. You always need to think about it from the point of view of understanding that we’re already deeply embedded in the American system, through the job facilities of which we’ve added another couple over the course of the last decade, in relation to another area of contest that need space, and therefore we’ll always making a substantial contribution to them. We need to work out whether or not we want to make more.

Kim Beazley:                         Tony Abbot, as I recollect at the time of his last latest engagement in Iraq was hardly influenced by American concerns at all. He was influenced by and trying to influence the Americans toward committing themselves because he believed that it would be fatal for the rest of us if that caliphate got underway and successfully ensconced itself in Syria or Iraq. I would have said that our engagement, and I was looking at it from the point of view of the point made in Washington while it was being discussed, not at my level. It was being discussed at other levels, but I was at least in there. It was virtually nothing to do with the alliance and virtually everything to do with the situation on the ground and our concern that the Iraqi government should survive.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That was in response to the ISIS sort of take over over parts of Syria and of Iraq, but the original decision in 2003, I’d like to ask, would you have handled that differently?

Kim Beazley:                         Yes I would have.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yep.

Kim Beazley:                         To be honest, I’m not quite sure where I would have ended up at the very, very last minute, but I can tell you what I would have been doing in the period of time when the British and the Americans and the rest of the world really was looking at what ought to be done about Saddam Hussein, and I’d be doing my damnedest to try to persuade the Americans not to do what they did because if you look at our speeches at the time, you will see that we knew exactly what was going to happen as a result of all of this. We understood of course that the Americans after 9/11, they’re pretty much a winded society, and there’s a lot of motivation around about punish one, educate a hundred.

Kim Beazley:                         We saw at the time that this was not a sensible way of doing that and that you were likely to get yourself into serious trouble if you persisted with it. I suspect that possibly at the end of the day, as the whites in their eyes time had been arrived at, probably would have redeployed the ships that were in the gulf anyway. That would have been a very last minute point, and that was after you’ve exhausted every capacity to persuade them not to. It would be a bit absurd had the ships sailing around there not engaged in what subsequently emerged.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Have been not perhaps as a starting player in the coalition of the willing, so to speak.

Kim Beazley:                         It would be a concluding point, not a starting point.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, that’s a good place for us to finish up. Just as a final question we ask all of our guests on Diplomates, which is, and you’re a former ambassador, so with international guests like to ask them which Australians they’d invite to lunch, but as a former ambassador I might ask you three Americans to lunch with the governor, who are they and why?

Kim Beazley:                         Well, I would love to have ex-President Obama as one of those to lunch. I’d love to have Hilary Clinton, and I would be fascinated to have added to them Jim Mattis.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Oh wow. That would be an interesting group.

Kim Beazley:                         To see what they’ve got to say about contemporary affairs. I’ve got a huge amount of time for all of them and I think that they would make, because all three of them make excellent dinner companions.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That would be a lovely, to be a fly on the wall that would be great, but look, Governor Beazley, thank you so much for your time. It’s been a fantastic conversation and all the best with the new year.

Kim Beazley:                         Thank you.

 

Steve Glickman

Steve Glickman, the CEO and founder of Develop Advisors, is the world’s foremost expert on Economic Opportunity Zones. Steve joined Misha to give his predictions on the mid-term and 2020 elections, discuss solutions to geographic inequality, dissect the problems with a UBI and explain what’s gone wrong with global trade. Steve also gives tips on how to overcome partisanship in the legislative process.  It’s a BIG chat.  

A young gun in US politics, Steve was an advisor in the Obama Whitehouse and started his career as Special Assistant US Attorney. 

While at the Economic Innovation Group  – which he co-founded with Sean Parker – Steve developed the radical ‘Economic Opportunity Zones’ that are tasked with kickstarting capital investment and job creation in areas of the US suffering from high inequality and low capital investment. He is now bringing EOZ’s to life via his new investment firm, Develop Advisors. 

It’s a great and really fun chat. For policy nerds, there’s a really fascinating critique of the Universal Basic Income.

We need this guy to run for President some day (no pressure, Steve).

 

 

EPISODE 2 FULL TRANSCRIPT: 

Misha Zelinsky:                  Steve Glickman, how are you? Welcome.

Steve Glickman:                 Thanks for having me.

Misha Zelinsky:                  I should say that it’s in the evening in DC right now. Is that right?

Steve Glickman:                 Yeah. It’s 5:40. So all the government bureaucrats have already gone home

Misha Zelinsky:                  Very good. So I should say we’re obviously recording this across time zone. So it’s early in the morning here in Australia. But yeah, the wonders of technology bringing people together. So Steve, I was actually just going through your CV before. You and I first met through the American-Australian leadership dialogue where youth delegates. I’m a little bit surprised at the depth of your CV. Are you sure that you actually youth delegate or are you fudging things a little?

Steve Glickman:                 Well, you know, I make up most of the stuff that I do or talk about on the spot so you can pretty much assume it’s all one big running lie.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, just on that. So your main role, and we’ll talk a little bit about your broad career as we go along. But your main role is that to you are the co founder and CEO of the Economic Innovation Group. I was hoping that you might be able to tell us a little bit about what the EIG is and how and why it was set up.

Steve Glickman:                 Yeah. I think a good way to think about us is we’re social entrepreneurs. So we are trying to find a new pathway at addressing big economic challenges in a very crowded marketplace of think tanks and political organizations, and other groups that are trying to make their mark in DC. We were founded in early 2013. It was really, much of this was the brainchild of Sean Parker, who as you know is the co-founder of Napster and the first president of Facebook. And when he and I got connected at the end of 2012, early 2013, he was really focused on how you leverage the private sector to solve big economic challenges. Particularly, how you drive more private sector investors to a bigger part of country.

Steve Glickman:                 And that was really our DNA from the beginning was could we get a group of Democrats and Republicans, conservative and liberal thinkers, private sector, public sector actors to really come together around the notion that we could create a new incentive system to change the flow of capital markets in the US?

Steve Glickman:                 And as we started unpacking that problem and that approach, we found ourselves doing a lot of research around what drives inequality on a community level around America, and what the depths are of that inequality and what the impact is. And the more and more we unraveled that onion, the more questions we had and the more we realized that we think we had stumbled upon maybe the most important economic policy challenge that wasn’t really being addressed by either political party and that gave us a pretty strong feeling that we were onto something meaningful. So we’re really intensely focused just around that problem, and bringing in a whole new set of actors from the private sector to solve it.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, that’s really interesting. So we’ll talk a little bit about the bipartisan part of the EIG. But I’m just curious. I mean, I think a lot of people talking about inequality. I think what’s interesting about what the EIG does is that you are very focused on can I say, in an American sort of way, is that it’s focused on capital investment and enterprise. I was wondering if you could maybe just unpack that a little around how you see the role of enterprise in lifting people up out of inequality and rather than it being perhaps a government led solution.

Steve Glickman:                 I think our approach to it is that it involves both, but that the government at all levels. Whether it’s the federal government or local governments in the US, which is unique to the US structure that we’ve got that federalist system. That a lot of the programs initiated by government having worked very well, but even more importantly, it’s both politically, financially, they’re broke. There’s just no capital based on the changes in our tax system and the changes in the political acceptability of big government programs to do a lot more out of the public sector. And some of that’s just a factor of the economy and our debt, and the fact that between social security and Medicare, and defense spending, and payments of the debt, there’s just not a lot of additional capital to go around unless you hike up taxes.

Steve Glickman:                 And certainly in America, the political trends are in the opposite direction where you’ve been lowering taxes, or have had pretty low taxes for 30 or 40 years. So if you, go ahead.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Sorry, keep going.

Steve Glickman:                 So if you’re gonna solve the problem of how you create more economic growth, it costs money from somewhere. And the private sector is to contrast to all those trends in the public sector has never been wealthier, more profitable. The stock market’s never been higher than ever before. So clearly there’s a lot of capital that’s resting there. From our standpoint, the capital markets aren’t broke, they’re just broken. And they’re not working in the way that they could or should work. And if you’re not driving more capital places, you’re not ultimately creating more businesses places. And if you’re not creating more businesses places, there’s no other way to get jobs. So we subscribe to the notion that to change economies, it starts with the ground up. You have to create local, homegrown businesses and you can’t do that without capital.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Now, that’s really interesting. And I think you talked a lot about tax cuts there. And tax cuts at the moment, corporate tax cuts are on the agenda in Australia in a very contentious. There’s a lot of argument from both sides of politics. I think what was interesting, obviously those are major tax cut I’m brought in by the Trump administration and the republican congress. But what was within that was a small piece of a very innovative policy that the EIG championed. I was wondering if you could maybe tell us a little bit about the role that the tax cuts have played in helping the EIG actually get some rubber on the road in terms of things you just talked about.

Steve Glickman:                 Well, so the program you’re talking about is called opportunity zones. And let me separate it out a little bit from the overall tax reform package. It was a vehicle to make a certain set of tax changes, but I think it’s a little bit different in the tenure of what you see from many other parts of that tax reform package. It’s designed to do something that the US tax code has done for a long time, which is if you want to incentivize certain types of behavior, and in our case it was incentivizing moving private capital to low income parts of the country. The tax code is the most important and most powerful, most systemic way to do that. And of course we do that in the US to stimulate a charitable contributions. We do it to stimulate people buy houses, we do it to stimulate companies to make investments in research and development. We do it to stimulate the clean energy economy.

Steve Glickman:                 So it makes total sense and if you think, and we do think that community level inequality using most important problem to solve and there’s lots of capital in the private sector. Let’s utilize the tax code to systemically change the flows of that capital. And that’s basically what the opportunity zone program does. It’s essentially a deal between the federal government and private investors that we as the federal government will give you some level of tax forgiveness if you’re willing to make longterm and economically productive private investments in communities that are cut off from capital markets.

Steve Glickman:                 The program is obviously more complicated than that and we can get into whatever level of details you want, but at the end of the day, that’s what it’s about. It’s about getting capital off the sidelines. By our calculation there’s about 6 trillion with a T, $6 trillion in unrealized passive capital gains sitting in the economy. that’s in the stock market, in the real estate market that has been booming for at least a decade now. And if that money can be funneled to distressed communities around the US, there’s a pretty powerful tax incentive attached to it and we think it will move markets, it’ll change the way the market works.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s really interesting. So yeah, obviously taxes. It controls the flow of money. You’ve talked a lot about the role of capital in these distressed communities. I know the EIG talks a lot about the geographic role of inequality. I’m just wondering about the role. How do you see the role of responsible business in addressing inequality? And obviously we want to see capital investment in distressed communities creating jobs, but what do you think, what’s the role of the business community in addressing wage inequality and lifting up people and making sure that we don’t have a situation where you have people working one job or multiple jobs, and being unable to sustain themselves?

Steve Glickman:                 There’s no doubt that how stagnant wages have been an America is a big source of inequality on a number of different levels. And this was one of the stories of the recession and the recovery was that we gained back all of our high wage jobs. We gained back way more than we lost in terms of low wage jobs, and we didn’t gain back those middle wage jobs. And a big reason for that is the industries that really never came back were a lot of those middle wage industries like manufacturing. Now a lot of thinkers and policymakers in both parties understand that. But then your solution set gets all over the place and a lot of it has been focused for years on well, if we want to bring back those type of jobs, we have to bring back those sectors, and that’s not our perspective.

Steve Glickman:                 It’s manufacturing has fundamentally changed. But those communities that were manufacturing communities need similar quality jobs to replace it. And jobs that fundamentally don’t require a college education. On the democratic side, you hear a lot of talk about how everyone should go to college and that’s just not really a practical solution at least in the US. So you’ve really got to create new business activity in order to change that. And listen, I don’t think you’re going to be able to get there by forcing the corporations to do that, at least not in traditional ways. There is a big competitiveness problem in the US economy. It is much harder for new businesses to start and grow. We’re on this huge 40 year decline in our ability to create. So there’s this myth that the US is this entrepreneurial economy, and of course in some ways we’re more entrepreneurial than many other places around the country. But that edge that the US has is rapidly declining, and in part that’s because we’re creating businesses in such a smaller number of places around the US.

Steve Glickman:                 So again, we think it’s a homegrown problem, and that there are entrepreneurs everywhere. And the way to get at solving that problem is by getting more and more of those entrepreneurs capital. Let me give you one quick stat. If you look at the venture capital industry which is the source of much of the high growth entrepreneurship in the US, nearly 80 percent of that capital is invested in only three states. So three out of the 50 states, Massachusetts, New York, and California get nearly 80 percent of the capital. And that’s true across many other parts of our capital markets. Including how banks lend and where banks are located around the US. So this is a big problem to unravel and we think it starts with how capital flows.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s really interesting, and I think it gives us an opportunity to talk a little bit about this geographic inequality, these distressed communities. It’s been discussed a lot and I’m curious to hear your take on it as someone who’s a Democrat and perhaps has a slightly a nuanced view of the election. The geographic role that inequality pied in the US selection, you of course grew up in Michigan. That’s a state that’s blue state gone red, so to speak. But I think that what’s interesting is you talked about there was the loss of jobs, Trump zeroed in on very acutely around this loss of jobs and the promise to bring back steel jobs mining jobs in those distressed communities. And whether it was true or not, it certainly resonated. So I’m curious just a little bit about the geographic role that inequality played in the US election.

Steve Glickman:                 So I think there’s a couple answers to that. One is let’s take a look at how people evaluate the economy. So in a time when the national economy was booming, our unemployment rate was close to four percent and the stock market had been growing for this long bull market. That national level economy was just not resonating to people because frankly, it’s just not how people evaluate the economy. They evaluate the comedy based on what they see happening in their community. And people are really good at evaluating how well their local economies are doing. And as it turns out, a lot of national policy makers and the media don’t fully understand what the country looks like outside of big markets like New York, LA, San Francisco, and DC because that’s where they spend most of their time.

Steve Glickman:                 It looks much different than the rest of America. We for instance looked at swing districts, at places that voted for Barack Obama twice and then voted for Donald trump. And those are places it’d be hard to say that the difference in the election was based on race because they elected for an African American president twice. And much more likely, the driving force there was the economy. And if you look at those counties, and there were 200 plus of them that voted for Barack Obama twice and then voted for Donald trump. The big tying factor for all of them is that three quarters of them lost businesses during the recovery years and lost jobs on net during the recovery years. So while our national unemployment rate is going lower, in those places unemployment rate is not being affected at all. In fact, they’re losing jobs.

Steve Glickman:                 And one of the stories about the economy that people don’t fully understand even now is when we talk about the recovery, we’re talking about a recovery that really disproportionately benefited the top 10 or 20 percent of the country, that the rest of country kind of stayed even. And that the bottom 20 percent of American communities lost jobs and even a greater trajectory than they did before the recession. And in a lot of those places, it was totally rational to say the status quo establishment economic thinking from both parties isn’t working for us. It’s not changing our trajectory. So we’re going to vote for something different. And, one of the things they’re voting for is how to maintain their quality of life, maintain a community where their kids can stay and achieve the American dream.

Steve Glickman:                 And we know the reality is changing in those communities. The tragic thing is I don’t think either party is really giving folks a viable solution for how they change their trajectory. Because a lot of these jobs aren’t coming back. And a lot of the problems for their current economic situation isn’t as simple as trade, or immigration, or any number of issues that have become the threshold issues in our debate. It’s really a much more complicated, long term structural change of communities that haven’t kept up with the how fast the economy’s been changing and having diversified the industries and the opportunities they’ve given to people who have lived in a lot of these cities.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s the challenge, isn’t it for progressives I think is that the difficulties of the problem cannot be explained in neat, make America great again, type sloganeering. So that is always the challenge. But what’s interesting as well as you talked a lot about there about the main economies LA, New York, San Francisco. But what’s interesting as well is this so called red state blue state thing where people look at them on a headline map. But what’s actually interesting, if you dig into a blue state, you’ll see that it’s actually perhaps a blue dot or a blue island on a red ocean. And maybe just talk a little bit about the differences between outcomes and metropolitan people versus outcomes in those sorts of non metro rural areas. And the tensions that are building there.

Steve Glickman:                 And I think the problem is even a little more complicated than that. So listen, the geographies that do really well in our economy typically are the suburbs. And the suburbs can be republican or democrat. Some studies going to do really well and some cities tend not to do well. And a lot of those cities, you have large population groups, particularly minority population groups that are doing much worse than whites even in rural areas. But ultimately, I think this comes down to a trajectory. If you’re living in an African American or Hispanic community, even one that’s on absolute terms not doing as well as a lot of white communities, you’re probably doing better than your parents or your grandparents did. And that’s not just an economic issue. That’s also a social justice, civil rights status that have improved for many, many millions of Americans despite a whole set of current challenges.

Steve Glickman:                 If you’re in the white working class community and a lot of those are small town and rural America, your trajectory has gone the opposite direction. You’ve lost. Particularly if you’re in a manufacturing community, you’ve lost those industries. You’ve lost those quality of jobs. You’ve lost your main street. It’s been replaced by a minimum wage jobs. Whether it’s working for really big companies or for distributors or call centers, or whatever is left. And the quality is just different. There are rural communities and small towns in America that are doing great, but disproportionately the parts of the country that are doing the best are cities that are connected to global markets, connected to immigrant communities, and connected to the digital economy. And those are places like you mentioned, like New York and DC and San Francisco and LA, and also other towns that are, cities that are taking advantage of it. In the middle of the country, like Denver and Austin. And Minneapolis and other communities.

Steve Glickman:                 But those are the exceptions. And so the reality is this is not a rural versus urban issue. There’s just huge amounts of distress in both communities, and it’s not even a black versus white issue. But a lot of this has to do with trajectory. And, if you see yourself going the wrong direction, if you see your kids have less opportunities than you do, it makes people angry. And rightfully so. And I think at a starting point, and this goes back to our conversation around Trump, people want to be seen. They want to know that you understand their problem, and how their problem is unique and different because of where they live. And I think to Trump’s credit, he understood it and was able to articulate it. And whether or not you have a good solution for it or not, more politicians on both sides have to articulate that as the biggest problem we need to solve with this country.

Misha Zelinsky:                  I think that’s interesting. And you’ve talked a bit about Trump, but I think what’s interesting and puzzling to a lot of Australians is that you had people that voted for Obama. We had eight years of Obama, and then suddenly those very same people turned around and voted for Trump someone that not only was the antithesis of Obama, but was the leader of the birther movement. So it is quite puzzling from an Australian point of view. But I’d be curious to get your views as someone who worked in the Obama administration in an economic portfolio. Could the Obama administration done more for people, in terms of making sure that those communities weren’t so left behind in the recovery? Because I think Obama rightly put a lot of focus on saving Detroit with the auto bailout and focused very heavily on making sure that those working class jobs were not lost. But should the Obama administration done more and should the Democratic Party have detected this problem that was out there?

Steve Glickman:                 So the short answer is yes. I mean clearly, the Obama administration should have done more. I would separate a little bit the first term from the second term and not just because I served in the first term and not the second.

Steve Glickman:                 But I really think in the first term, the big focus was on the economic infrastructure of both America and the world. Which as you probably remember was teetering. And even right coming out of the recession, people were extremely nervous. Not just about the US, but Europe was going to collapse. That Italy and Spain and Greece, were going to default. And that meant the end of the EU and a new global recession and we would have all been screwed. And so that sucked up a lot of the bandwidth in the first term all the way through. And the bailout and TARP and the stimulus package, and the auto rescue in Detroit. And I’m pretty proud of the role I think the president played in, not just in America but globally in stabilizing the economy.

Steve Glickman:                 In the second term, I think we could’ve done a lot more. In part, we didn’t have as much political capital as we had in the first term for sure. And we didn’t have congress anymore. And that makes it difficult to do real big meaningful things including things that require for instance, changes to the tax code, which you need an act of Congress. Congress controls really all the spending in the US political structure and they were openly at war with the president and vice versa. So, the White House was really limited to what it could do through executive order, which is a much smaller set of authorities then you can do through law. So I think a lot of bridges had been burned by then, and all that political capital had really been used on creating health reform and creating universal access to healthcare, which I think is part of the problem you’re talking about.

Steve Glickman:                 But this is a problem that we could have focused more in on in the second, could have done more about. It’s also a really longterm problem. So the recession was not a turning point for most of these communities except in degree of distress. Most of these places where it had been distressed for at least 10 years before the recession and probably decades beforehand. Detroit hit its peak in the 1950s where it was one of the wealthiest economies in the country and had been in a downward slide as the US lost manufacturing shares to other world economies. And that’s just the way the economy works. So I do think the White House has some blame and the administration has some blame. But at the end of the day, this is as much an issue about local leadership as it is about federal leadership. And there are certain places now that are just well much better prepared to take advantage of this economy than others.

Steve Glickman:                 And once they got lazy and passive, and decided they were gonna hope and pray for another company or another manufacturing plant to take the place of the last one they lost instead of how do we take advantage of this new tech enabled economy and use our infrastructure of universities, I mean don’t forget, places like Michigan and Ohio and Pennsylvania have had world famous engineering research universities. University of Michigan, Carnegie Mellon, Ohio State, and so you have the raw firepower to take advantage of the new economy. But it requires a local leadership and local vision to get there. And I think too few places had that until the last couple years or so.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s really interesting. And I think you’ve touched a little bit on trade and touched a little bit on the effects of job replacement in communities where you’ve seen perhaps a steelworks shut and not be replaced with anything. One of the things I’m very fond of, and we certainly see similar things in Australia. I certainly see that in my role in the Australian Worker’s Union. One of the things I always say is that trade is good, but fundamentally trade destroys and distributes unevenly. And I think we’ve certainly seen it in the US, but I’m curious at Trump has been putting forward a very muscular focus on trade. He sees trade in a binary sense where a trade balance if it’s negative, the US is losing. And if it’s positive, the US is winning, he sees it in a zero sum manner. Just curious how do progressives grapple with this question of trade which can hurt people, and how do you make sure communities aren’t left behind in the process?

Steve Glickman:                 So there’s no doubt that trade, as a lot of people will say, the benefits of trade are dispersed pretty widely and the impact of trade and the challenges with trade tend to be very concentrated. And that’s certainly the case in the US economy. The economies that were most dominant by manufacturing, not necessarily most dominated by trade because the trade rich, trade dependent economies, some of them are booming. And a lot of the places we mentioned like Seattle and Los Angeles and New York, which are big hubs of trade are doing really well. But if you’re a dominant sector and is manufacturing and you don’t have a diversified economy, than the impact of trade can be huge. And one, as the Democratic Party or either party. I think we need to start by doing a better job giving communities the tools that they need to adapt.

Steve Glickman:                 Some of that is capital and how they access capital so they can build new industries. Some of it is how they retrain workers. We have a terrible and a terribly outdated worker retraining system in the US. It requires you to lose your job. It retrains you into sectors that aren’t producing jobs. It’s both inefficient and ineffective for people. And this is really a place where the private sector can and should play a huge role. If you’re not creating a workforce training system where the private sector is at the table to talk about where their hiring needs are and how government can offload some of that training with the guarantee or the commitment that private sector interview and hire people coming out of these programs, until that works better it’s really hard to solve this problem. But this conversation has been one that progressives have been good or even better at talking about for a long time.

Steve Glickman:                 So if you look at the height of progressivism, you’re really talking about the thirties, forties, fifties, sixties, even going into the seventies. So from like FDR through Lyndon Johnson where we had massive policies around retraining, around settling the west. And I think just as importantly and something that the Democratic Party is starting to talk about more around competition and corporate consolidation. So we really have the most consolidated and economy in the US we’ve had since the depression, since the 1920s and thirties where a smaller number of big companies control a bigger part of our economy. And that leads to a lot of this inequality and wage suppression and lack of investment, which we’re all seeing. Because workers and communities are less able to compete. And if you look at where airline hubs have gone from when you’ve gone from having 10 airlines to having four airlines. Or where banks are located. Bank of America shut down 10,000 of their branches over the last 10 years. And community banks are growing at a slower rate than ever, which means small business lending in this country is basically plateaued at a 20 year low.

Steve Glickman:                 So it matters what the private sector is made up of, not just what they do. And if they’re made up of lots more of, many more companies that are growing and more dispersed as opposed to a few really big companies, it makes a big difference in the economy. And so this question around how you create a more competitive economy in the US is really important. And Democrats used to talk about this all the time, and we really stopped talking about it in the last 20 or 30 years.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s interesting. It’s interesting, the concept of competition. It’s a bit of an anathema sometimes to those on the progressive side of politics, but competition is inherently good for the economy. It’s also good for consumers, which fundamentally the people that we seek to stand up for which are families, people buying things. And you want to see competition in wages, making sure that wages are going up and competing for labor, but also that you want to see competition in the cost of goods and reducing the cost of living for people. So it is interesting the level of concentration, but also what you’re seeing increasingly is a global phenomenon. We certainly see it here in Australia with many US firms where it’s winner takes all markets. And, one of the things I’m curious actually if your take on this and I think perhaps I could already know your answer. But one of the solutions being advocated is universal basic income. If there’s no jobs and jobs that are being inherently more and more consolidated into mega firms and you’re seeing market’s up ended and people unable to work, that we should have a universal basic income, which is basic principle.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Everyone gets, no matter if you’re a billionaire or dirt poor, everyone gets a certain income and then off you go to try to do best from there. But I think that there are certainly some problems with that idea, but I’m curious about your take on that because I think fundamentally, the better outcome is you want to see a good job. If you lose a good job in a steelworks, a unionized job, it’s well paid that it’s replaced with another good job and it’s not that you’re on your own driving Uber and trying to make ends meet.

Steve Glickman:                 So I dislike almost everything about UBI. One I think it’s an American. We already really have a UBI through our social security system, and it’s just for people who can’t contribute to the economy. People who are disabled or a retired, or for reasons that are no fault of their own no longer working. And then it makes sense to have a massive safety net, one that’s growing with the way the economy’s changing, for people who are no longer contributing. But otherwise our system is premised on people working. And I believe people want to work and want quality jobs where they’re contributing to their economy and being, their wages reflect their contribution.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well there’s a dignity in work as well, right?

Steve Glickman:                 Of course. But in UBI is like giving up. It’s a form of charity and saying we can’t solve this problem of how we create new businesses and new industries and train people with new skills. So we’re going to pay people, but we’re going to pay them a poverty level wage. And I believe even if we could afford it, which we couldn’t because you gotta think in the US, if you’re paying for 350 million people, but let’s assume half of those are workers, so 150 million workers and you’re paying them $15,000 a year, you’re talking about a program in the trillions of dollars a year. And the US doesn’t have that type of capital. It can’t afford that program. And even if it could afford that program, it would suck away from every other single domestic spending program we had. We’ have a UBI program, and a Pentagon, and social security and Medicare. And that’s all the economy could withstand. The US budget $4 billion dollars a year. You’re talking about this would be something like 40 or 50 percent of our budget.

Steve Glickman:                 So I don’t think it’s either politically or economically viable, which is why I don’t spend too much time thinking about it. But I think conceptually it’s also a broken. And we shouldn’t be giving up. On the Republican Party, I think as they see the economy particularly in the lens of this new republicanism, it’s very focused on how we separate ourselves from immigrants and our trading partners. And I think that’s a big mistake, and it’s particularly a big mistake in the context of immigration.

Steve Glickman:                 Immigrants, there are very few economic thinkers who would tell you that immigration is not a large net positive to any economy. These are people that want to be here, that want at work, that are disproportionately business owners and the creator of high growth businesses. Something like half of our venture backed businesses in the US, 50 percent are backed by immigrants or immigrant co-founders. So they’re a huge part of our economy. But on the democratic side, there’s this theory around the future of work that robots and artificial intelligence are taking over and there’s nothing we can do about it. So let’s just pay everyone, five or 10 or $15,000 a year. And to me that’s just as big of a cop out.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s technological determinism, so that we have no control over the technology that we can’t shape it to our way either, right?

Steve Glickman:                 Well first, yes. And there is no evidence of that. Our economic evidence shows a low productive, low wage, low unemployment economy. And if there were tons of robots and artificial intelligence, productivity will be super high. Wages would be higher and there’d be a lot less jobs because robots would be doing it. So that’s not the case right. Now that even if you thought that was the case 10 or 20 or 30 years from now, which I don’t subscribe to, the fatalistic way to your point that we look at this is sad. Because there are lots of things we should try. If we thought robots were going to take over the economy in 30 years, then the solution is let’s not give everyone charity so they’re making a poverty wage. The solution is how do we prepare more American communities and more American workers to take advantage of that technology enabled economy? We need more thinking about that, not more thinking about how we’re going to spend more money to spend our way out of this problem. At least in my view.

Misha Zelinsky:                  I subscribe to that view too. I don’t think the UBI, whilst it’s interesting, I think it’s under the assumption that there’s no work, and I don’t believe there will be no work. So I think it’s actually making sure that the work we have is well paid and people are skilled for it accordingly. But so I’m just curious. You touched on immigration there and the role that immigrants play. And I think any policy person would agree with you, but that’s certainly not the mood in the community globally. You’re seeing it in Europe, you’re seeing it in Australia, you’re seeing it in the United States, suddenly with Trump with his wall. How can progressives articulate a positive view of immigration and not purely on an identity basis, but on an economic basis?

Steve Glickman:                 Well listen. Fear and economic scarcity or the perception of economic scarcity drive bad policy decisions, and they drive anti-immigrant thinking for hundreds and hundreds of years.

Misha Zelinsky:                  This is not new. That’s important.

Steve Glickman:                 No. And I think for a lot of these issues, the question like for instance, the answer to trade is not making a better argument for trade. And the answer for immigration is not making a better argument for immigration. It’s ultimately solving that perception people have of economic scarcity and that they’re in decline. And so these are all first order questions. It starts with if you want to get those issues right, and we may get them wrong for the next four or five or six or seven or eight years. And it’s not because people are in my view, hateful or mean or irrational. It’s because they don’t see any other option. So I think we have to give people other options. We have to convince them that there’s a way they’re going to get skills and there’s gonna be new programs, new cooperation between the public and private sector around how we upscale people.

Steve Glickman:                 I think they have to see that investors are rebuilding a bigger part of this country because they buy the fact that there’s a future in more places than just a handful of cities around the country, and they have to see new businesses start in their backyard so the trend lines aren’t just Kmart and Target, and then came Walmart, and then came Amazon, and out went all the local businesses that thrive and grow in these economies.

Steve Glickman:                 And by the way, the notion that San Francisco and LA, and New York, and DC are better places because everyone’s crammed into them looking for opportunity and they have to pay outrageous amounts to buy condos. It costs over a million dollars to buy a one bedroom condo in San Francisco now, and they’re losing more people than they’re taking in because nobody wants to live there anymore, because it’s unlivable. The fact that that’s a better outcome even for those economies is crazy.

Steve Glickman:                 So this requires dramatic action. The market’s not going to work it out. People are not mobile. We have lower rates of mobility in the US than we’ve ever had before because people don’t have the connections, the skills, the capital they need to be able to move to places that have these industries. The only solution is to create more industries and more businesses in a bigger chunk of the country. And I think there’s plenty of interesting entrepreneurs and you, I think at this point earlier. We know there’s plenty of work because there’s plenty of problems to solve. Work is just a function of solving problems for other people. Whether it’s the problem of how you create stuff in mass or how you grow stuff in mass, or how you provide certain services to people. And most of those jobs you can trade away.

Steve Glickman:                 Our economy like the Australian economy is mostly a services economy. And those services are locally provided. They’re your restaurants and dry cleaners, and they’re your bars and your doctors, much of this stuff you get locally. So a lot of the economy is not going to change dramatically. We’re really talking about the parts of the economy that are globally connected, and if you just focus in on that part of the problem, there are solutions there. At least in the US, we have a huge infrastructure around our capital markets and our labor markets and it’s just working really efficiently, and we as a society and the government can fix that if we wanted to.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s a really interesting point. So earlier on, you touched on this concept of unamerican. I think as an Australian, I certainly understand what you mean by that and I think many people in the world would. What’s a lot of people asking at the moment is what is it that America stands for? And I know that’s a broad question, but we talked a little bit about immigration and Trump’s take on that. And, we talked a little bit about trade. The US, for many, many decades now since certainly since World War II is been the guarantor and the prorector and advocate of an open global system. Be it of immigration, be it of trade and has also added support that with its institutions. Now in recent times, the US is turning in on itself. So I’m curious about how does the US with these challenges that it has around inequality, around the negatives around trade and around the negatives around immigration and the political impacts of that is happening, and the political part is detecting that? But at the same time, the rest of the world, countries like Australia, other western liberal democracies are looking to the us to say how is it that the US can help underpin the challenges we’re seeing from China, from Russia, from other models. From non-US models. And how can the US juggle both its challenges at home but also help us friends abroad?

Steve Glickman:                 Well, listen. There’s no doubt we’re at an unprecedented point in our politics where leadership that our friends around the world who are used to seeing from the US is lacking, at least in terms of our role in the global economic stage. With that being said, nothing in my view so far has fundamentally changed. We’re still a part of an active participant in the WTO, the World Trade Organization. We still have, with some very small exceptions given the size of our economy, a very open market both for investment and portrayed. We still have a immigrant rich country, that takes in large numbers of people every year and it brings a large number of tourists here, and large number of people are educated around the world in US universities. So I think the tone and the rhetoric is certainly off in terms of where the US is traditionally lead.

Steve Glickman:                 I’m not sure anything has fundamentally changed yet in terms of how the American economy and the American immigration system fundamentally works. Now of course, some of it is starting to change. I think it’s an open question of whether Congress pushes back against that. Our system is, the president’s got a lot of authority, particularly around foreign policy issues, but very little unilateral authority around core economic issues. And that includes trade, taxes, and even immigration where the president’s powers are limited. So congress ultimately has to come along, and I think what you’re not seeing is an acceptance from either party, including the Republican Party that their norms have fundamentally changed around trade or even that our national consensus has changed around immigration yet. I wish we were letting in far more immigrants than we are now, and I wish we had not pulled out of the transpacific partnership, which I think would have put us on a much stronger footing to be closer allied to Australia and Japan, and Korea, and other countries in the region in dealing with China. That was a big I think self inflicted wound.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Let’s talk about TPP. Let’s just talk about TPP.

Steve Glickman:                 But I’m not sure how much has fundamentally changed in the US beyond that.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, because I think TPP is interesting because you talked about trade. And you said the US president has limited powers. But the TPP, I think there are a lot of problems with that deal. But nevertheless, the TPP was seen as the US as part of Obama’s pivot into Asia is about setting the rules of the game, setting the rules of the road. And the US 2016 election pulled, both parties away. I mean the Republicans got pulled away first through trump’s challenge internally, but then Hillary Clinton was also pulled to the left by a firstly Bernie sanders and then Trump himself who she was effectively crucified over NAFTA and the impact that NAFTA had rightly or wrongly at least in a perception sense on the communities we talked about earlier. So that’s I think one real world example, and China are filling I suppose the vacuum around TPP with their one belt, one road initiative, certainly in the Asian region. So I think there’s certainly already observable impacts from new us retreat from an open liberal system.

Steve Glickman:                 Yes. I mean you’re totally right. I wouldn’t buy too heavily into any of the campaign rhetoric, at least from Hillary Clinton’s camp around TPP. She was one of the architects of TPP when she was the secretary of state in the Obama administration. And if you look back at the history of trade agreements, it’s typically been democratic presidents who have done the heavy lifting on trade despite the stereotypes of the party. Bill Clinton got NAFTA done. I’m, Barack Obama did most of the heavy lifting around the TPP. Kennedy was really the initiator of the first big trade expansion in US history, and Roosevelt and Truman were big supporters of how you use economic diplomacy to solve big means here. I think what we got wrong in the TPP debate was that it’s fundamentally an economic agreement. It’s fundamentally a political agreement. I think the biggest, most important part about TPP was securing our place and our alliance within Asia and dealing with any number of issues that balanced powers in East Asia that would give us better footing from everything from North Korea to the South China Sea, to engaging with Russia and elsewhere.

Steve Glickman:                 And that should’ve been the debate we were really having because that’s where it has the biggest impact. It would have honestly marginal economic impact even though these are really big markets because we had agreements with most of these countries. The only one that we didn’t have a meaningful agreement with was Japan. And that’s where a lot of the tussling was at the end and it was around really small issues. Most of the tussling and these agreements, for instance, TPP happening around Ag. And the AG sector in the US is .5 percent of our GDP. 99.5 percent is something else. Manufacturing, services, natural resources. This is a really small part of the US economy and that’s not really what the agreement was about. It was about a new political order or at least preserving a political balance in Asia. And unfortunately we’re losing some of that.

Steve Glickman:                 What’s interesting is that the president’s in Singapore right now trying to create a new political packed with the Koreas, and we’ll see if that works and we’ll see whether his shoot from the hip model is effective. I’m not ruling it out. It’s not the only way to get there. But I do think when we take away the tools from our tool box, which trade is a big one of those tools, we hurt our standing around the world and thus hurt US security and foreign policy interests.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So you talked about China and the South China Sea. One of the things that Australia focuses a lot on is the role of China and trying to grapple with the economic underpinning relationship that we have with the Chinese, and also the challenge that China brings to the liberal world order, but also the challenges that it brings to our launches with the United States and other like minded countries, and they’ve been very city in the South China Sea.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So there is a lot of nervousness around the US’s continued role as a strategic guarantor of freedom of navigation in South China Sea. But also, do you see that the US is focused enough on the challenge that China has brought? The US tends to be at its best when it’s challenged. Much like in the Cold War, but also with the rise of Japan. And do you see that it might actually bring the best out of the US in terms of raising its own standards, but also reaching out to friends around the world?

Steve Glickman:                 Well, China is the most complicated national security foreign policy issue the US has to deal with. And we have a really complex, multifaceted conversation with China that’s ongoing and has been ongoing for years. However, I think 2018 is not the 1940s and 50s. I think that across the world, countries that have long relied on the US as a guarantor have to start taking care of their own backyard. And that’s both Europe and Asia. I think the Europeans have to step up and play a bigger role in world affairs. They’ve got the resources, they have the military technology and the military powers to do it. I think it’s the same thing in Asia. I think that Japan’s, the current construct that Japan is going to be taken care of by the US is one that’s been outdated over the course of 70 years, and that everyone needs to play a role in keeping up their own backyard.

Steve Glickman:                 The US is not the sole world power. It’s undoubtedly still be richest and most powerful country in the world, but that margin has decreased across a number of different factors. And that means other countries have to step up. And the US, listen. I have no doubt that over even the medium term, the US will know its allies from its friends and be there for its allies when push comes to shove. But it’s a lot easier if our allies have leverage in their own regions. I think frankly, not to preach to the choir here, but Australia has done a really good job of this. Australia’s emerged as a powerful force in Asia. It’s a tiny country, because it has stepped up, and stepped up in a lot places have where it’s had the US back where it didn’t really need to, in I think asserting its roll and influence. I’d like to see Japan step up in a similar way and I’d like to see Germany step up in a similar way in Europe. These are the two richest country in the world aside from the US and China, and they need to step up.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah, I think that’s an interesting point. And I know the Japanese certainly are looking at amending their constitution. But I do think even from a leveraging resources standpoint, it’s important that every country unifies. Because people often look at it as though it’s a United States versus China, but when you actually look at it, if you add the liberal democracies. You add Europe, you add the US, you add the UK, now Australia and other countries. You put those together, the GDP between those countries is extraordinarily huge. And you can certainly leverage that in a number of strategic ways, further the projection of a broader liberal order.

Misha Zelinsky:                  But I just want to take it back to domestic politics. You are, as I said earlier, a senior figure in the Democratic Party. And you’re also based in Chicago, which is endlessly fascinating. From a political standpoint, it’s obviously the political home of Barack Obama. I’m curious, you didn’t grow up there, but you’re now in there. So maybe you could give us some insights as to how you ended up in Chicago from a political standpoint, and we’ll talk a little bit about the midterms as well.

Steve Glickman:                 So two small corrections. One, very few people would describe me as a senior figure in the Democratic Party.

Misha Zelinsky:                  I’m being generous mate.

Steve Glickman:                 And two, I don’t live in Chicago. I live in Washington DC.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Oh yes you do. But you are Chicago Bears, Cubs fan?

Steve Glickman:                 I do. My dad and my grand father grew up in Chicago, so spent a lot of time there growing up and a big Chicago cubs fans.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Someone needs to do better research for me.

Steve Glickman:                 No, I chalk it up to the time zone change. That’s probably what’s contributing to this.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s right. So your family is from Chicago. That’s right, isn’t it? And that is a very democratic political city.

Steve Glickman:                 Yeah, although every city is a Democratic city these days for the most part. But yeah, there are these very storied democratic roots in the, in the city of Chicago.

Steve Glickman:                 Listen, I think that there’s this, what’s I think interesting to me now is there’s been this incredible comeback story of the role of cities as almost replacements from actors on the federal level. There’s lots of ways you’re seeing this in ways that are kind of surprising, if you look at climate change and the pact Eric Garcetti, the mayor of Los Angeles has pulled together by getting a large contingency of mayors to subscribe to certain climate change goals. Even with us pulling out of the Paris Accords. Or whether it’s the role cities are playing in creating new economic future for their citizens without relying on the federal government to step up and do anything dramatic. The most interesting I think politics right now are city level politics. And some of these cities, their economies are so large, whether it’s LA, New York, Chicago, and elsewhere. That they rival many countries around the world, so they’re starting to pursue their own trade missions, and starting to pursue their own commercial diplomacy around the world.

Steve Glickman:                 And so I think those are really fascinating trends of the rise of cities around the world, and I wonder whether they’ll start to displace the role of federal governments everywhere when there’s more interesting things happening in the city level than on a national level.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And so just coming up to the midterms and a lot of attention on the elections. A lot going on. It will be very important, at least to Trump’s presidency, whether or not the Democrats can secure either of the houses. How do you see that probably playing out?

Steve Glickman:                 So I think as is typical in lots of midterm elections, the opposition party does really well. And I expect Democrats in 2018 certainly in the house. There’s a much more challenging playing field in the Senate in 2018 because Democrats are defending so many seats in the Senate. But I expect us to do very well in the house. I think Democrats will take over leadership of the house, and I think there’s a lot of signals you’re getting from existing members of Congress, including in the Republican Party where you see a number of senior retirements among Republicans in the house. Which is a pretty good signal that they don’t have a strong feeling they’re going to hold onto power next year. Now with that being said, being in control of one house of Congress only gives you so much when the presidency is the other party and the Senate is the other party, which I think is like most likely to be the case. Although the Democrats have a fighting shot to take over the Senate. We’re only down two seats. 49 seats are held by Democrats in the Senate and 51 are held by Republicans.

Steve Glickman:                 But it will make a difference in at least slowing down the agenda that President Trump has in the White House because he’ll be forced to work with Democrats. I think it might be a very interesting paradigm though, because I think President Trump has shown that he’s willing to work with Democrats and Republicans when the circumstances are right. And so I wonder if he’s going to have some issues he can work on with a democratic house.

Steve Glickman:                 I think the other big looming question is whether a democratic house moves forward to impeach the president, which they can do with-

Misha Zelinsky:                  I’m curious to ask you about that because you’re a former trial attorney at the Department of Justice, so it’d be remiss of me not to ask you on the Trump Russia investigation, how you see that playing out.

Steve Glickman:                 Yeah. And there’s also an investigator for congress. I investigated the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And so a sense for how that process works. So all democrats would need is a majority vote in the house to impeach the president. And they should I think have the numbers to do that if everyone voted that way, I’m not sure everyone would. I think right now, I think the grounds on which to impeach the president are pretty late. I think that there would be some unintended consequences of this creating some sympathy for the White House and a distraction for an agenda the Democrats may want to start to lay out going into the 2020 presidential election. And I don’t think it’s likely to result in the president being removed from office because Democrats would need two thirds of the Senate, which is likely to be controlled by Republican to be pretty close to 50/50.

Steve Glickman:                 And so they would need a number of Republican votes. Unless there’s a smoking gun that comes out of the Bob Mueller investigation of the Trump campaign, and their connections with Russia which at least I’ve not seen or heard yet. I don’t think that’s very likely to be successful. And I’m not even sure whether that vote will be taken in the house because it comes with a lot of political risk. So I think the president is likely to serve out his term and I think there’s likely to be a Democrat who’s speaker of the house. And that brings us to 2020, which I image you’re curious about as well.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Yeah you’re well ahead of me mate. You’re just naturally guiding yourself to the questions. But so 2020, you’ve talked a lot about I think a bit of a different democratic agenda for certainly in respect to the campaign that the Democrats ran in 2016. So I’d be curious to see what you think are some of the lead candidates are to take on Trump in 2020 in the assumption that he’s there, and then who you might favor?

Steve Glickman:                 So I’ll answer both those questions maybe a little differently than how you asked them. One, let me just talk about the context now. So if you ask voters, and I’ve heard this pretty recently from very experienced public opinion researchers who have looked at how voters view the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, and the president. I think you get some surprising results. One, the president’s a lot more popular than people give him credit for. And in part, I think it’s a factor of the fact that the economy is still really strong, and the president’s viewed as very strong on the economy. And he’s viewed as someone who a while his unfavorability rates are still very high and they had been all the way through the campaign, even when he won. People view him as pretty strong, as someone willing to stand up to what he thinks is right. And someone who’s good at business and good at the economy.

Steve Glickman:                 And that still holds true. And if you ask voters what Republicans stand for, it’s pretty clear to them they stand for less government spending, lower taxes, and for big business. Now as a Democrat, I think that’s a very vulnerable set of associations to have with voters, because people like a lot of the things government provide. And they’re I think skeptical of large businesses, but you have to give them an alternative vision. And when you ask voters what they think about Democrats and their economic vision, there’s a series of like 10 question marks in that answer. No one has any idea.

Steve Glickman:                 I was close with Hillary Clinton’s economic team when she was running her campaign for president. And I could not tell you what her priorities were, and I can easily tell you what Trump’s priorities were. In fact, he stayed pretty focused on them. I may disagree with a number of them, but you know what they are. And so Democrats first and foremost, they need a positive vision for the economy, which is the only game in town. People don’t vote in foreign policy issues, and they don’t vote on social issues, at least on a federal level. They really vote on the academy, first and foremost. It’s issues like one through five for when you ask people what’s most important to them, it relates to the economy. It’s healthcare, it’s housing, it’s a good job. It’s my community, etc. Wages. So we need to give them a reason to vote for democrats. We really need a new economic world view and vision and philosophy. And ultimately that boils down to a new generational thinking of this.

Steve Glickman:                 There’s this very outdated notion in I think both democratic and republican circles that we’re still having a debate that’s left versus right or left versus center. When really we’re having the most important debate is one that’s new versus old. It’s a new generation where you’d see a lot of agreement around certain issues among new republicans in new democrats. A new generation of them, let’s say under 45. And the old views of what the parties stands for, and that I think is the most important debate in the country. Now, democrats are going to run 20 candidates for president. And lots of them are impressive and maybe might be very good presidents. I’d give you some who I think are going to be front runners.

Steve Glickman:                 I think you’ll see Cory Booker, the senator from New Jersey do well. I think you’ll see Terry McAuliffe, the former governor from Virginia do really well. I think you’ll see Jason Kander, a young rising star from Missouri who ran for senate and has now become a national figure. I think you’ll see him do very well. But I think all of them are going to have a really tough time beating the president. It’s very hard to beat incumbent presidents. It’s very hard to beat incumbent presidents in a really good economy. It’s really hard to be incumbent presidents in a good economy who’s maintained a pretty high level of popularity in his own party. And he’s extremely popular in republican circles. The notion that he’s vulnerable is a total farce. His approval rating in the republican party is 80 percent or higher. This is like George W. Bush numbers after 9/11. He doesn’t have to win by much to win. So I think you need a democrat that’s got a real affirmative vision that people want. It’s got to be more than being anti-Trump. And frankly, I have not heard much of that breakthrough in the party so far and it makes me very nervous the democrats are not prepared Well for 2020.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well that’s a very sobering analysis and we’ll leave it on that note on the serious. All our guests are asked, so I know you’ve been to Australia and this is about making, the show’s called Diplomates. So it’s about making some mateship across the ocean. So just curious about having visited Australia, who are the three Australians that you would invite to a barbecue, and obviously you’d invite me. So I’d be there anyway. So I’d be looking for you to think of three others mate.

Steve Glickman:                 Yeah. Well I need someone to drink all the beer. So that’d be you. So I’m going to stick in the political and economics lens around three Australians I’d like to have dinner with. So let’s start with politics. We’re bipartisan, so I’ll take a bipartisan approach to this. So on the left, definitely Julian Assange, I’d want to have him at the table. When I think about Australia-

Misha Zelinsky:                  You might have to get him in by Skype mate. I don’t know whether or not he’s going to be allowed out of the embassy, but …

Steve Glickman:                 You didn’t say it had to be practical. You just said who I want. If I’m thinking about someone who to me represents Australia, it’s Julian Assange on the left. On the right, the most famous Australian, most consequential Australia I can think of is Rupert Murdoch. So he’d be the Australia and I’d have from the right. I’m sure you’re loving these choices. You’ll like choice number three.

Steve Glickman:                 So choice number three would be an economics focused choice. And the person I have in mind gave probably the most compelling analysis of what happened in the economic crisis of anyone I’ve seen, American or Australia. And do you know who that would be? She’s from a very famous movie you may know.

Misha Zelinsky:                  I ask the questions on this thing mate, so I have absolutely no idea. But you’ve got me on tender hooks right now with Julian Assange and that Rupert Murdoch.

Steve Glickman:                 So number three in this trio would be Margot Robbie, because there’s no one I’d rather listen to on the economy then than Margot Robbie. I think she, Julian, and Rupert all in one room would be a tremendous Instagram photo at least.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, Steve Glickman, Margot Robbie, Rupert Murdoch, and Julian Assange would make quite a group. I don’t know whether or not either Rupert or Julian would want me there, but I’d certainly be happy to get along and at least drink couple of those beers you talked about. Steve, thanks so much for your time. I think it’s been a fantastic chat, a lot of great insights and good luck with everything. Hopefully if we don’t see on the ticket in 2020, hopefully see 2024, 2028 Glickman. I’ll be there handing out for you mate.

Steve Glickman:                 Well, I appreciaTe that. That will never happen, but I do appreciate you having me on the show anyhow and love talking with you. Good on your Misha.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Never say never mate. Thanks a lot.

Steve Glickman:                 Talk to you, bye.

Ambassador John Berry

Ambassador John Berry was the US Ambassador to Australia from 2013 to 2017. He is now the President of the American Australian Association.

Ambassador Berry joined Misha Zelinsky to talk about the future of the ANZUS Alliance, strategic competition in the Asian region, Chinese debt diplomacy, the rise of autocrats globally and how we can get young people to care about politics and democracy.

 

FULL TRANSCRIPT

This is a transcript from the interview with Ambassador John Berry. Please forgive any typographical errors.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Recently, I caught up with Ambassador John Berry. John was the U.S. Ambassador to Australia from 2013 to 2017. Since that time, he’s been named the president of the American Australian Association. Ambassador Berry and I had a great chat about the future of the ANZUS Alliance. Strategic competition in the Asian region, the rise of autocrats, and how we can get young people to care about politics.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Ambassador John Berry, welcome to Diplomates. I honored to say today, it’s a little bit of eponymously named, as you are a former ambassador to Australia, and obviously, I know you’ve said on many occasions that you were a mate of Australia. And we certainly consider you a mate of ours. But, welcome to the show, and thank you for joining us.

John Berry:                            Misha, it’s a great privilege to be with you this afternoon. Thanks so much, I really appreciate it.

Misha Zelinsky:                  The privilege is all mine, I assure you. But look, I though it would be a useful place to start, it’s a big sort of topic, but the importance of the relationship between the U.S. and Australia. You’re a former ambassador. You’re now the head of the American Australian Association. I think sometimes, Australians don’t think that the relationship matters from the American end. And sometimes, we feel that it’s slightly one-sided, or that we’re very much, the junior partner. I’d be curious to get your take on that.

John Berry:                            Yeah, I think there’s really no sense of a junior partner. Australia is a full-fledged partner, and really, the best ally of the United States, both in history and in current times. We deeply, deeply appreciate both the creativity, the intellectual power, and the straight-forwardness of the friendship that the United States shares with Australia.

John Berry:                            Sometimes, when you’re heading off in the wrong direction, it’s awfully good to get advice to get you back to the destination. And Australia is not afraid to do that. And you’ve never been, and never will be. We don’t ever want you to. You’re a sovereign nation. We want your straight opinion, and I think the relationship is so deep, because that opinion has been proven time and time again to be so helpful to the United States.

John Berry:                            So, it’s a full partnership. It’s an active one. It’s engaged on every level. Economic is the strongest. But, also, equally important is that the defense and the intelligence and the cultural, and the educational connections that we share, along with sports.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s right, and unfortunately, though, whilst we’re good friends with the Americans, we often don’t criss cross in the same sporting arenas. We very enjoy beating the English at cricket, but unfortunately, you guys aren’t really much into it. But, maybe we’ll teach you sometime.

John Berry:                            Yeah, my Tigers didn’t make it to the grand final this year, but they acquitted themselves well this season. Maybe next year for the grand final.

Misha Zelinsky:                  You can’t win them every year, unfortunately. Now, you’re showing your Australian bona fides, but of course, you were ambassador in Australia for a very long time. But, your father was also in Australia for World War II, as I recall. It always fascinated me, that story. Perhaps you could share a little bit about that.

John Berry:                            Yeah, Misha. In fact, it’s interesting. You know, right now from August until December of this year, it’s the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Guadalcanal, which was the first land offense in the Pacific in World War II. And, my father was in the United States Marine Corp, First Division, which was the division charged with taking and holding that land during the war.

John Berry:                            It was a much harder, tougher slog of a battle than was expected or anticipated. Japan appreciated the strategic importance of that battle, and knew that if they could defeat the U.S. land effort there in Guadalcanal, that likely, U.S. attention would prioritize Europe ahead of Asia, and that perhaps, the war would not end up as it did.

John Berry:                            But in fact, those Marines did hold that rock of an island, that’s an important island. And were given R and R to come to Melbourne. It was a tough six months. My dad was a skinny kid, 18 year old from Philadelphia. And he lost 45 pounds on Guadalcanal. He didn’t have that much to lose. But, I grew up with, from the youngest age, of hearing his powerful stories about what a wonderful people he found in Australia, and that not only were they good, they were true. They really reestablished his belief that there was good left in the world, which quite frankly, he and many of his mates doubted after they left Guadalcanal.

John Berry:                            And, you know, he tells a story about how he was just on the trolley car in Melbourne, and he was looking pretty, his clothes were pretty loose on him. And the ticket taker on the trolley said, “Young man, you look like you could use a good cooked meal.” He said, “You know, I get off work at the next stop. Why don’t you come home with me?” And my dad would tell us all the time how that was the best dinner he had the entire war. And he was just so stunned that someone would be so friendly.

John Berry:                            And so, till the day he died, if we were anywhere, when I was growing up and even when he was older and I was older, if my dad heard an Australian accent, he would jump up and offer to buy them a beer. And it was that deep and profound a relationship.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, that’s a great way to make a mate in Australia, is to buy them a beer.

John Berry:                            Yeah.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So, if he’s …

John Berry:                            Well, lest you think it’s just one guy’s story, it’s important to point out that it was so impactful, not only on my dad, but on the entire First Marine Division, which is the storied First Division of our United States Marine Corp, when they landed at Melbourne, a band struck up the tune, Waltzing Matilda. And here we are, 75 years later, the fight song of the United States Marine Corp First Division is, and always will be, Waltzing Matilda. And it’s because that tune and the spirit and welcome of the people of Australia, renewed their faith in the goodness of humanity, and taught them not only was it still very much alive in the world, but it was still damn well worth fighting for.

John Berry:                            And so, it is, whenever that division ships out even today, to Afghanistan, to Iraq, they do so to the strains of Waltzing Matilda. And when they come home, it’s to the same song. So, you get a sense of just how deep and power and lasting that friendship is.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s an incredible story. And we often like to hear Waltzing Matilda around the water. I never would have imagined you’d hear it in a U.S. Military Division, but that is a fantastic story.

Misha Zelinsky:                  I think that’s a good spot to sort of pivot to the importance of the relationship between the United States and Australia. Because it’s probably at it’s most contested. You recently said that it’s important for democracies to stick together when you were in Australia. And you said that we must defend democracy, our collected democracies. And that second place is not an option for democracies and the geo-strategic place in respect to military, AI, and that we need to avoid a Sputnik moment, so to speak, as you put it.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And I’m curious to take your, get your take on why democracy needs to stick together, and how we might defend our democracy in that context.

John Berry:                            Well, you know, we’ve been lucky. We have enjoyed 75 years of peace, or just under that, because obviously, World War II didn’t end until later. But, the world has enjoyed an absence of world conflict, if you will. Not to say that there haven’t been regional conflicts or terrible battles and troubles around the world, but nothing on the scale that would go back to World War I or World War II.

John Berry:                            And, I think we, you know, would be looking at history through rose-colored glasses if we felt nothing like that could ever happen again. And look, I think a lot of us who’ve worked in diplomacy over many years hoped and continue to hope that China’s rise will continue to be peaceful. But, there are many signals that are warning signals, that democracies need to pay attention to.

John Berry:                            First, we need to admit we’re not dealing with a democracy in China or in Russia, or in Iran, or in North Korea. And these countries are increasingly coordinating their efforts, and they are significantly, not only singling us out, but attacking each of us individually, through our democratic processes and using our own liberties and tools against us, if you will, in such a way that you have to call into question what their end goal and end objective is.

John Berry:                            You know, I was very happy when President Xi stood in the Rose Garden and promised that there would be no militarism of any of the land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea. He lied. We now know they’ve been intentionally militarized. There are three runways on those islands, now longer than the runway, the international runways at JFK here in New York City, right behind. Those are not runways needed for life-saving missions.

John Berry:                            The hardening and the missile installations and the radar installations that are being installed on those islands are not for life-saving missions. And no one should kid themselves about what’s going on there. And when you see what China’s done with the internet and the use of information, and artificial intelligence, what they have done has been able to increase the ability of authoritarian governments to suppress liberty, to suppress freedom, and to clearly, as they’ve shown both there, as well as other countries, like Russia’s involvement in our elections and other countries around the world, that they are not supporting democratic values, vision, or future.

John Berry:                            And we ought not kid ourselves that this is all going to end without some troubles. And so, you know, democracies are slow to recognize and prepare, oftentimes, for these things. As the world gets more technologically proficient, the time to prepare may grow even shorter. And so, that’s why I think it’s a good time for all democracies around the world to be on guard.

John Berry:                            I’m not saying it’s time to hit the panic button. I’m not saying conflict is a given. But, we shouldn’t be caught off guard.

Misha Zelinsky:                  No, it’s interesting, you’ve talked about the South China Sea. It gets discussed quite a bit in Australia. How do you think Australia and the United States should be responding to the militarization of the islands in the South China Sea? I mean, you know, part of China’s strategy is seem to be, to break up some of the will to resist, particularly with the Asian region, you know, with the Philippines. Is there a way that those countries can actually stick together in a way that gives them confidence? Or, is China gonna be able to pick countries off one by one?

Misha Zelinsky:                  Some countries in our … Well, there’s some discussions of the quad which is India, Japan, United States, and Australia. I’m just curious about how do you think you can resist that kind of, almost, irresistible force from the China’s government in the region.

John Berry:                            Well, we ought to not kid ourselves. It’s not gonna be … There’s no simple solution, Misha. This is gonna be a long-term effect. And I think Australia’s doing a great job already with your response right now. And Papua New Guinea, and you know, to …

Misha Zelinsky:                  In respect to the cables, you mean, or …

John Berry:                            Yeah, well, in terms of the one belt, one road expansion throughout the Pacific. You know, that’s not only the Pacific, but the Indian Ocean, around the world, and Africa, and beyond. And, these 99 year leases are all, when you step back and look at the map, are very interestingly located in strategic military and trade choke points. You know, again, not saying that they have to end up being military or strategic choke points, but we ought not kid ourselves. We ought to prepare. And one of the ways we can do that is to … You know, nations are already realizing this debt burden that they’re being saddled with is taking away a great deal of their sovereignty. And that’s of great concern to their populations and governments.

John Berry:                            And as the awareness of that grows, I’m concerned for this initiative as a true trade initiative will be called into greater question. But, the responses that are happening by democracies, you’ll notice, not only is the United States regularly exercising these rights of free travel and navigation throughout the South China Sea, but many other nations do as well, including Australia. And Great Britain has stepped up its actions in that regard.

John Berry:                            So, it’s again, a sign of democracies recognizing that you can’t just let an existing situation rule the day, especially when it’s been done by might and not right.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And you touched there on the 99 year leases. In Australia, we were quite alarmed to find out that there was discussions of a potential port being funded by the Chinese government in Vanuatu, and given the situation that occurred in Sri Lanka, where that port was funded by the Chinese government through the One Belt, One Road Initiative that government can’t pay. And, of course, that port is then handed over. The prospect of a port that could be militarized, 200 nautical miles up Australia’s coast, is very alarming.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s debt diplomacy, it’s called, which is, you know, you lend on terms that are somewhat unfavorable. And then, of course, when you can’t pay, you take that strategic asset, as you said, and in key points. How can the U.S. and Australia resist that type of easy money for these countries? You know, the Papua New Guinea government has made it very clear that they’ll take the best deal on the table, commercially.

John Berry:                            No, I think that’s where we have to be involved. And Vanuatu is a very good example of that, Misha. And Australia’s response there has been very, very helpful. You know, the United States is stepping up its efforts and increasing resources that’ll be available. I think other democracies will hopefully do that. And I think coordinating that effort is going to be something that we really need to think through.

John Berry:                            There are many institutions that can do that, but we need to, we could increase and leverage the power of our investments on the democratic front, if we were to work more carefully, in careful coordination. And so, I think that’s begun. That’s under way. And it will hopefully, only continue to improve.

Misha Zelinsky:                  And I’m just curious to get your take, you know, we’ve talked a lot about the contest between democracy and autocracy, and perhaps the autocratic countries coordinating in a way that, perhaps, they haven’t in the past. And that the importance of liberal democracies coordinate amongst ourselves. And I think that makes a lot of sense in a geo-strategic sense.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Curious about the credibility of democracy. You know, that’s another thing that is new, perhaps, in the modern debate with the Brexit debate, you know, what’s happening in Europe with the rise of autocratic governments in parts of Europe with the … Italy has a pro-Russian government. Hungary and Poland have right wing governments. You know, the Brexit election was very troubling for Britain, but also the recent United States election and the discussions of Russian meddling. What’s the … How does the credibility of democracy impact on this broader piece of countries competing against one another?

John Berry:                            Well, I think it’s important, each generation has to revive it’s appreciation for those core values of being able to have governments created that are responsive to the will of the people. That is still a very legitimate goal. And it is a goal that every one of the authoritarian nations fear mightily. And much of their actions are meant to undermine it, wherever they can, because they do not see it washing onto their own shores.

John Berry:                            So, first, we need to recommit our own selves to our own values. Those core values that our fathers and mothers fought, died, and suffered and sacrificed for, over so many generations. And I think we ought not take them for granted, because we’ve been fortunate to have enjoyed Australia … You’ve enjoyed the longest period of economic growth, I think, in any country in the world. You have a really phenomenal …

Misha Zelinsky:                  For 27 years.

John Berry:                            It’s a pretty phenomenal result. You know, you didn’t go through the global financial crisis like we did. You didn’t make many of the mistakes that we did. But, you know, so each generation can sometimes forget amidst its good times, the importance of those core values that allow those good times to exist. That allow people to exercise their creativity and earn a living, and to benefit from their creativity and their ideas and their hard work.

John Berry:                            As you, so you say it so beautifully in your National Anthem, wealth for toil. That is not a given around the world. And it’s important for democracies to continue to support and continue advancement. We have to always get better. As Winston Churchill said, it’s the worst form of government ever invented, but no one’s found anything better. And so, so we’ve got to keep at it. We’ve got to … We need to deal with … You know, in our own country, we have issues with student debt. We need to resolve that.

John Berry:                            We need to resolve our overuse of our credit card. You all are much more fiscally responsible than the United States. Here we are, in very good times ourselves, we’re running up increased debt at a time when we should be paying it down. So, you know, democracies make mistakes. Let’s not kid ourselves. But, it doesn’t mean that the core values of allowing people to control their governments and protect their liberties isn’t important and still worth fighting for.

Misha Zelinsky:                  It’s interesting, because you’ve talked about student debt and the economic piece. And I think that that’s also an interesting part of what’s going on around the inequality story and how that’s eroding the capacity of democracies deliver for ordinary people. I find it very concerning in an Australian context, but it’s certainly global, that young people don’t automatically consider democracy to be the best form of government. And I think that’s very troubling.

Misha Zelinsky:                  You’ve, in the past, said that, from an Australian context, that you’d like to take back what we call independent redistricting, or having the government, an agency, set the boundaries of electorates. In the United States, that’s a political exercise done by the politicians in charge, who unsurprisingly, draw up the boundaries to suit themselves; What you guys call gerrymandering. And also, you have non-compulsory voting in Australia, compulsory voting is in place, which the theory goes that the more people that vote, the more that they [inaudible 00:22:06], and you get less extremes. Do you think that those would be useful in an American context, still?

John Berry:                            I think they would greatly assist us, Misha. It would be a great thing, not only those two ideas, you know, correcting gerrymandering, compulsory voting. Americans don’t like to be told to do anything, so we’ll have to find a different word than compulsory. You know, maybe a national holiday voting, or something that would encourage higher turnout would be how we, maybe, have to approach that.

John Berry:                            But, you know, other ideas you do that are brilliant, I think, you limit your entire election time, is it to 60 or 90 days? I forget the day limit.

Misha Zelinsky:                  The minimum is about 31 days, I think. But sometimes that could be longer.

John Berry:                            Americans would think they’ve died and gone to heaven, if we could have a 31 day or a 60 day, even a 90 day election. You know, as you know, our presidential election for the next, which is three years out, has begun already. So, you know, obviously, we have a mid-term coming up here in three weeks, which will tell a lot. But the other thing you have … I’d say there’s four things that would really benefit our democracy that you’ve pioneered. And the last one is campaign contribution limitations.

John Berry:                            And, prohibiting, you know, the impact of so much money that can have such an untold influence on elections these days. So, you know, the secret ballot was invented by Australia. And we adopted it after much debate here in the United States. And while it was being debated in the late 1800’s, it was referred to in the United States as the Australian ballot. So, you gave us our secret ballot, which now we take for granted.

John Berry:                            I hope that the four lessons you all have also pioneered in this past generation of having a national commission that draws up unbiased legislative districts, having 99 percent of your population voting, you know, limiting your election cycle so that they don’t endlessly drag on, and controlling campaign contributions, are four very smart things for democracies to undertake. And certainly, the United States would benefit from all four of them.

Misha Zelinsky:                  No, although I will say that we actually had a … Our last federal election was eight weeks, and it was considered to be the most longest, most oneriest, you know, turgid campaign. And so, even an eight-week campaign in Australia seems like a long time.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Just on, you’ve touched on contributions and the effect of money in politics. You made some comments about, that the United States was alarmed about donation interference from the Chinese government in Australia’s democracy. It was very alarming to a lot of Australians, as well. I think it was something that we, a little bit, as a country, slip on the wheel and have sought to correct. But how concerned should all democracies be of that foreign interference of that nature?

John Berry:                            Look, I think it’s one of the areas where we have to play a very, very strong defense. There is no legitimate purpose, Misha, for any foreign government, especially a foreign authoritarian government, to be involved by contributing dollars in any other sovereign nations, a democratic nation’s, elections. There’s just no legitimate purpose. It’s illegal in the United States. It should be illegal in every democracy, because there is no argument on it’s behalf. It is, it has no good, positive effect. And, I hope, I know Australia has a number of efforts that it’s considering in that regard that it will continue, but not let the issue die. Because you know, if it’s allowed, we will eventually, if it is allowed in democracies, I believe that democracies can eventually lose control of their ability to maintain their sovereignty in dealing in important issues. And, you know, no democracy should allow itself to be so prostituted.

Misha Zelinsky:                  I think that’s very, very good advice, and that’s certainly something that we’re looking at very closely in Australia. But, I think you’re right. We need to guard against the easy money that can seem easy. But, as we talked about, even in the context of the 99 year leases with the debt diplomacy of the One Belt, One Road Initiative, money often comes with strings attached, as you rightly point out.

Misha Zelinsky:                  So, yeah, I just wanted to, perhaps, pivot to last couple of questions, but pivot to, you’re a former ambassador, but you’re also our most recent ambassador in the sense that the chair has not yet been filled. Let’s [crosstalk 00:27:41].

John Berry:                            Very, very hard to replace, Misha.

Misha Zelinsky:                  That’s right, irreplaceable John Berry. So we’ll, well, you’re welcome to come back, mate, at any time. That’s …

John Berry:                            I would in a heartbeat, but I don’t think I’ll be being sent your way.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, we did actually have an ambassador en route who was then directed to some important work in South Korea. Are you able to give a scoop? Are we gonna get an ambassador soon?

John Berry:                            Well, he would have been fantastic. He’s a dear friend, Harry Harris, Admiral Harris, is a brilliant man. And he would have made an outstanding ambassador. I know there’s a bunch others being considered now. I hope the president will pick a good one and send them down as quickly as he can. It’s important, and thank goodness we have a great [inaudible 00:28:28] in James Carouso there. He’s doing a great job during the interim, and I think James would make a great ambassador.

John Berry:                            So, there’s plenty to pick from. There’s plenty of good Americans who would do an outstanding job in Australia, and I just hope the president sends one soon.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, we’d love to have one. But as I said, mate, the chair’s still warm for you if you’d like to come back. But, just lastly, the question I’d like to ask our guests is … particularly, foreign guests, it’s a show that’s about, we call it Diplomates. It’s about mates you put in diplomacy, and it’s a hokey pun. But, I would say, in your time in Australia, if you could invite three mates to a barbecue, perhaps at the ambassadorial residence, given it’s still vacant, we could have a party there, who are the three Aussies that you would invite along as your mates?

John Berry:                            Well, the hardest thing, Misha, would be narrowing it down to three.

John Berry:                            Oh, boy, well, one, I’ll tell you, would be Quentin Bryce, who is the most wonderful person I’ve ever met in terms of everything, intellect … She has more class in her little finger than I will ever have in my entire life. And whenever I get to spend 10 minutes with her, I learn something. And so, I would love to have Quentin Bryce be one of those people. She is one of the crown jewels of Australia, in my opinion.

John Berry:                            The other is someone who I just love. He’s a native of Cambra. He’s president of the University of Cambra, Dr. Tom Calma. Tom is a brilliant leader in the Aboriginal community. He’s an indigenous Australian, a proud indigenous Australian who has done so much good in his lifetime, advancing his community within your wonderful country. And, we … Just like you, we talked about how you could help improve our democracy through some of your reforms, there’s many things that I think we could learn through more exchanges between our indigenous cultures. Because our history with Native Americans, Native Alaskans, and Native Hawaiians, for example, here in the United States, has been a sad one. And we’re still wrestling with many, many issues that are a result of that sad history.

John Berry:                            There’ve been some great success stories in Australia, just like we have had success stories in the United States. And I think Tom is one of those people who is a glass half full kind of guy, who is always coming up with new ideas and creative ways to make the future better, for not only indigenous people, but for all people in the country. So, Tom would be my second person.

John Berry:                            Who, who’d be the third? That is tough. Gosh, it’d be a toss-up between … You know, you’ve got two LGBT leaders there that I think are wonderful. Ian Thorpe and Alan Joyce. Alan comes at it from the business perspective, Ian from the, sportsman perspective.

John Berry:                            But, both of them have been amazing leaders in the LGBT community. And as you know, that’s one of my lifetime Civil Rights engagements and involvements.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Absolutely, yep.

John Berry:                            So, maybe you can give me the luxury of having four, and I’d invite Ian and Alan together, and then, we’d have a wonderful barbecue.

Misha Zelinsky:                  Well, I wouldn’t, couldn’t possibly deny having the Thorpedo there, so it’s more … And Alan can fly everyone in, so it’s no problem at all.

John Berry:                            And all of them should bring their spouses, so that would be, that makes it more than three. You can’t have a barbie without their good partners along, so …

Misha Zelinsky:                  Absolutely. Well, thank you so much for your time, Ambassador Berry. I think Admiral Phil Davidson recently said that there’s friends, allies, partners, and then there’s mates. And Australia and the United States are mates, and I think you’ve proven that today. So, thank you so much for your time. And good luck with everything over there. And we look forward to getting an ambassador soon.

John Berry:                            Misha, thank you so much.