AUKUS

Ambassador Hsiao Bi-Khim: Peace in Taiwan – Democracy, Freedom and the Indo-Pacific

Amb. Hsiao is Taiwan’s diplomatic representative to the United States.

Bi-khim is a decorated Taiwanese politician, having served twice in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s lower house) as an elective representative of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). She is a passionate advocate for a peaceful and open Indo-Pacific as well as a defender of democracy at home and abroad.

Misha Zelinsky caught up with Bi-Khim for a chinwag about the history of Taiwan and its relationship with the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan’s flourishing and highly performing democracy, the relentless grey zone and political warfare efforts that the Taiwanese people are enduring from the CCP, the threat of CCP military invasion, why we must not allow Taiwan to be erased from global discussions, the importance of human rights globally, how the world can maintain peace and avoid war, and most critically what the Taiwanese people want for themselves and from the world. 

Be sure to follow Bi-khim on Twitter! @bikhim

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TRANSCRIPT

Misha Zelinsky:

Ambassador, welcome to Diplomates. Thank you so much for joining us.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Thank you for the invitation. It’s a pleasure to join you today.

Misha Zelinsky:

Now, lots of things to discuss in sort of present day geopolitics, but a thought for our listeners, it might be a really handy way to begin the conversation. If you might just sort of take us back in time a little bit into the history of Taiwan and maybe give us a quick descriptor of how Taiwan was initially founded and it’s relationship with the mainland, et cetera.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Yes. Well, to put a long history short, let me first start by saying that I do believe many native Taiwanese could be distant relatives of native Australians. In prehistoric days, of course Taiwan was mostly indigenous peoples and of the Austronesian ethnic groups and their relatives extend away as far as the Maori people of Indonesia and across the Pacific islands. And in the 17th century, that’s when history was recorded in language and that was the initial colonialization by the Dutch. The Spanish briefly colonized Northern Taiwan, but they were also driven out by the Dutch and later on, the Ming Dynasty of China and towards the end of the 19th century, the Japanese started to occupy Taiwan since 1895, 50 years of Japanese colonial government and that was followed by Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan starting after 1945 and here’s where the complications begin.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Like Australia, Taiwan, besides indigenous people, most of the people of Taiwan come from different parts throughout our colonial history, including from different parts of China. But essentially Taiwan was made up of people seeking to find a new life to reestablish themselves. So we see ourselves also as an immigrant society in many ways in our recent history. And in 1949, the Nationalist Party lost the civil war in China and established their government in Taiwan with the intention of one day retaking China but that didn’t happen. Throughout the Cold War, in the ’70s the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek were replaced in the United Nations by the representatives of the People’s Republic of China or the Communist Party and Taiwan has since been in a very challenging and unique situation in which most of the countries in the world recognize the Communist Party and their government in mainland China while Taiwan has been left to stand for ourselves despite international marginalization.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

But I must say that during the Nationalist government of Taiwan, we survived 37 years of martial law and that was a one-party rule. These were very difficult years for the people of Taiwan. Martial law was lifted in 1987 and it wasn’t until the ’90s when we started to have our general elections and it was ’96 that we for the first time in history had the right to elect our own president. And so democracy arrived in Taiwan just about 30 years ago and as the people of Taiwan have the right to elect our own government, we also expect to be respected internationally as a modern democracy, especially as a society that has overcome many odds to finally be masters of our own destiny. And I think that’s a very important aspect considering the evolution of Taiwan and the series of governments coming from the outside. And finally, we are now governed by people elected solely by the people of Taiwan and that is what we represent today in terms of modern democracy.

Misha Zelinsky:

And so, I’m curious about Taiwan’s democracy. Maybe you could quickly describe the type of system that’s operated in Taiwan and also maybe just a bit how it’s performing. It’s a very young Asian democracy but it’s very highly rated by Freedom House in terms of its overall performance stacked up against much older democracies.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Yes. Well, first in terms of our political system, we have made a number of amendments to the original constitution that was placed in Taiwan in the 1940s to better reflect the needs of the modern Taiwanese, a political system and we continue to try to refine that including the next reform, we are trying to lower the voting age from age 20 to age 18 so that the young people would feel more, having a greater stake in our society and in public policy. But I think it’s important to recognize and acknowledge that though we had 37 years of martial law and one-party rule, today Taiwan is an open multiparty democracy and a very competitive democracy. And we have had a number of changes of government through elections, you just mentioned Freedom House’s rankings and observations on our political system and our basic freedoms indeed human rights, basic rights, basic political rights are part of the modern Taiwanese political identity.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

But I also want to say though, in addition to those institutionalized rights protected under the constitution, our society has also become a very open and liberal society respecting diversity, differences of opinion, freedom of speech. We also became the first country in East Asia to legalize same-sex marriage and I think that reflects the nature of our society and that is respectful of different lifestyles and religious freedom is also a very important value that we cherish in Taiwan. So these are the characteristics of the modern Taiwanese society and that is extremely different from what we are seeing in China today where, well, I must say a first for Hong Kong that the backsliding of basic rights, a deprivation of the rights that had been committed between the Chinese and the British years ago and that is a very tragic situation but a very important lesson for the people of Taiwan.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

It has actually had the impact of strengthening our will and determination to protect our democracy. And of course our modern democracy also contrasts the Chinese narrative that democracy is not suitable for Asian people. I think Taiwan proves that narrative wrong along with other democracies in the region, Japan, South Korea and others, Australia, I think it’s important that we continue to fight for the basic rights and the democracy that’s so important for human progress in our region.

Misha Zelinsky:

And so maybe just very quick before we sort of shift into some of the more contemporaneous issues, but you had an election not too long ago and not all listeners might know, but Taiwan has a female president, a woman president, President Tsai, and maybe you might just quickly touch on the issues that were contested at that election and how the Taiwanese people sort of interacted with that election and its determination.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Yes. Well, we elected for the first time a woman president in 1996 and she was reelected in the year 2000. This election was a landslide but I must admit that it was a contentious struggle, a very competitive political landscape in the process of getting her reelected. Mainland China policy is always a very important political issue in all of our elections. What type of economic relationships should we have with them? What type of political positions should we have? All of these are always contentious issues in our society. But in addition to China policy, I must point out that in the years leading up to my president’s election and reelection, she did confront some very challenging domestic policy reforms, including labor rights, including the issue I just raised, legalizing same-sex marriage and these in any society could be rather contentious.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

But we also implemented some pension reforms that were essential to ensuring the sustainability of our pension system, all these are very domestic however, they are always challenging for modern democracy and we are very proud that we’ve overcome many of the challenges and that our society is on a steady path of continuing to strengthen our democracy and to demonstrate our resilience.

Misha Zelinsky:

And so, talking about resilience-

Misha Zelinsky:

Sorry. So talking about resilience, Taiwan’s been in the news quite a bit in recent times in relation to its relationship with the mainland China and the Chinese Communist Party, in Australia, Australia’s been subject to a lot of gray zone, so called gray zone interference, political warfare interference from the Chinese Communist Party, probably best exemplified by the trade sanctions against Australia in place at the moment on a number of exports to China, but in a Taiwanese context, what are the sort of behaviors that you are seeing and the Taiwanese people are seeing in that sort of gray zone intimidation space?

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Thank you. Well, before I respond to this very important issue of gray zone coercion, let me correct myself. Previously in talking about my president’s election, she was first selected in 2016 and I think I said 1996-

Misha Zelinsky:

I wondered that myself. I didn’t think she was so old but I wasn’t going to-

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Yeah. No, she hasn’t been in power for so long. But she was first elected in 2016 and then reelected in 2020. And I had misspoken thinking about the original first ever presidential election. But on the gray zone area, China has been trying to coerce our society in multiple domains. The economic coercion and I know Australia has been going through a tough time also facing similar attempts to use economic leverage to pressure your society. We are also facing that. In fact, we’ve been facing this for a long time. They have used economic leverage to try to pressure our business leaders, our companies and our society, our media in so many ways. A second major area involves cyber security and this is something I know that Australia is also facing. A third general area involves political interference.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

In addition to the economic coercion, the Chinese have tried to use disinformation to propagate their narrative, but also to sow divisions within our society, to sow distrust over our democratic system and that has been a very challenging process for us. Another area that we are facing uniquely is the military coercion. The near daily flight intrusions into our air defense identification zone and also the maritime circling of China’s Naval presence. I think all of these … but the way we see it, there are multiple purposes and including the purpose to coerce the people of Taiwan, to threaten the people of Taiwan into accepting Chinese political positions.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

And this is something that has been ongoing since the missile crisis during our first presidential election in ’96, but it has intensified in many ways. And so we are in a situation where coercion is a hybrid threat and that does require hybrid solutions and I think we are in a position to share these, how we respond, some effective or not effective experiences with some other democracies that are increasingly also facing this type of bullying and coercion from the PRC.

Misha Zelinsky:

And so this gray zone interference is sort of designed to sort of wear down the psychology of society from within, but even just the … CCP has gone through an enormous modernization of its military, it’s tradition in the military and Xi Jinping, there’s a timetable for reunification 2049 from Taiwan to the mainland, but how concerned is China’s traditional military buildup in the context of everything you’ve just said?

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

We look at Chinese military buildup in kind of two perspectives. One is the intention part and the other is the capacity part. In terms of intentions, the Chinese have been very clear in terms of refusing to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and this has been a continuing position that they have held for decades and that has certainly intensified by the second part and that is building up their capacity and attempting to operationalize those threats. And what does concern us is not only the demonstration of their will to actually use force against Taiwan, but also building up certain capabilities to deny access to third parties who also share an interest in the peace and stability of the region. And so I think the threats against Taiwan have now expanded to actually become threats against the freedom of navigation and the stability of the region. And so threats against Taiwan are not only threats against Taiwan, they are threats against all those stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region who share an interest and the freedom of navigation in the free and open Indo-Pacific.

Misha Zelinsky:

And so, I’m not asking you to speak for the entire Taiwanese people, but you are the ambassador. How is this perceived at home in Taiwan and how hard is it to live under the threat of this constant intimidation, be it military or all the types of coercion you’ve just mentioned? In Australia, it’s at the forefront of our minds but the distance between the PRC and Australia is far greater than the distance between Taiwan and mainland China. So maybe you could just talk about the perceptions of Taiwanese people and how that plays out in the society and I suppose in the political debate.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Well, as I said, these threats have been ongoing for decades although they have been intensified in recent months. The people of Taiwan have been forced to live under these continuous threats but we have no choice but to carry on and go on with our lives. So we cannot forsake our daily routine or trying to improve our democracy and also pursue prosperity of our country because of these threats. And so despite the threats, Taiwan has continued to develop and evolve I think in a very positive way. But at the same time, we cannot take these threats lightly and so our society is also supportive of the government establishing and strengthening our own defenses. Our defenses are now aimed at what we call an asymmetrical warfare strategy. We are in no position to engage in an arms race with the PRC but what we intend to do is to be strong enough to deter the operationalization of their threats.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

And the capabilities that the Chinese possess and what we possess, it’s a dynamic process and we have to continuously respond to China’s growing capacities. And therefore our partnership with the United States is extremely important. And I must also say that the intensification of the threats against Taiwan also comes in the context of growing United States support for Taiwan. And this is bipartisan, it has crossed administrations, we also appreciate that other stakeholders in the region and around the world have also highlighted and underscored the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and in some cases have also indicated and demonstrated that concern with some action including freedom of navigation operations. I think all of these plays into the important strategy that we have and that is ultimately deterring the PRC from the actual operationalization of their threats.

Misha Zelinsky:

And I suppose in that context, what do the people of Taiwan and what does the Taiwanese democracy want from the Chinese Communist Party? The Chinese Communist Party’s demands are relatively clear, but what is it that Taiwan is seeking out of this relationship?

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

In our relationship with China, it’s a very complicated relationship. There are historical, cultural, business, economic, political, military issues, multiple issues involved in this. But in short, what I want to say is, the people of Taiwan, what we want is the survival. We want to defend our democracy and our basic rights, these rights that we fought so hard to achieve. And I started this conversation in the very beginning by talking about how for centuries we’ve been governed and ruled by outsiders and we have finally won the right to determine our own future, and that’s what we want to defend. But at the same time, we want to do this in a peaceful context. We are not trying to provoke China, we want to live with dignity with our basic rights protected, but we also seek a peaceful coexistence.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

And so I think successive administrations in Taiwan have indicated a willingness to engage in dialogue with the leaders of the PRC. The problem that we face now in terms of engaging in dialogue is the PRC is setting unreasonable political preconditions to that. And as long as they are willing to engage in peaceful dialogue with us, that’s a concept we are open to, but the political precondition in which the Chinese claim that Taiwan is part of China and in which they seek to govern Taiwan in the way Hong Kong has evolved, that one country two systems formula is not something that the people of Taiwan will accept. So this is the current status of Taiwan and according to polls, most of the people support the status quo. The different stakeholders may have a different interpretation of what the status quo is.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

We see Taiwan as a defacto, independent and sovereign country and we have a democracy that we intend to defend while the Chinese of course have a different interpretation. But we believe that shouldn’t prevent us from engaging in dialogue. Unfortunately, the unreasonable political conditions set forth by the government in Beijing makes it very difficult to engage in such peaceful discussions. On the economic side, there are greater complications. I just talked about the political side but on the economic side, a lot of our private sector like in Australia have a presence in China and right now we are trying to help our business diversify so that we are not as vulnerable to the economic coercion that the Chinese have become so skillful at using. We want to engage with our multiple trade partners in ways that are conducive to our long-term economic resilience.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Part of our economic diversification involves Taiwan’s application to the CPTPP and we certainly hope that other democracies like Australia will be supportive of Taiwan’s participation in the CPTPP. And that would help us, it would help prevent Taiwan from further marginalization as China continues to block our access to international organizations and to engaging with the rest of the world. I think our economic resilience is essential to sustaining our political system and our democratic process as well. And so, well, some businesses do engage in China from an economic perspective, but I think we also want to emphasize the importance of diversification so that we are all less vulnerable as democracies to the use of economic leverage and economic tools to interfere and to suppress our right to decide our own future.

Misha Zelinsky:

And so you’ve talked a lot about peaceful resolution to this and I think the entire world is invested in that and a peace for Indo-Pacific is absolutely critical to everyone’s prosperity and war is a disaster. So how do we avoid conflict in the Taiwanese Strait between Taiwan and the CCP and how do we avoid more broadly conflict in the Indo-Pacific because any student of history knows that war is a disaster for everyone who’s involved in it, victors or losers?

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Well, our view is that we will not bow to pressure but neither will we provoke a conflict. At the moment, our policy is to sustain and maintain the status quo and the PRC, the Chinese leadership are attempting to change that status quo by coercion and also military threats. And it’s a very, very complicated process, but I think what’s important is we maintain the ability to deter any unilateral change to the status quo, especially with the use of force. And our position is ultimately the future of Taiwan has to be decided by the people of Taiwan. And in terms of our deterrence, I just spoke about the military aspects and our asymmetrical strategy but I think it’s also important that the international community continues to make clear to the PRC that the use of force is unacceptable and that everyone has a stake in the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.

Misha Zelinsky:

So let’s just unpack that a little because some people will say, “Well, this effectively …” Going back to the historic places is a resolution of a civil war and ultimately these are matters for people of Taiwan and the people of the People’s Republic of China to sort out. Is that a fair characterization or you are sort of saying all democracies ultimately are invested in Taiwan’s fight? So how do democracies become more invested in that outcome?

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Well, I have to say that over the past century, Taiwan and China were integrated for only four years, and those were very painful and brutal years for the people of Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China has never governed Taiwan, not even for a single day and that is the reality, that’s a historical fact. And so I think characterizing this as a civil war doesn’t really do justice to this historical fact of what has transpired over the past century. And also, I think it’s important to acknowledge that Taiwan through decades of hard work and really building our political system, we have evolved into a modern democracy in which the people want to have a say in their future just like the people in Australia and in other countries. But at the same time, we want to do this in a peaceful context.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

And so we will do what we can to prevent a war, building up our own defenses is part of that deterrent strategy to ensure that we can continue to survive as a modern democracy. And I think it’s, again, if we look beyond the immediate Indo-Pacific region and even in a global context, historically appeasing bullies just doesn’t work. I think there was perhaps a point in history where many Western democracies thought that engaging with China or doing business with them would lead them to become a rule abiding, responsible global citizen, supporting their accession to the WTO may also lead to the Chinese abiding by global trade practices.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

But the reality is, they are not as a global power, they are not using that power in a responsible way. They are breaking the rules, they are disrespecting the global status quo and I think it’s something that we can only deal with in a collective way. And that’s why it’s important that democracies work together on this. And again, the challenge is so immense that it is a multi-domain, hybrid challenge in which we need to have security on solutions, economic solutions and political solutions at the same time.

Misha Zelinsky:

And so we talked a little about human rights at the beginning. I want to unpack this a little bit more, but obviously there’s a very big attention at the moment on Peng Shuai who’s a famous Chinese tennis player who effectively made a claim of sexual assault against a senior member of the Chinese Communist Party, essentially the ruling committee, one of the top seven people in China. And it’s almost like effectively China’s moment but the difference of course is that Peng Shuai is effectively being disappeared. Issues like these arbitrary detention of people, disappearing of people, the control of information, how concerning is that firstly for Taiwan but secondly more generally for the way the world seeks to hold China to account for its human rights violations, Uyghurs, et cetera. How do we deal with that challenge?

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Well, it’s not just Peng Shuai, and her disappearance has certainly gotten the attention of many Taiwanese people. But that is one out of many cases including other high profile cases like Jack Ma and the two Canadians and others. And there have also been individual Taiwanese who have tragically and unfortunately faced arbitrary detention and imprisonment as well. And I think as we look at these cases, but also Hong Kong and the Uyghurs, we’re looking at a serious deterioration of rights in China and I think any advocacy of appeasement is just a thing of the past. And I think there have been governments that believe that by being silent or quietly engaging China, China might change, but apparently that has been tried for decades and it hasn’t worked. And I think it’s time that we work together as democracies to call out these violations that are increasing and also to come up with some joint action plans whether they be economic or political or through strengthening the effectiveness of international organizations to hold China accountable. I think there’s a lot that has to be done.

Misha Zelinsky:

And you’re right in the sense that this is much bigger than one tennis player, but I think it has sort of captured the attention of the world, but there’s been a lot of attention on the detention of Uyghurs. You’ve had upwards of one to perhaps three million Uyghurs being held in so-called labor camps, others will call them essentially prisons and so where all sorts of atrocities have been alleged. You’ve talked a bit about how Taiwan has recently legalized same-sex marriage and the sort of rights for people of the old GBTIQ community but what’s the contrast with people’s ability to express their religious freedoms or their sexual freedoms on mainland China because I think that’s an area that gets less discussed than perhaps Uyghurs or the arbitrary detention of high profile, be it the athletes or tech billionaires, et cetera?

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Well, there’s certainly a contrast there. And in addition to the contract on that the contrast in the way basic rights and diversity and differences are respected in our societies, I think it’s also important to highlight an area that is technology and how technology is used and applied. I think in our society, in Taiwan, we share the belief that with Australia, the United States and other democracies, that technology fundamentally is there to advance freedom to advance human progress. And that also contrasts fundamentally to the way the Chinese government is using technology and that is to exert control and surveillance of their people.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

And I think fundamentally this is an area that is evolving, it could be a defining aspect in a global competition of values and also in the effectiveness of responding to many of the human rights challenges that we’ve just mentioned. And I think it’s an area that again we need to take seriously. We’ve noticed that through QUAD, Australia, India, Japan, you’ve identified emerging technologies and AI as potential areas of cooperation and our hope is that we can expand on this particular area to involve other technologically advancing societies that are also democracies to work together in terms of not only, it’s not just about protecting IPR, but it’s about creating technology that truly advances freedom.

Misha Zelinsky:

Should businesses be more, one of the things that’s been discussed a lot is businesses not really looking at how they’re investing capital into essentially CCP, technological companies that are then being used for this type of surveillance that you are describing or oppression of particular groups be they religious or particular ethnicities within autocracy such as the CCP. Should that be more at the forefront of discussion and policy making?

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Well, certainly. Yeah, we have been engaging here in Washington on the issue of export controls. The United States certainly has a broader capacity to examine on a global level those companies that could potentially violate or support violations of basic human rights and Taiwan has, we have complied with those export controls and I think it’s important that we work together internationally to ensure that these are enforceable, but also investment screening is an important area. The way Chinese capital comes into our democracies and has an impact in a way that doesn’t meet our goal of advancing freedom and human progress but instead become tools of economic coercion. I think we need to examine that too. And so I think investment screening, export controls or more international discussions on those export controls and entity lists and countering China’s economic coercion, I think all of these are areas that do need a lot more work.

Misha Zelinsky:

And so just shifting into sort of more regional, global diplomacy relating to the CCP, we talked about human rights violation, holding the regime to account, but then also how it uses economic leverage. You saw good examples where the Houston Rockets coach spoke about Uyghurs and was basically stomped on by the NBA because the CCP said, “We’re going to ban NBA games.” So mainly in China and it’s a huge amount of loss there, but we’ve seen the Women’s Tennis Association make a stand saying that unless Peng Shuai essentially they are satisfied that she’s safe, they’re no longer going to have women’s tennis tournaments within mainland China.

Misha Zelinsky:

And then we’ve also now started to see nations talk about a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing winter Olympics. Are these good opportunities to sort of press the regime in a high profile way and how do we coordinate that to make sure you get maximum impact because the method that CCP loves to use is one-on-one bullying on a bilateral basis, be it nation to nation, big nation versus smaller nation, Australia is experiencing that or organization versus the regime and market access. So how do we actually sort of thread that needle?

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Well, you mentioned the NBA and China’s, again, use of their market leverage to pressure sports organizations or even entertainers and other sectors. This is not just unique here, they’ve been doing this to Taiwanese entertainers and artists as well for a long time and forcing them to actually take or advocate political positions or otherwise be completely silent about any position that the Chinese would find offensive. And I have to say too that their anger threshold has been lowering in recent years and so they are easily offended. It’s actually pretty hard not to offend them nowadays for anyone who want to speak their own mind. So this is becoming an increasing problem, but I think you laid out a keyword and that is, they’ve been good at this one-on-one bullying.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

They pick people out and pressure them, whether they are a business or an entertainer or a sports star, they will bully them, they will bully an industry like they have bullied your wine and other sectors, but this is a divide and conquer, a very typical divide and conquer tactic. And the only way to respond to that is collective action. And that’s why these dialogues and discussions like the one we are having today and other discussions across democracies and open societies in terms of raising awareness and working together as broader sectors and democracies, and even consumer movements to support each other, support countries that are being bullied. I think that’s fundamentally what humanity has to do if we really care about basic rights, if we really want to counter such bullying and outright violations of basic rights, it’s something that governments, civil society, consumers and others have to work out together.

Misha Zelinsky:

And so, one of the areas where there’s been enormous amount of bullying and frankly some pretty diabolical acquiescence has been essentially the Hollywood, the entertainment industry essentially is very nervous about doing anything that offends the CCP because the market access is very lucrative, increasingly driven by movie goers in mainland China. One of the areas that the CCP is very focused on is sort of seeming to want to erase Taiwan from discourse or people’s minds, the example that comes to mind for me, and it seems petty but Tom Cruise’s Top Gun jacket, then one in the ’80s, one of my favorite all movies, anyone listening to this will not be shocked. There was a flag on his jacket relating to Taiwan that’s now been replaced in the second Top Gun movie that’s being released next year.

Misha Zelinsky:

And that’s just one example where you’ll see airlines being sort of bullied to get rid of having Taiwan as a separate destination on the map or even school children being called out for discussing Taiwan as being its own nation. Why firstly is the CCP doing that and what’s the impact of that? Because the way it appears to me is, if no one’s discussing Taiwan and makes the objectives that we discussed earlier from CCP, bullying or CCP seeking to reunify under any means necessary, easier to achieve. So I’m kind of curious if you can unpack that a little.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Well, you’ve raised a number of examples of what China is doing to further marginalize Taiwan’s international presence. And in addition to all these examples that you have also raised, one thing they’ve been doing is threatening political leaders that even talk about Taiwan or dare to visit Taiwan. And this pressure again has increased in recent period of time, for example, for decades, we’ve been able to welcome members of Congress visiting Taiwan, and now China is responding to these delegations visiting with more fighter jet incursions and military threats. And they are reacting in a way that is not acceptable in terms of international norms and practices and it’s certainly problematic. But I think on the optimistic side, the good thing is that their threatening behavior has also generated a tremendous backlash.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

They have sanctioned for example members of the European parliament but by their own sanctions, for those who have been not only talking about Taiwan, but advocating for the rights of the Uyghurs and Hong Kong and others, and by attempting to censor them or to suppress these views, they are actually generating a greater backlash among other democratic societies. And I think the open societies are our last defense, when the people want to support their political leaders that have principled position instead of appeasing to bullies, I think that is our most important defense and that will continue to, hopefully that will continue to forge the direction in which democratic governments will choose to take when it comes to dealing with China.

Misha Zelinsky:

Would you like to see Hollywood and other entertainment industries talk more about Taiwan and its people and its stories and support Taiwanese efforts in that way?

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Well, we certainly hope to have a greater presence and awareness internationally and it’s unfortunate that self-censorship has really had a negative impact on many sectors. But if we look at the recent evolution of events in Hong Kong and the recent unfortunate arrest of Jimmy Lai, a media tycoon, we will notice that before things went down this way, extreme, tragic way, there was about a decade or two of self-censorship in which a lot of Hong Kong media would kind of refrain from reporting content that the Chinese might find offensive. And we see this now in many other democracies. And so I think it’s important that the citizens speak up and open societies have an impact and maybe the development of new social media platforms and the participation of citizens in the process of information, distribution and dissemination that would help to democratize the global media environment and the messaging environment so that there would be more room for public messaging that helps to highlight our plight and the successes of our democracy, but also the challenges that we face together.

Misha Zelinsky:

And another area where you’re seeing a sort of contest playing out, and a lot of people wouldn’t be aware of it, but it’s around diplomatic recognition. You mentioned that in the ’70s a lot of nations shifted their recognition of the capital and the government of China from Taiwan, Taipei, to Beijing and PRC, but there are still some nations that tend to be smaller but a lot of them in the Pacific where there’s an enormous contest at play in terms of trying to … Beijing is seeking, the CCP is seeking to have those nations shift their democratic recognition away from Taiwan and to the PRC. But also you’re seeing these sorts of things playing out in Eastern Europe where the Eastern Europeans are now sticking up for small nations, like Lithuania sticking up for Taiwan’s rights. How do you see that contest playing out in small nations? We’ve talked about bigger nations like the United States and Europe and even Australia is much bigger than some of these nations we’re describing.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Well, we want to work to maintain the partners that we have, the 14 countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and four of them are in the Pacific and Taiwan continues to maintain these ties in a way that is sustainable. We try to support areas in the medical field, in the agriculture, developmental, climate and multiple issues. And we want to be a force for good in the region as well as in the world. So we welcome any support from the United States and Australia and others in sustaining those partnerships that we have at the moment. At the same time, we are building new partnerships with other countries and you mentioned Eastern Europe and Central Europe, and although they don’t recognize Taiwan diplomatically, they are engaging with Taiwan in ways that helps to deepen our relations in so many ways.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Unfortunately, China is threatening sanctions against some of these countries and most notably Lithuania recently. And so it is our hope that other democracies will support Lithuania as they are the new victim of bullying. I think it’s especially important that other countries who have been through this bullying, who have also been victims of bullying stick together and support each other so that we can all be stronger and better withstand all types of coercion and economic and political threats that the PRC exerts against our democracies.

Misha Zelinsky:

Well, Lithuania has had all trade to China cut off. So Australia had some specific sanctions on specific goods. So Lithuania is really feeling like the world should definitely help them out given that they are now feeling the full wrath of the CCP now, you talked about this a little bit at the beginning, but I want to unpack it a little bit. You talked about Taiwan seeking to join the CPTPP, which is an evolved version of the Trans-Pacific Partnership which is a trade agreement originally championed by the Obama administration then of course Donald Trump withdrew from that and then became the CPTPP, which was the nation’s remaining a lot of the, Pacific nations without the United States of course, they’re welcome back. Why is it important for Taiwan to join an organization like that? And also this talk of Taiwan seeking entry into the WHO, the World Health Organization and other multilateral bodies, why is that important and also why is the CCP resisting that?

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Well, first on the CPTPP, Taiwan is heavily dependent on trade for our economic development and we have been for decades and we certainly want to continue to expand our trade relations. And there are a number of regional trade regimes, not just CPTPP but also RCP that have been set up and we are concerned that the exclusion of Taiwan or the marginalization of Taiwan will negatively impact our competitiveness as well as our trade and access to other regional economies. Furthermore, as I said in our earlier discussion, we seek to diversify our economic partnerships with other major economies in the region. So that is essentially why we submitted our application for the CPTPP. Now, does Taiwan have the right to legally and politically? Yeah. We are a member of APEC.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

We are also a part of the WTO as a customs territory. Taiwan on has had bilateral trade agreements with countries that don’t necessarily recognize us politically, but as a trading entity, as an economic entity, we have a bilateral trade agreement with New Zealand, we also have one with Singapore. And so with these precedents and with our membership in the WTO as a customs territory, there’s nothing institutional that prevents us from engaging with other trade agreements and joining international multilateral trade arrangements. So I think we are pretty solid in terms of our intention, our application and our right to be part of these international trade organizations. The problem of course is China’s attempt to again block us and it’s clear that their efforts to block us are part of the broader campaign to marginalize Taiwan, to wipe us off from the face of the earth in terms of having our own identity, their attempt to absorb Taiwan is also part of this broader intention.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

So we are in a very challenging situation and certainly hope that other like-minded democracies would be more supportive, especially those economies, those other partners in the CPTPP could be more supportive of Taiwan’s accession. We are a trading partner to many in the region and we certainly hope to continue that as a law abiding rules-following economy and responsible stakeholder in the region. Now, on other organizations like the World Health Organization, I think it’s clear that China’s marginalization of Taiwan has been a loss to the world. In the outset of the COVID 19 pandemic, Taiwan was one of the earliest societies and governments to alert the WHO of the evolving situation in China. We started to quarantine against travelers from Wuhan in December 2019 before any other country in the world took the pandemic seriously.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

And if Taiwan could be integrated into the global health network, I think we could contribute to that. We have expertise. We have handled COVID 19 relatively successful. I can’t say not without some challenges but we certainly want to work with others for the benefit of global health. We are also seeking to be part of Interpol, the global effort to fight transnational crime. We seek to be part of ICAO, which is the International Civil Aviation Organization for the sake of civil aviation and the safety of all the flights that fly around Taiwan, our airspace on a daily basis. It’s good for the world for Taiwan to be incorporated, it allows us to share our expertise, it also allows Taiwan to learn from best practices of others around the world.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

And so I think it’s also important, and I do want to say here, I want to express our gratitude to Australia, the people and government of Australia for supporting Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations and this has been reiterated on a number of occasions and we are truly grateful for that. I think another platform for which we are grateful is the GCTF, it’s called the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, that initiated as a bilateral Taiwan/US platform for supporting Taiwan’s engagement on a global level on multiple policy issue areas. Japan joined as a formal partner and recently Australia has also become a partner in this. It’s a platform in which we can work together on a wide range of issue from climate to women’s empowerment, indigenous people’s rights and economic empowerment, small businesses, a wide range of issues where Taiwan has the expertise to offer but also where the world can benefit from Taiwan’s participation.

Misha Zelinsky:

Well, we could talk all day, and we didn’t even get to the fact that Taiwan’s pretty much the world’s engine room for semiconductors which is basically central to every piece of technology, including what we’re using right now to have this conversation. So it’s a critical economic engine room for the world and a very highly technical and sophisticated economy with a very high per capita income, et cetera. Now, I’m going to get in trouble because you need to get going, but I can’t let you go without asking my notoriously bad question. And you’ve talked a lot about Australia, but as a foreign guest on our show, you have to nominate three Australians to be at a barbecue with the ambassador. Now that could be at your residence in the United States in DC, or it could be in Taiwan. I’m open to either, but I’m very curious to get your answer before we let you go and I can already imagine your staff are getting irritated with me.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Yes, well, I have to say like many Taiwanese people, we grew up with some Australian icons and entertainers that are very well known in Taiwan, like Olivia Newton-John and others, Crocodile Dundee and others. But that’s very much prominent in our popular culture and certainly I’m one of those that have … I grew up in that environment. But I do want to say though that now that with my strong political interest and passion in working with other democracies, and I say this at a risk of, again, irritating China, but I would be honored and love to have a conversation with your current government leaders of course on how we can work together to strengthen our democracies. And I think another area is, if I could choose to have a barbecue with, maybe not an individual, but a category of friends, maybe the red wine industry to see what we can do in terms of countering economic coercion.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

And I think it’s important that consumers support each other and for months, my office has been buying Australian wine for our own entertainment purposes, also as a stance. I think it’s important to support freedom and markets abiding by the rules. And so if there’s a third category in addition to the political leadership and the wine, the vineyards, I would say I’m very interested in learning more about the indigenous people of Australia. And as I said in the beginning, we are related perhaps thousands of years ago, but the indigenous people of Taiwan and the Austronesian peoples have a long cultural relationship and we do want to explore opportunities to further highlight that and to share those experiences.

Misha Zelinsky:

Well, it’s a very big barbecue in that you’re going to have [crosstalk 01:02:18] cabinet, you’ve got the red wine and white wine industry, you’ve got a number of our indigenous leaders and community members and then of course crocodile Dundee and Olivia Newton-John, but you can have a lot, this is your barbecue so I’m happy for you to have the lot. And thank you so much for coming on the show and being so generous with your time. I think when I describe the challenges in Taiwan, I talk about an island of democracy of nearly 25 million people being bullied by the Chinese Communist Party and it should sound very familiar to anyone in Taiwan and very familiar to anyone in Australia. So thank you so much ambassador and good luck and have a great Christmas. I’ll see you soon.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Well, thank you, Misha. And again, thanks for this interest in Taiwan. I think Taiwan and Australia have a lot in common and I look forward to working together with our Australian friends.

Misha Zelinsky:

Thank you. Take care.

Amb. Bi-khim Hsaio:

Thank you.

Misha Zelinsky:

Good day Diplomates fans. Thanks so much for listening. Huge big, thank you once again, to Bi-khim for coming on the show. I think you can also see what an outstanding advocate she is for the Taiwanese people but also for democracy and freedom more generally. Now, I brought a question. Now, a few of you have written asking actually about the Beijing boycott given that the government has now essentially said that it’s going to support the diplomatic boycott and a number of other countries are now doing it. Obviously, I think that’s a good thing, but I sort of won’t dig into that too much because we’re already kind of past that. I actually have a random one here from Alan. Alan has asked, is there a summer read you recommend on foreign policy? Well, Alan, let me tell you, there are so many. So many, but if you’re looking for something on China, I would really recommend Peter Hatch’s Red Zone.

Misha Zelinsky:

It’s a kind of an extended version of his quarterly essay, Red Flag. It’s a really great sort of … it’s an easy read, but it’s really well-researched, really well articulated piece relating to the Australian relationship with China, but the world’s relationship more generally and he breaks it all down and I think you’ll find a lot out of it if you … after an interesting one, Garside recently wrote a book called China Coup and it’s just kind of a hypothetical look at what a coup against Xi Jinping might look like, but he actually names real people and real actors and sort of plays it out and then he also says, “Look, here’s my underpinning assumptions of why I believe this could happen, feel free to challenge me.” So that’s an interesting one. If you’re after a kind of a more political, like a US politics book, Lucky is a really good read about the US.

Misha Zelinsky:

It’s kind of behind-the-scenes take on the US election with the Biden team but also everyone sort of running in the primaries, et cetera. So it is a really good read in the way that if you’re ever a game changer or doubled down, or those types of behind-the-scenes books. Another one, slightly a bit wrist slashy but Peril by Bob Woodward is absolutely outstanding. Meticulously well researched, and really it digs into some of the troubling things that we saw unfolding under the last days of the Trump presidency leading to the January 6th insurrection. So that’s also good. So a number of there to chose from and if you do read any of them, let me know how you go, otherwise, thanks so much for listening and I’ll see you next time. Bye for now.

Speaker 2:

You are just listening to Diplomates. A Geopolitical Chinwag. For more episodes, visit www.diplomates.show or subscribe to the podcast on iTunes or through any of your favorite podcast channels.

Speaker 1:

This podcast was brought to you by Minimal Productions producer, Jim Mins.

 

Dr Thomas Mahnken: Going Nuclear – Submarines, AUKUS and Great Power Competition

Dr. Thomas Mahnken is President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He currently serves as a member of the Congressionally-mandated National Defense Strategy Commission and as a member of the Board of Visitors of Marine Corps University. 

His career in defence is extensive and includes service as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning. 

He is the author of numerous books, including The Gathering Pacific Storm: Emerging U.S.-China Strategic Competition in Defense Technological and Industrial Development.

Misha Zelinsky caught up with Tom to discuss all things nuclear subs, including why this is was the right call for Australia, the significance of the AUKUS agreement, restoring diplomatic relations with the French, how Australia can get subs before 2038 to avoid capability gaps, the lessons from historic great power competition and what total technological competition with the Chinese Communist Party looks like.

Please keep rating and reviewing the show.  If you have a question, send it through to us on any of our social media channels or directly to Misha.

EPISODE TRANSCRIPT:

Misha Zelinsky:

Tom, welcome to Diplomates. Thanks so much for joining us.

Tom Mahnken:

It’s a pleasure to be with you.

Misha Zelinsky:

Now, huge news over the last week, the announcement related to AUKUS, the awkwardly named acronym. Although, I should say from the outset, Australians, we love acronyms. We basically shorten everything. But awkwardly named AUKUS.

Misha Zelinsky:

But maybe just starting here, you might just explain the significance of this announcement. It’s made a huge splash, not just at home in Australia, but around the world. Why is this so significant, compared to other announcements?

Tom Mahnken:

Well, I think it is tremendously significant. I think it’s tremendously significant for Australia. I think it’s tremendously significant for the United States, and for Great Britain. Because it represents an opportunity to move forward and collaborate closely on cutting-edge capabilities. To enhance the security of each of the parties, but also, the collective security of all three nations.

Misha Zelinsky:

So you’ve been, for a long time, personally … You were telling me before that you’ve been arguing the case, I suppose. So, maybe give us a little bit of the history about we got to this AUKUS announcement, and the history and the arguments around this particular debate relating to a particular nuclear capability.

Tom Mahnken:

Yeah. Well, you’re right. It seems like, as good as the news was last week, it was a long time coming. Because, particularly in the nuclear domain or the nuclear-powered submarine domain, it’s an argument that I’ve been making for the better part of a decade. And not just me, but a number of folks on both sides of the Pacific.

Tom Mahnken:

And I think the reason … Well, there’s multiple reasons why we’ve gotten where we have. But the logic, seems to me, has always been compelling. I think we’ve just gotten to the point now, where we’ve now gotten the political willpower and political imagination to bring that to fruition.

Tom Mahnken:

But the logic behind it, well, first it stems from Australia’s geo-strategic circumstances. That, fortunately for Australia, throughout much of her history, she’s a long ways from those who seek her harm. But of course, the ability to reach out and touch Australia and her interests is growing. So, the capability edge is needed. I think that’s certainly one dimension of it.

Tom Mahnken:

And then, of course, the capabilities of nuclear propulsion when it comes to submarines, I think are particularly appealing to Australia and to Australia’s strategic circumstances.

Misha Zelinsky:

Before we get to the tick itself, I think it’s also important to talk about just how rare it is for a nation to share its nuclear technology. The United States has only previously shared its technology in 1958, so a long time ago, about 60 years ago. And that was with the other partner of AUKUS, the United Kingdom.

Misha Zelinsky:

So maybe explain just exactly the significance of that decision in and of itself.

Tom Mahnken:

Well, look, I think it represents just a statement about just how closely the United States, Australia, and Britain are able to collaborate. So I think it really builds off of, as you say, literally decades of close cooperation in a whole range of areas between the United States and Australia. And now extending that cooperation into the nuclear realm. As you say, heretofore, it’s only been the United States and Great Britain, because of the sensitivity of the technology involved.

Tom Mahnken:

But Australia is a wholly trusted ally, and a wholly trusted partner of the United States, so it makes sense to extend cooperation into this realm. And I would hasten to add, of course, AUKUS is not just about nuclear propulsion for submarines. It envisions collaboration in a whole variety of high-leverage, cutting-edge capabilities.

Tom Mahnken:

This, I think, will just be the first significant case of what I certainly hope will be collaboration in various other areas, as well.

Misha Zelinsky:

Well, I think that’s interesting. Because a lot of the detail’s been missed in the politics of it, I suppose, or the reporting, which is focused so much on this monumental decision for Australia to acquire nuclear subs, and break its deal with the French Naval Group maker.

Misha Zelinsky:

But that other component is so critical; it’s almost bigger in some senses. So, just turning to the subs, and you touched on it at the beginning there, but the capability question. Why is it that … Was it almost inevitable that we’d go down the nuclear propulsion path?

Misha Zelinsky:

Maybe for people that don’t quite understand subs, which, I’m one … Why is nuclear superior to diesel technology?

Tom Mahnken:

Yeah. Nuclear propulsion for submarines provides a mixture of speed, range and endurance that’s unmatched by other means of propulsion. So, particularly if you are a continent-sized nation like Australia, located at the crossroads of the Indo-Pacific, you need … The Royal Australia Navy needs submarines with range, with endurance, and with speed.

Tom Mahnken:

So, either that is a nuclear-propelled submarine, or it’s the world’s largest, most capable conventionally powered submarine.

Misha Zelinsky:

Which is what the French were going to build us, basically, or …

Tom Mahnken:

Well, look, so I think Australia has faced, previous to AUKUS, Australia faced a dilemma. Which was, on the one hand, the geo-strategic logic pushes Australia toward nuclear-propelled submarines. On the other hand, to state the obvious, Australia, even though the largest or second largest repository of uranium ore in the world, doesn’t have nuclear power, civilian nuclear power. Doesn’t have a nuclear industry. So, it seems like a little bit of a strange fit.

Tom Mahnken:

And I think, if one looks closely and carefully at Australian defense policy over decades, I think you can see different attempts to deal with that dilemma. And I think fortunately, we’re in a position now, where that dilemma can be solved properly. But yeah, look, if you go back to the process that led to the choice of the Shortfin Barracuda to fulfill the requirement to replace the Collins-

Misha Zelinsky:

That’s the Japanese submarine.

Tom Mahnken:

The Barracuda’s the French design.

Misha Zelinsky:

French, French. Sorry. It was the Soryu [crosstalk 00:07:28].

Tom Mahnken:

Yeah. There were three contenders for that. There was a German contender, a European contender. There was a Japanese contender in the Soryu. And then there was the French contender in the Barracuda, which became the attack class.

Tom Mahnken:

And if you look at that process, and if you look at what the Australian government was looking for … again, in terms of characteristics, in terms of design attributes like speed, range and endurance, they were looking for a nuclear submarine.

Tom Mahnken:

In other words, the only propulsion plant that could really deliver those capabilities was a nuclear propulsion plant. And yet, for all sorts of understandable reasons, the … I would say the Australian government didn’t ask, and the United States didn’t volunteer, at that time.

Tom Mahnken:

But again, fortunately, we’re at a time now, and I think it speaks to the times we’re living in, where the three governments involved were able to make this happen.

Misha Zelinsky:

Was it a mistake to engage Naval Group to build this hybrid submarine that you described there? We sort of, for political reasons, tied ourselves into a pretzel to come up with this … basically converting a nuclear submarine to a diesel submarine, and making it much, much more difficult.

Misha Zelinsky:

And Australia seems to do this a lot. We build these bespoke products that no one else has, which raises the cost and extends the timetable in building them. But was it a mistake to not have bitten the bullet then, in 2016, when the Naval Group contract was signed?

Tom Mahnken:

Look, I think the options that were on the table at the time, each bore with them risks, and risks of different sort. Going the European route would have really put a dent in the Royal Australian Navy’s power projection capability. So really would have been much … resulted in much more of a coastal submarine force.

Tom Mahnken:

The Japanese alternative posed another set of risks. First, Japan at the time had just recently lifted its restrictions on exporting defense articles. And this would have been a big ask for the Japanese government to deliver on. Also, I think the Japanese were looking to continue manufacturing the Soryus in Japan. Whereas, the Australian government was obviously looking for manufacture in Australia. But there was risk there.

Tom Mahnken:

And then, the risk for the French design was … Well, among other things, it was a technical risk. The French design is the design of a nuclear-powered attack submarine, converted to a diesel submarine. And one can argue, as people have argued, that it was nonetheless a proven design.

Tom Mahnken:

But really, switching out the power plant in a submarine renders it a new design. It’s like, I don’t know, taking a six-cylinder BMW and putting a four-cylinder diesel engine in it. Now, the worst thing that can happen, if you were to do something like that with an automobile, is you get a clunker. The worst thing that happens in a submarine if you do something like that is sailors lose their lives.

Tom Mahnken:

So I think there was another set of risks involved there. All this points back to the fact that the best, the optimal solution, back a handful of years ago, was not on the table. And that best optimal solution then was a nuclear submarine.

Misha Zelinsky:

So, interestingly, the talk’s now … people said, “Well, we’ve made the French turn inside-out, to … ” as you say, redesign a nuclear submarine to our specifications. Wouldn’t it have made more sense just to build a French nuclear submarine, just that the one that they were already building?

Misha Zelinsky:

But is that an attainable outcome against the technology that is available through the Virginia-class United States tech, or the Astute-class of British tech? Or is that actually not a good comparator? Because people say it’s like for like, but …

Tom Mahnken:

I think one element has to do with propulsion. So, a nuclear design would have been superior to the world’s largest, most capable, conventional design, which is what you’re looking at. But I think interoperability with the United States is also a key element. So, they’re having a US combat system, as the attack class was to have. And hopefully, the next generation submarine will also have. I think that’s an important part of it, as well.

Tom Mahnken:

And whether that could have been accommodated … On one hand, you would have gotten a truly proven design. On the other hand, it would have been potentially less interoperable. I think that’s yet another factor that weighs here pretty heavily.

Misha Zelinsky:

And what about the fact that, as I understand it, one of the advantages, and certainly, our prime minister Scott Morrison, was talking this up quite a bit … that a British or American nuclear submarine is a once-off fueling proposition. Whereas, the French, you would require a domestic nuclear energy industry to fuel it as you need. Can you maybe explain that? Because I think that’s a fascinating thing that these subs can run on one charge.

Tom Mahnken:

Yep. That’s right, and that’s yet another variable, is the lifecycle of the submarine and the need, or not, to refuel it. American and British nuclear submarines use one variety of reactor for propulsion. The French have gone another path. In terms of the nuclear fuel cycle for the submarine, it ideally would be a one and done for an American or British design.

Misha Zelinsky:

So, what’s the lifespan of a submarine, then, on a …

Tom Mahnken:

Well, it depends on how it’s deployed, essentially. It’s, if you imagine, the plant has so many hours on it.

Misha Zelinsky:

Sure.

Tom Mahnken:

But you’re talking decades of service life.

Misha Zelinsky:

One of the things that I’m really interested about, and you touched on it, the jobs question, and that political economy question. I represent a union at home that has people that work in ship-building. And there’s going to be a lot of jobs in South Australia, particular from the French build.

Misha Zelinsky:

So, trying to work through exactly how long it takes. But one of the things that is … I’ve never quite understood, and maybe you can explain it to me and to people listening, is … Okay. We made this decision in 2016 to build 12 ships with Naval Group. And they’re talking about the first ship hitting the water in 2035. It just seems crazy.

Misha Zelinsky:

And then today, if we were to press Go on an Astute-class or Virginia-class, or something in between, we’re told like 2038. It’s 18 years, pretty much. I can raise a child in that 18 years into an adult, and go out and do things. So, why does it take so long? Explain it as a lay person, it just seems a crazy long lead time.

Tom Mahnken:

Well, I think in specifics, for Australia and Australian skills in Australian ship-building, a key part of this is building those skills. So, going from not having an active submarine production capability to having one, requires a lot of recruitment, a lot of skills development.

Tom Mahnken:

And again, at the front end of the selection process for the Collins replacement, there was actually some very good work done … literally surveying the skills base across Australia for the types of skills and the quantity of skills needed to produce, at that point, a very capable, large conventionally propelled attack submarine.

Tom Mahnken:

And what that analysis showed is … to state the obvious, you didn’t have a lot of highly skilled submarine techs and engineers just sitting around on the beach, waiting to be employed.

Tom Mahnken:

That the skills would have to be developed or brought in from adjacent trades, and folks being trained up. This was actually something that the United States faced in its own way, briefly, in the early to mid 1990s, after the end of the Cold War. Where for us, the question was, what was the minimal production run for our, then, our Los Angeles-class attack submarines, to keep the skills base intact.

Misha Zelinsky:

To avoid the valley of death, as its called.

Tom Mahnken:

Exactly. And now, and I think this will figure into AUKUS going forward … I think now, actually, the challenge that we face is, even though we’ve got a very solid submarine production base, it’s running close to flat-out right now. And there’s growing demand just from the US Navy for attack submarines than obviously our next generation of ballistic missile submarines.

Tom Mahnken:

So even for us, we’re looking at having to probably expand the skills base in some ways. But again, for Australia, starting from zero. Again, it’s not like the last of the Collins-class is just coming off the production line, and now you just roll over to something else.

Tom Mahnken:

No, there’s been a gap. And when you have a gap, hey, look … This is a lesson that on the surface ship side, the Australian government has learned. So, you currently have a continuous build for surface ships, but you don’t have a continuous build for subs. And some of those skills there are just very specialized.

Misha Zelinsky:

That makes sense, in a way. But what it doesn’t address is the fact that arguably, we need subs now. How worried should Australian policy makers be about 2021 today? Make the announcement for the geo-strategic reasons you touched on. We can dig into that in a sec.

Misha Zelinsky:

But this gap between ship in the water in 2038, Collins is going to have to be extended. What sort of problem does that represent for Australia’s defense policy?

Tom Mahnken:

Look, arguably, it’s, again, with political will and political imagination, arguably, the nuclear option can alleviate that window of vulnerability that was, again, that was going to occur because of the age-out of the Collins-class.

Tom Mahnken:

And the way you would alleviate that is through some arrangement. And I’ll just say the US version of that arrangement would be purchase or lease of some number of Virginia-class submarines. You could imagine a parallel conception, where it would involve purchase or lease of British attack submarines. But I’ll stick to what I know best, and I’ll talk about the Virginia-class.

Misha Zelinsky:

You wouldn’t be a patriot if you weren’t selling the US product.

Tom Mahnken:

Well, look, I also think that there’s, back to the industrial base, and back to the size of our submarine force, I think there are probably some in the US Navy who-

Misha Zelinsky:

Won’t love the idea?

Tom Mahnken:

… won’t like what I’m about to say. But, given the size of our submarine force and our procurement, I think there’s greater scope for a non-traditional approach like that, than there is, say, for the British sub force, which is just a much smaller force.

Misha Zelinsky:

Though, as I understand it, the Brits, they’re reaching the end of what they propose to build for themselves. So there is some attraction for them, in terms of capacity in the way you described.

Tom Mahnken:

But either way, I think a key element of this is getting hulls in the water sooner. Again, as you say, not waiting 18 years, or not having to wait 18 years. It’s also skills development, because Australian crews will have to get used to crewing a nuclear powered submarine. And that has challenges of its own.

Misha Zelinsky:

And they’re bigger, right? Even just by themself. So you need more people. But also, speaking of skills, as I understand it, essentially, the captain of a nuclear submarine is essentially a nuclear scientist or an engineer. Right?

Tom Mahnken:

Exactly.

Misha Zelinsky:

So they need to understand how the core works, and the engine works. Because, anything goes wrong, it can be catastrophic.

Tom Mahnken:

And not just the commanding officer, but really, the whole ward room and your senior enlisted folks are highly skilled, highly trained professionals. And the US Navy, the Royal Navy, have over decades, developed training, education pipelines, security apparatuses, to maintain the highest levels of safety and security and readiness, with their nuclear submarine forces.

Misha Zelinsky:

So how would you imagine then, could you foresee a situation where, say, we buy one off the shelf initially, whilst working out how to build them at home, or lease one, as you described. Can you imagine jointly crewing these, and learning alongside US or British sailors? Is that possible under these arrangements?

Tom Mahnken:

I think it borders on the mandatory, not just possible. I think that’s what needs to happen. Now again, that’s perhaps less of a stretch than many, most Australians, might imagine. In that there is a history of collaboration/cooperation between the US submarine force and the Australian submarine force.

Tom Mahnken:

And certainly, there are Commonwealth manning arrangements between the UK and Australia. In other words, there are decades of ties and relationships that take this from being just some pie in the sky idea, to something that is imminently practical.

Misha Zelinsky:

So, you talked about safety there; you talked about … A number of times, you’ve talked about this is a highly technical piece of equipment. So, one of the comments … so, “Fortunately, this has been, has bipartisan support in Australia.” The Labor party, as you know, I’m close to, and the Labor Party supporting it, which is good, on the proviso that we don’t have domestic nuclear energy production.

Misha Zelinsky:

Which, funnily enough, I actually think we should have. But I have a fringe position. I’ve also thought we should have nuclear subs sometimes. But nevertheless, that’s the position of the Labor Party leadership at this time.

Misha Zelinsky:

The Greens Party, who are sort of the far left party, have described nuclear submarines as floating Chernobyls … Maybe you can talk a little bit about the safety record of nuclear submarines. Because it’s actually very strong, as I understand it. But I’d be keen to hear from you on that.

Tom Mahnken:

Yeah, look, the safety record of American nuclear submarines or British nuclear submarines, of Western nuclear submarines … Let’s just take the Soviet Union out of it, is actually, yeah … is very strong. And that’s built on, there’s a technical dimension to that that has to do with reactor design. The reactors that the US Navy uses are quite safe.

Tom Mahnken:

It also has to do with education; it has to do with training. It has to do with personnel selection, a whole host of things. But yeah, the track record of not just the US Navy, but certainly including the US Navy on these matters, is really, really very strong.

Misha Zelinsky:

Good to hear. Certainly not floating Chernobyls, there.

Tom Mahnken:

No, not at all. Not at all.

Misha Zelinsky:

Noting the Soviet Union issue – which is perhaps a better analogy for the Greens Party, if they would like to pursue that, I’m thinking. But so, we’ve spoken a lot about the French. We need to really talk about the French reaction to this.

Misha Zelinsky:

Now, in my view, it’s a bit of a failure of diplomacy, certainly on the Australian side of things. I’ve maintained the people of Australia’s been breaking hearts on these submarine deals, broke the Japanese hearts with Abe. Now, with the French and Macron. I don’t think he can break …

Misha Zelinsky:

And this is not a commentary on the United States, United Kingdom. But I don’t think he can break a $90 billion marriage via text message. So when you’ve seen ambassadors being recalled, not from the United Kingdom but from the United States and Australia, I think you’ve kind of mishandled the diplomacy.

Misha Zelinsky:

How important do you think the French are to this overall architecture of democracy, getting together in this Biden White House’s view that we need to stitch democracies together as a counterweight to autocracies? Pretty negative outcome, do you think? You got a NATO ally really with his nose out of joint about what the three nations have done here.

Tom Mahnken:

And I think it’s a shame. Because I think France is a world power. France-

Misha Zelinsky:

And an Indo-Pacific power.

Tom Mahnken:

Yeah. I was about to say, France is an Indo-Pacific power, and realizes it, and acts like it. And certainly, Franco-Australian relations have been closening around Indo-Pacific issues. So I think it’s regrettable that the French government has reacted the way it has.

Tom Mahnken:

And whether there was action or inaction on the part of the United States, Australia, UK, that contributed to that, that would also be regrettable.

Tom Mahnken:

But I think that France is an important actor moving forward. But I would say, look, just in, as I alluded to earlier, just in the case of the submarine deal, again, it’s … It struck me at the time, and it’s struck me in the year since. It was a little bit of a forced fit.

Tom Mahnken:

And when it is a forced fit, again, I’ll take countries out of it. I always like to say that when you’re doing something new, when you’re building something new … whether it’s military hardware or something else, you pay for it. You pay for it in money; you pay for it in time. And what Australia and France agreed to do was something new, in ways that maybe were variously acknowledged or unacknowledged by both parties.

Tom Mahnken:

So, when costs ballooned and when schedules stretched out, one shouldn’t have been surprised. But that did leave the capability gap that you talked about a few minutes ago. And seems to me that you can’t wait forever. And particularly, if there is a better solution, and a path to a better solution that also is … can be a more near-term one.

Misha Zelinsky:

Yeah. I think any fair-minded analyst would say that it was always a complex decision that we entered into with Naval Group. The relationship, frankly, notwithstanding the way it’s blown up, so to speak, in the last fortnight … It was already in rocky territory.

Misha Zelinsky:

Morrison and Macron had had discussions about, had problems with it. Naval Group were not keeping up their end of the bargain, in terms of timetable, or engagement with domestic procurement in Australia there. And a lot of promises were made before entering into the agreement, which had not been followed up on.

Misha Zelinsky:

But how do you see … France is a key player globally, in the Indo-Pacific, key NATO player, key player in Europe. What can be done to repair that relationship, do you think? Is this a question of time, or are there things that could be done actively, to deepen them into … not just the ego piece, but what could be done on a practical way?

Tom Mahnken:

Well, look, I think … And again, far be it from me to tell the French government or French analysts what’s in France’s interest.

Misha Zelinsky:

I got it.

Tom Mahnken:

But I think, actually, if you step back and look at the vision of AUKUS, at least when it comes to … Or I’ll say particularly when it comes to the nuclear-powered submarines, what we’re talking about here is in France’s interest. And that is not just Australia getting into the nuclear submarine business, but the dimension that we haven’t talked about yet, which is keeping Great Britain in the nuclear submarine business. I think that’s a key part of it.

Misha Zelinsky:

Why is that important?

Tom Mahnken:

Well, I think it’s important to France in a NATO context, that the Royal Navy be as capable as possible. It’s also important, again, when you talk about nuclear submarines, you can go beyond the NATO context and the European context, or global context.

Tom Mahnken:

And France, as a democracy, with other advanced democracies, should want Great Britain, the Royal Navy, the Royal Australian Navy, the US Navy … to be as capable as they can be. So again, I think, step back, several deep breaths … That is hopefully the view that’ll emerge in Paris and elsewhere.

Misha Zelinsky:

I want to shift to the geopolitics of this. Last question I want to ask you is Collins. It’s had a bit of a bad rap over many years, though it’s, as I understand it, a pretty decent sub these days.

Tom Mahnken:

Absolutely.

Misha Zelinsky:

How capable is it going to be until we get our hands on some Virginia-class or Astute-class submarines, in the way that you described before? How problematic is it going to be relying on the Collins-class into the 2030s?

Tom Mahnken:

Look, as you noted, I think Collins has suffered from, in an unfair, longterm way, from teething pains that the boats had early on in their life. And again, that’s something that just happens. Again, particularly when it’s something new, you inevitably have problems. That gets bad press. You fix the problems; you get increased capability, but people remember the problems.

Tom Mahnken:

Look, the main problem with the boats is that they’re getting towards the end of their life. So, there’ll need to be some investments made in keeping them in fighting shape.

Tom Mahnken:

I think that the key judgment, and again, this is a judgment that the Australian government will have to make in this case and other cases … The case that US government has to make with a bunch of older platforms, is at what point are you just putting a disproportionate amount of money into upkeep. Because I think any weapon system’s life, you get to a certain point, it’s almost an asymptotic curve where you’re just spending more and more and more to maintain-

Misha Zelinsky:

Propulsion capability.

Tom Mahnken:

Exactly. And again, I would not presume to tell the Australian government what that point is. What I would say, again, back to the idea of leasing, purchase of submarines like the Virginia-class, is that it does offer some relief there.

Tom Mahnken:

It does offer some relief to transition crews off of Collins-class, and on to the next generation. And also, get those … alleviate those older boats from the operational burden, the deployment burden, while letting newer boats do that.

Misha Zelinsky:

I suppose the big question here is why now. Subtext to what you were saying, I think your term was not asked and not answered. Basically, in 2016, when we were looking at subs, I think had Malcolm Turnbull … was the Prime Minister at the time, picked up the phone, rung … It may have been late-stage Barack Obama, or early-stage Donald Trump presidency, and said, “Listen, mate. We’d like some of your submarine technology,” the answer would have been no. Fair to say?

Tom Mahnken:

Well, I think that’s a great question. I’d say the counterpart question is would any Australian prime minister around that period, have taken the political risk of doing so without knowing in advance … whether it was President Obama or President Trump on the other end of the phone, was going to say in advance.

Tom Mahnken:

I really do think it was the two things going together. And I do think, and this was the argument that I made for the better part of a decade, was … The argument that I made was frankly, that it was in the US interest to make it known to the Australian government that, should the Australian government ask this, that this option would be on the table.

Tom Mahnken:

Obviously, it’s a sovereign decision by Australia. But I think it would have made sense then, ultimately did make sense, to just put that option on the table. But short of that, again, you have this awkward dance between … even in an awkward dance even between very close allies, over, “Okay. Well, am I really going to lead with my chin on this one?” When the answer might be no, or might be, “We’ll study it.”

Tom Mahnken:

But I think that the … At the time, the US answer of “We’ll study it,” would be to turn it over to the bureaucracy. And I think the bureaucracy would have done what bureaucracies do. Bureaucracies, where good ideas go to die … so probably wouldn’t have survived contact with the bureaucracy.

Tom Mahnken:

But like I say, we’re in a position now, I think for good and bad reasons, generally speaking … where this now has become politically feasible.

Misha Zelinsky:

So, why is it then? What has changed in the geo-strategic environment, in the Indo-Pacific suddenly, that … why would Australia now decide, “Look, the diesel subs aren’t going to cut the mustard. We need to bite the bullet and go nuclear,” for the first time in history?

Tom Mahnken:

I don’t know. What could it be? I don’t know. Could be climate change; could be migration. Oh, it could be China, too. It could be China. And it could be increasing concern over a worsening military balance. And increasing concern, I would say both, about Australian defense. Again, neither, I think, you nor your listeners really need to have that rehearsed.

Tom Mahnken:

But you certainly have growing commitment in recent years by the Australian government, to national defense, which is a reflection of a worsening strategic environment. Concern over, I’d say, a looming period of danger. We don’t have, again, back to the … you don’t have 18 years and a lot of hope that the right thing will emerge just over time.

Tom Mahnken:

So, I think that certainly is a part of it. And I think, on the part of the United States, you have, I think, a very closely shared perception of that strategic environment. And also, a desire to do more and work more closely, particularly with our closest, most trusted allies.

Misha Zelinsky:

So, is this the start of a new Cold War? You got the Chinese Communist Party and its various mouthpieces, saying, “Oh, this is an outrageous provocation.” I would say it’s a response to the outward belligerence of the Chinese Communist Party and the construction in the South China Sea, militarized islands, and the false claiming of sovereignty there.

Misha Zelinsky:

Australia’s presently dealing with a number of billions of trade coercion as a result of domestic decisions around foreign interference, principally related to China’s Communist Party. Is it incumbent upon democracies to be more accommodative of this approach from the Chinese Communist Party? Or are they crying crocodile tears about this decision?

Tom Mahnken:

Look, I think you’re right to ask this question. I think we should all ask ourselves, what is it about Chinese behavior, truly concerns us. I think that’s a clarifying question. And as I try to answer that question, I really have four answers.

Tom Mahnken:

The first is, it is, in general, Chinese international behavior, and the pattern of Chinese international behavior. We care more about, and we’re more concerned about China today, because China is, and the Chinese Communist Party is, more active externally.

Tom Mahnken:

Second, and more specifically, its behavior in maritime Asia, maritime Asia-Pacific. That is what, I think, concerns Americans. I’d say it concerns Australians as well, more than, say, activity in other areas.

Tom Mahnken:

Third, it’s a Chinese Communist Party that has grown increasingly dissatisfied with the international status quo. And is more and more overt about wanting to change that status quo.

Tom Mahnken:

And then the first, the final, rather, point that, sometimes we don’t like to talk about it in polite company, is the fact that China is an authoritarian power.

Misha Zelinsky:

Totalitarian, I would probably just go further.

Tom Mahnken:

Absolutely. And so, that actually is … a friend and colleague of mine coined the phrase a number of years ago, so I’ll steal it now. But I would say, China wants to make the world safe for totalitarianism. If for no other reason, to help the Chinese Communist Party perpetuate itself.

Tom Mahnken:

Those are the things that have brought us to where we are today. I think the … calling it a Cold War II, capital C, capital W, probably Roman numeral two. That may be overblown. Is it a lower case C, lower case W cold war, or a peacetime competition, or great power competition? I think that’s a little bit more … maybe less evocative, but I think that’s more accurate.

Tom Mahnken:

And look, China’s been competing with us for decades now. I think we, the Western democracies, have been a little bit late to wake up to that. But we are awake to it. And that means we need to protect, defend those things that we care about. Because if we don’t, we could easily see them go away.

Misha Zelinsky:

Just to quickly unpack something you said there, I think that we always look to history to try to see patterns, as Mark Twain said, “History doesn’t repeat, but it rhymes.” But Cold War’s an imperfect analogy for many ways, but particularly because we’ve had very distinct and separate geographies and systems.

Misha Zelinsky:

What we have now is entwined economies, information systems enmeshed. And you’ve got competing political systems within that. And obviously, you’ve got a lot of asymmetry, too. That we remain relatively open, and China, Russia and others are completely closed, more or less. So, there’s no reciprocity.

Misha Zelinsky:

But how do you see that contest playing out? In these questions of systems competition, but also in that technological competition?

Tom Mahnken:

Yeah, look, I think you’ve stated it accurately. You mentioned the word reciprocity, and I should just pick up on that. Because I think it’s something that we haven’t thought enough about, and really should probably think more about.

Tom Mahnken:

And here’s where I will go back in history, to the capital C, capital W, Cold War. One of the things that the US and like-minded allies eventually adopted during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, was a policy of reciprocity. As a matter of fact, my godmother actually worked in the State Department office that sort of enforced reciprocity.

Tom Mahnken:

And I think it’s the type of idea whose time may have come again. Look, if the Chinese Communist Party is really serious about being treated as an equal, then I think we should take them at their word, and we should treat them on the basis of strict reciprocity.

Tom Mahnken:

Any access that they gain to our economies should be predicated on access that we have to theirs. Their access to our information sphere, our public, our population, should be predicated on equal access.

Tom Mahnken:

In the Cold War, it was, again, the diplomats had it down to a fine art. Which was, “All right. Well, what did American diplomats in Moscow get to do and not do? Okay, well, Soviet diplomats in the United States, you get treated the same exact way.” I think if we were to think about that, our relationship in that way, it might lead us down some very interesting paths.

Misha Zelinsky:

One thing I’m keen, just to follow along the conversation there … One of the things a lot of people talk about in all these areas we’ve discussed, is the competition piece. But then the inevitability. What China and the Chinese Communist Party like to project is linear inevitability, therefore, don’t bother.

Misha Zelinsky:

So, we see a lot of this sort of discourse in Australia. United States is in decline. The Chinese Communist Party and China are the inevitable new superpower that will eclipse everyone on any sort of linear projection.

Misha Zelinsky:

And therefore, how can you aim to compete? Don’t try. Try to live with the angry dragon, rather than antagonizing them. How do you see that narrative and that challenge, in a policy context, as well as a … I guess, a systems competition context?

Tom Mahnken:

Yeah. I’d respond in two ways. One is, just because we’re talking about competing with China, there’s no inevitability as to where that competition will go. If we go back and look at competitions between great powers historically, some of them have led to war. The Anglo-German competition bred two world wars.

Tom Mahnken:

Other times, competition actually leads to a satisfactory settlement to all concerned. The competition that I think many Americans forget about, or don’t like to think about, is the Anglo-American competition that went up until the beginning of the 20th century. We don’t think about it, by and large, because it was resolved amicably.

Tom Mahnken:

Now, I would just say parenthetically, maybe one of the reasons it was resolved that way was because ultimately, it was a competition between democracies. So, just hold that thought. But then again, if we go back to the big Cold War, the US-Soviet competition, that was sort of a middle case. It didn’t lead to war. It didn’t lead to war, thank God, between the United States and Soviet Union.

Tom Mahnken:

It ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. But it was sort of a middle case. So, I would caution against inevitability in that sense. Just because we’re talking about competition now, doesn’t mean we are destined for war, to quote Graham Allison’s book.

Tom Mahnken:

Now, but if we now just think about the United States and the Western allies versus China, I don’t think that there’s inevitability about China’s future trajectory, either. And again, here I’ll revert to history.

Tom Mahnken:

Look, from the perspective of the second half of the 1970s, early 1980s, it looked to many, to most in the West, that the Soviets were strong; they were powerful. Their gains just kept mounting. When in fact, there were some very deep weaknesses and systemic weaknesses of the Soviet system that were laid bare at the end of the decade. But those weak, systemic, catastrophic weaknesses of the Soviet Union were all but invisible to many, to most observers, including to specialists.

Tom Mahnken:

So, lesson one, shame on them. Should have done a better job. But lesson two, things can change fairly rapidly, and they can change particularly rapidly in the face of strategic pressure. And that’s part of what the United States, its allies, did in … beginning in the late 1970s and into the 1980s. So, I reject wholeheartedly the idea that any of this is inevitable.

Misha Zelinsky:

One final technical question about this rivalry, going back to where we began, around subs, productions, navies. A lot of people, again, around this linear projection piece, say, “China has the world’s biggest navy now. It’s eclipsed the United States as a maritime power. And then if you look at production rates, China is putting a new sub into the water, one every year. Which is a pretty quick rate. And we, the royal we, the West behind. And therefore, we’re well behind in this contest.”

Misha Zelinsky:

You’ve talked about some of the shortages that we’re seeing in the United States. So then, how do you see that? Is that an alarmist take? Is that an accurate take? Is that a ill-informed take?

Tom Mahnken:

Look, I think at the heart of it, at the very root of it, China is a continental power. China is a continental power, whose circumstances have permitted it to go to sea. And I mean its political circumstances, the fact that China’s continental borders have been largely peaceful.

Tom Mahnken:

And her economic circumstances, Chinese prosperity, have conspired to allow, to permit, to give China the luxury of expanding her navy and also, you could say, air forces.

Tom Mahnken:

But look, for the United States, and certainly for Great Britain, we’re maritime powers. It’s not elective. So, I think American superiority at sea is not willed by God. It is the product of men. But it is built on decades and decades of experience.

Tom Mahnken:

Whereas, I think the Chinese are … sure, they’ve been making some real gains, but from a pretty low starting point. They see the benefits; they see the attractiveness of sea power. Whether they can ever really get there, I think is an open question. Because again, historically, I would say China’s but the most recent in a series of continental powers that have sought to become sea powers.

Tom Mahnken:

Whether it’s 18th, 19th century France, 19th, early 20th century Germany, Soviet Union … And at least in those cases, ended badly for the continental power that aspired to be a sea power. It doesn’t mean that it’s destined to repeat this cycle. But I would be a little … It’s not a recipe for ignoring what the Chinese are doing.

Tom Mahnken:

But it should be a recipe for us to be more confident in our deep strengths. And to do more to exploit those deep strengths. And again, to take us full circle to AUKUS, that’s why I think that this is actually so important, so compelling, and so potentially consequential.

Tom Mahnken:

I say potentially, just because obviously, it depends on what governments do from here on out to make it real. But potentially, a very consequential development.

Misha Zelinsky:

You’ve touched on AUKUS, which is … I always note how bad my segues are, into this final question after a lot of heavy discussion of naval sea powers, continental powers, nuclear propulsion technology. Now we’re going to get into the real business with you, Tom, about … You are a foreign guest on my show.

Misha Zelinsky:

So, as a foreign guest, you are obliged … I’m sorry. You’ve got to bring three Australians to a barbecue. Hopefully, they’re not too obnoxious. But, who are they, and why, in the spirit of AUKUS?

Tom Mahnken:

In the spirit of AUKUS. Well-

Misha Zelinsky:

No Brits, though.

Tom Mahnken:

Yeah, no. Okay, right. Yeah. Because they wouldn’t know what to do. Well, you have to give me a little bit of latitude. Actually, the first would be John Howard.

Misha Zelinsky:

Right.

Tom Mahnken:

I presume I have to give you a reason why, right?

Misha Zelinsky:

Well, [crosstalk 00:51:28].

Tom Mahnken:

Because the last time I gave it because-

Misha Zelinsky:

Ok

Tom Mahnken:

… look, I would say Howard because he’s a compelling political figure. And because he was a close friend to the United States at a time when we needed close friends.

Misha Zelinsky:

He’s the only Australian prime minister to have ever enacted the protections under ANZUS.

Tom Mahnken:

He’s an easy one. The second one is Peter Garrett.

Misha Zelinsky:

Right.

Tom Mahnken:

And that’s because I’d like to see him at a barbecue with John Howard.

Misha Zelinsky:

Well, they were in Parliament together for a period.

Tom Mahnken:

And maybe we’d need some entertainment. So, [crosstalk 00:52:07]-

Misha Zelinsky:

That would be … you might need to break up with some Midnight Oil music. Because I’m not sure they’d have a great deal in common, mate.

Tom Mahnken:

That’s the second one. The third one would be actually the late professor Coral Bell, who I think wrote just so insightfully about international politics and the Indo-Pacific. So, I would have to rely on a little bit of magic to bring her back for the barbecue. But she’d be a fitting companion for a good deep discussion of trilateral collaboration and the Indo-Pacific.

Misha Zelinsky:

Well, hopefully, she’s got good diplomacy skills to break up Howard and Garrett. But that’s a fantastic way to end the conversation. So, Tom, thanks so much for coming on the show. It’s been an absolute pleasure.

Tom Mahnken:

My pleasure.